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Introduction
Today Ukraine is seen by many as one of the least stable and pre-
dictable neighbours of the European Union. Possible scenarios for 
Ukraine’s further development as a country are very diverse – from 
the collapse as such, as described by Huntington (1993) in his nar-
rative on the so-called “torn countries” to rather optimistic proph-
ecies on rapid growth, similar to the South-East Asian “tigers” 
Taiwan and Singapore, which are known for their significant and 
rapid economic achievements, leapfrogging from being agrarian 
and highly corrupted neofeudal countries to high-tech and post-
industrial economies, living now happily under free market.
Even though there have been indeed several episodes of quality 
economic growth in the contemporary history of Ukraine, a lot 
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of time and resources since Ukraine’s independence back in 1991 
have been wasted. Instead of following exactly, step by step, the 
already developed reforms programme, Ukraine’s political elite 
was often balancing between populism and primitive egoism, and 
this has lead to the creation of a rather hybrid national economic 
model. This model is now being overloaded by an enormously 
huge and at the same time low-efficient officialdom, millions 
of public servants and the same millions of public benefit hold-
ers, while public servants at all levels are mostly devouring their 
shadow rents. Meanwhile, the political system in the country is 
more of a fragile and immature, not a fully functioning democracy.
New hopes and opportunities suddenly showed up in Ukraine 
in late 2013–early 2014, being the natural consequences of the 
political and socioeconomic crisis in the country. Speaking gen-
erally, early signs and preconditions for this wide social split in 
which Ukrainian society found itself at the very end of 2013 had 
been formed over many years. This split reached its peak in the 
situation of vital strategic choice for the country between exter-
nal political vectors  – European or Eurasian. This geopolitical 
dichotomy quickly became just another double game for Ukrain-
ian politicians, and this double game had lingered for decades. It 
is noteworthy, however, that this state of the political elites man-
aged to find its nourishing sources in the ambivalence of the mass 
consciousness of the Ukrainians. This ambivalence somehow 
combines features of paternalism and nostalgic feelings towards 
the “Soviet easy life” with its guaranteed employment, totally free 
healthcare and education on one side, with rather idealized (if not 
to say utopic) ideas about “flourishing Western democracies” on 
the other.
The Revolution of Dignity and further political developments 
in Ukraine made it quite clear that there is no place of geopolitical 
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imitations anymore, and all further development of the country 
will depend not on diplomacy and oratory, but on real steps and 
changes.
At all previous stages of Ukraine’s development, migration 
flows of population were always the key indicator, the litmus test 
for internal policies of frequently changing governments.
At the beginning of the 1990s, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
citizens of Ukraine got the opportunity for free movement, and 
not only within the socialistic camp. Since those times, the migra-
tion of Ukrainians has been always synchronized with the trends 
of country’s socioeconomic development: periods of stabiliza-
tion and growth always demonstrated positive migration balance, 
while periods of economic slowdown and/or political instabil-
ity were always accompanied by growing external migration. In 
Ukraine, external migration is not a situational phenomenon, but 
a historical and traditional one: Ukrainian diaspora in the world 
totals several dozens of millions, among which there is quite a 
large number of those keeping constant contact with Ukraine, 
thus forming a sort of social network welcoming newcomers in 
host countries.
It is important to differentiate between stationary labour 
migration and other types of migration by their aims and forms. 
At the same time these differences are rather abstract, in real life 
and empirical research they will not be always that obvious. To 
the best of our knowledge, the share of Ukrainian citizens who 
leave the country and renounce citizenship at once is miniscule. 
Double citizenship is illegal in Ukraine, still, many migrants 
keep passports and citizenship even after naturalization in a 
host country. Therefore, in real sociological practice it would be 
extremely hard to measure the volume of stationary migration 
as such.
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Absolute majority of external migrants belong to the economi-
cally active population. They perform paid labour in host coun-
tries and often send money back home; hypothetically, they can 
also return to Ukraine anytime. Thus, even artificial and not-
always-accurate division by migration types would simplify the 
research procedures.
During spring and summer 2016, more and more frequent news 
concerning the liberalization of visa regime between Ukraine and 
the EU became the first sign implying that maybe the hard times 
of this EU’s “uneasy neighbour” are over. However, Ukraine’s way 
to a visa-free regime, with all of its legislation and institutional 
and economic changes, has not always been perfect. The military 
conflict on the East is still ongoing; April’s Holland referendum 
result was not favourable for Ukraine; in addition to that, a range 
of corruption-related scandals and yet another Cabinet rotation 
delayed the formal decision on visas.
At the same time, the Association Agreement between Ukraine 
and the European Union has already formed an institutional and 
political framework for further gradual integration. The external 
economic activity of the country was among the first to feel the 
changes: EU-Ukraine export-import relations are moving fast, 
while sales turnover with Russia has decreased dramatically.
Significant changes took place in the mass consciousness as 
well. In the last two years, the ideas of joining the EU and NATO 
got thousands of new fans. And now Ukraine, in its public dis-
cussions, just like any other European country, has two camps – 
Eurooptimists and Eurosceptics. The Eurooptimists perceive 
visa regime liberalization as a good sign of the country’s “home-
coming”. Eurosceptics, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the 
rather symbolic meaning of it, deprived of any real life value, since 
visa liberalization as such does not guarantee more employment 
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opportunities and/or a longer stay in the EU. Additionally, con-
sidering the scale of the recent hryvnya devaluation, for the vast 
majority of the Ukrainians, European tourism is just a dream.
At the same time, visa liberalization gave rise to a range of new 
fears related to the EU migration risks. Today especially this issue 
is becoming more and more sensitive, considering the almost 
uncontrolled mass migration from the Middle East, and also the 
fact that starting from 2014 Ukrainians also started to apply for 
the refugee status much more frequently. The (half-)open doors 
to Europe led researchers to pose the following general questions: 
What is that combination of factors which force Ukrainians to 
migrate? Which of these factors are decisive, final ones? What is 
the hierarchy of these factors, and does this hierarchy change over 
time? Which social groups are the most inclined to make a migra-
tion decision? How do potential migrants imagine Europe to be? 
What do they expect from hosting societies? With what life goals 
are they coming to the European Union and what are they look-
ing for there?
The subject matter of external migration in Ukraine is rather 
well developed in research (historic, demographic and statistical, 
economic and sociological), mostly due to the significant impact 
and volumes of this phenomenon in the country. Ukraine is a his-
toric donor of migration flows, and the related corpus of studies 
has been formed since the middle of the twentieth century when 
the third wave of Ukrainian migration was about to slow down. 
Aside from Ukrainian authors  – who for obvious reasons have 
always had an interest in this subject matter  – foreign authors, 
first of all from Central Europe and Poland in particular, have 
joined these academic debates.
In general, scientific discourse on external migration from Ukraine 
have several distinctive features as follows: 1) ethnocentrism, the 
xii Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
studies consider specifically external migration from Ukraine as 
migration of ethnical Ukrainians, disregarding ethnical minori-
ties and providing no cross-national context as such; 2) discipli-
nary narrowness, external migration of the Ukrainians has been 
hardly ever studied in the interdisciplinary context; 3) alarmism 
and negativism in the descriptions of external migration, pri-
ority is always given to problems not prospects related to the 
phenomenon.
All of this has shaped the corresponding academic paradigm 
of migration studies on Ukraine. Naturally, such specific features 
did not contribute to adequate assessment and understanding of 
external migration from Ukraine. However, as it was well noted 
by Kuhn in his “Structure of scientific revolutions” (1962), the 
growth of scientific knowledge is happening as a result of strug-
gle between competing scientific theories and paradigms, while 
revisionism is one of the most widely spread model of scientific 
activity.
These days we can observe the gradual change of the external 
migration research paradigm in Ukraine. This change has become 
possible due to many researchers, among which the international 
project EUMAGINE has its prominent role. This project from the 
very initial stage has been implemented as cross-national aiming 
at well grounded description of migration intentions, perceptions 
and practices in the societies which are traditional donors of 
migration flows to the EU Member States. Covering both socio-
cultural and economic aspects, this project provides an opportu-
nity to abandon the so-called methodological nationalism and to 
form the most advanced corpus of comparative knowledge on the 
factors behind migration to the EU (Bilan, 2015).
In the theoretical and methodological sense this research is a 
good example of wide interdisciplinary integration. The empirical 
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material was gathered using quantitative and qualitative sociolog-
ical methods, while the data obtained was interpreted using such 
culturological and economic concepts as: imagined geography, 
informal economy, institutional efficiency, private transfers etc.
Finally, the Ukrainian part of this project has managed to prove 
that negativist and alarmist approaches to external migration 
phenomenon are outdated and not adequate to realia1: at the lev-
els of both mass and expert discourses, external migration is more 
and more often perceived as a potential life success strategy. And 
the very phenomenon of migration in Ukraine today is becom-
ing more circular and highly dynamic, disruption of families and 
social contacts is observed less frequently. Moreover, one of sud-
den discoveries for both politicians and researchers became the 
fact that a large share of external migrants do not end up as mis-
erable hunters for low-paid jobs or social allowance  – many of 
them are successful innovators and agents of economic, cultural 
or even political change, both in hosting countries and at home.
The EUMAGINE project also turned out to be fruitful when 
it comes to a number of the related publications, which are still 
growing. The Ukrainian part of the project is covered, inter alia, 
by the following authors: В. Vollmer, F. Duvell, Y. Borshchevska, І. 
Lapshyna, S. Vdovtsova, among others. Namely, F. Duvell (2014) 
has been concentrating on the phenomenon of highly paid profes-
sionals’ migration and the correlation between this phenomenon 
and the socioeconomic development of sending countries. Duvell 
emphasizes that the very idea of “brain drain” is already outdated 
since it does not take into account that today’s migration processes 
 1 This vision is also supported by Prof. Ella Libanova, who also mentions 
that“there are absolutely no grounds to conclude that families of migrants 
risk poverty more than other, risk to be social excluded” (Libanova, 2011, 
p. 24). 
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tend to be more seasonal, circular and temporary. Therefore, aca-
demic discourse on brain drain develops into the new concepts 
of “brain circulation” and “brain gain” as advantages and achieve-
ments which a sending country may get as a result. However, as it is 
well noted by the same author, in public, media and academic dis-
course, negativism in relation to external migration from Ukraine 
still does not cease to be dominating.
B. Vollmer, in his monograph “Ukrainian Migration and the 
European Union – Dynamics, Subjectivity, and Politics” (2016), 
somehow goes beyond traditional academic discourse borders, 
and along with the analysis of external migration from Ukraine 
in its historic perspective, structural determinants of external 
migration at the current stage, perceived corruption as being the 
central push factor, he also suggests a wide range of methodologi-
cal and sociocultural reflections concerning subjectivity of migra-
tion decision – meaning the level of independence in the decision 
to leave and the ability to implement this decision.
In spite of the variety in theoretical and methodological 
approaches applied, methods and tools, and disciplinary polyph-
ony as such, there are still certain gaps in scientific knowledge 
on external migration from Ukraine. First of all, such a gap is 
observed due to the total absence of integrative interdisciplinary 
studies which would use the potential of sciences’ orchestra to its 
fullest in order to form the complete understanding of external 
migration as a truly multiaspect phenomenon.
The study presented here is actually an attempt to fill in this gap 
by means of combining sociological, econometric and statistical 
analyses. The study also covers rather understudied aspects of the 
external migration phenomenon: the dynamics of mass, expert 
and public media discourses concerning external migration; the 
role of post-imperial cultural dependences in the formation of 
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migration intentions and geographical perceptions of Ukrainian 
citizens; the role of religion and confession in external migration 
processes; the roles of political instability, corruption and con-
flict on the East of the country stimulating migration intentions; 
mathematical modelling of the system of both micro- and mac-
roeconomic, institutional and sociocultural factors of external 
migration since the beginning of the fourth wave through today.
Theoretical grounds
Back in the 1970s, one of the leading social notionalists of today, 
R. Inglehart, introduced the notion of progressing postmateriali-
zation into scientific use and circulation, implying the value shift 
which had taken place after the World War II in many countries, 
first of all, in those which are called developed now. This value 
shift made these countries move from industrial development to 
the postindustrial stage in their development (Inglehart, 1977). 
Since then the dynamics of economic, political and sociocultural 
processes has increased dramatically. Global information space, 
mass culture, highly developed communications and transport 
infrastructure has turned our world into a “global village”, as well 
noted by McLuhan (1962). Postmateralization of values, easing of 
national borders and strengthening sociocultural integration in 
today’s world, on one hand, lead to certain changes in motivation 
behind human behaviour. On the other hand, they also require 
a brand-new scientific optics to be applied. The once-popular 
model of homo economicus is now being treated as limited, if not 
to say archaic. It treats humans as consumers in a supermarket 
who are driven by rational choice, and today in all fields (eco-
nomic, cultural or political) such an explanation would not be 
valid anymore. The same is observed for many other classical 
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concepts and notions. In sociology these would be social roles, 
group affiliations and identity. Liquid modernity, as termed by Z. 
Bauman, makes social structures, values, norms and the whole 
system of interpersonal communication also liquid, changing all 
the time. Besides, sociological only approaches to the analysis of 
external migration factors would require shifting some attention 
to the institutional dimension as well. In this context, attention 
would be paid to the actions of governments and political elites, 
forming migration regimes, signing international agreements, 
setting barriers or providing opportunities for external migration. 
Other subjects bearing the “right for nomination”, as stated by P. 
Bourdieu, deserve similar attention – in particular, those who set 
the agenda, describing external migration as the good and the 
bad, presenting it as a problem, a threat, or on the opposite – as a 
potentially positive life strategy.
Understanding traditional subject matters of economic science, 
like the factors of migration, require today the integrated scientific 
methods since only their integration would enable covering all 
aspects and levels of this complex phenomenon. One of such inte-
grative method is neoinstitutionalism which combines the insti-
tutional organizational dimension with its own political, legal and 
economic logic of functioning with the dimension of mass, group 
and individual consciousness predetermined by various psycho-
logical, social and cultural factors. From the neoinstitutionalism 
grounds, external migration can be interpreted as a comparatively 
autonomous fragment of social space, with its rather stable struc-
tures of perception and action, which are revealed through insti-
tutionalized or informal rules: starting from migration regimes 
which are set according to international agreements, specific rules 
of employment centres, registration offices, customs etc. and end-
ing with informal perception structures and actions, which are 
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then rooted in individual, group and mass consciousness through 
social and moral norms, traditions and codes of conduct, patterns 
of social networks formation and functioning, social discourse, 
and specifically, imagined geography.
The structure of the book
The first chapter, titled “Material and Non-material Factors of 
External Labour Migration in Their Theoretical Aspect”, analyzes 
the scientific discourse on external migration according to the 
classical, neoclassical and structural theories. It emphasizes that till 
now most research on external migration from Ukraine is rather 
one-sided, carried out within rather tight frames of economics, 
or demography, or sociology, while system analysis of this phe-
nomenon is still missing. Secondly, most of these research works 
are essentially ethnocentric; that is, they consider the experience 
of Ukrainian migrants only, without any comparison with other 
donor countries in terms of influence factors. The prospects of the 
use of a neoinstitutional approach as applied to external migration 
are considered in its combination with sociological elements.
The second chapter, “Factors of External Labour Migration of 
the Ukrainians in History and Today”, considers the peculiari-
ties of external migration from Ukraine in its three waves: 1) the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century till the beginning of World 
War I; 2) in between the two world wars; 3) after World War II. 
Using the methodology described above and a large corpus of 
sources in this chapter we try to reconstruct institutional, socioec-
onomic and discursive factors forcing the Ukrainians to migrate.
Concerning the contemporary, fourth wave of external labour 
migration from Ukraine, the socioeconomic dynamics of the 
development of Ukrainian society is analyzed for the period of 
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the country’s independence. These dynamics are considered in 
correlation with the external migration dynamics. Within the 
fourth wave of external migration from Ukraine, we can already 
track down two distinctive periods which differ from each other 
by both socioeconomic and discursive factors forcing emigration. 
In the 1990s the typical combination of push factors included: 
economic crisis, growing unemployment and inflation, currency 
depreciation and, on the other side, high social anxiety, demor-
alization and social pessimism. At this stage the key motivation 
factors for external migration were rather tangible, and they 
mostly concern “getting by” as such. From the beginning of the 
new century to the explosion of the global financial crisis, socio-
economic and discursive factors were already radically different: 
in this period of time Ukraine was demonstrating rather good 
growth indicators, the welfare level was objectively going up, and 
Ukranian citizens’ subjective perception of life was also improv-
ing. Therefore, at this stage along with material motivation for 
external migration there was also mixed motivation, with some 
postmaterial values included. While the first period can be called 
the “escape from misery”, the second one was already “searching 
for better life”, in which this search for higher life quality was seen, 
for example, through starting one’s own business.
The third chapter, “Empirical Research on the Factors of Exter-
nal Labour Migration from Ukraine at the Current Stage”, ana-
lyzes the current sociological research on the factors behind 
labour migration from Ukraine. It considers in detail the theo-
retical and methodological grounds of the EUMAGINE project, 
its design, both its quantitative and qualitative sociological data 
on the discursive factors behind external migration in the mass 
consciousness of the population in four macroregions of Ukraine, 
as well as the migration intentions and migration experience of 
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the Ukrainians in the context of other donor countries for exter-
nal migration to European countries.
It is demonstrated that in Ukrainian respondents’ perception 
of their own country and of the countries for potential migra-
tion, we can clearly observe the negative stereotyping of Ukrain-
ians’ own country and the positive stereotyping of Europe. In 
their view, Ukraine’s scores on institutional efficiency and social 
infrastructure are very low, while education and healthcare in 
European countries are evaluated as affordable and of good qual-
ity. The Ukrainians tend to negatively evaluate and do not trust 
Ukrainian politicians, while their European colleagues are highly 
evaluated. One of the most painful problems the respondents see 
in Ukraine is corruption; however, they reject their own personal 
experience with it. They rate the level of corruption in the imag-
ined countries of Europe as low, or “close to zero”.
In the context of positive stereotyping of Europe, regional 
features are very important. People from Western and Central 
Ukraine tend to have more of positive stereotyping about Euro-
pean countries than those living on the opposite side of the coun-
try, very far from the EU border. The general ideas about Europe 
are very much idealized. In Ukrainian minds Europe exists as 
a discursive structure, as an image of an ideal society, and this 
image is built by the principle of mirror reflection: what is so bad 
and inefficient at home simply must be perfect in Europe. And as 
our quantitative research shows, there is a significant correlation 
between such ideas about Europe and migration intentions. This 
discursive structure becomes one of the important pull factors.
Peculiarities of media discourse are also considered in this 
chapter. Significant differences are observed between public 
authorities, experts and mass media discourse. First of all, these 
discourses differ by topics: mass discourse on external migration 
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has strong resemblance with tabloids, with all these dramatic life 
stories, scandals etc. Mass media discourse is concentrated on the 
problems from external migration. At the same, all three stud-
ied discourses demonstrate the general decrease in the emphasis 
on problems of external migration from Ukraine. Once-popular 
topics of human trafficking and sexual exploitation are off stage 
today. The same concerns the illegal emigration of the Ukrainians.
The subchapter on mathematical modelling of the external 
migration factors demonstrates that during the fourth wave, the 
system of migration factors is changing. These changes are natu-
rally determined by the corresponding socioeconomic, sociocul-
tural and institutional changes in Ukraine itself during the period 
in question. By means of regression analysis two models are built 
to describe the importance of certain external migration factors 
at two stages of the post-Soviet development of Ukraine (1991–
2002, the stage of deep crisis; and 2003–2013, the stage of stabi-
lization and relative welfare). At the first stage, important factors 
were related to the labour market and employment, since this was 
the period of long-term delays with salary payments and over-
all the period of the lowest life quality in Ukraine. At the second 
stage the key factors behind external migration became the index 
of poverty and several institutional factors related to efficient gov-
erning, people’s impact on political and administrative changes, 
overcoming corruption. The picture of the population’s demands 
and visions then became more complex. This change can be called 
the shift from materialistic factors in external migration to mixed 
ones (materialistic but also post-materialistic).
In the fourth chapter, “System Analysis of External Labour 
Migration of Ukrainian Population at the Fourth Stage”, the sys-
tem of external migration factors is constructed on the basis of 
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regression analysis. It concerns macro- and microeconomic fac-
tors (just like in many other studies) but also institutional and 
sociocultural factors. The dynamics of migration factors is ana-
lyzed for two periods  – 1992–2002 and 2003–2013. Significant 
differences in factors for these two periods are determined. Dur-
ing the first period the key factors behind external migration 
were related to the peculiarities of the labour market and employ-
ment, while during the second period of the fourth wave external 
migration was determined by a mix of economic (materialistic) 
and institutional (post-materialistic) factors.
Therefore, the aim of this monograph is to present its readers 
with a wide-scale interdisciplinary study on the factors of exter-
nal migration from Ukraine in its historic retrospective and at 
the current stage, as well as to model the system of factors related 
to migration behaviour of the Ukrainians, taking into account 
the wide range of socioeconomic, sociocultural and institutional 
dimensions with a special emphasis on the European vector of 
external migration from Ukraine.

CHAPTER 1
Material and Non-material Factors of 
External Labour Migration in Their 
Theoretical Aspect
1.1 Classical, neoclassical and structural theories 
of external labour migration and their bottlenecks
Migration is inseparable from any human community function-
ing and it accompanies humanity throughout its history, mutating 
all the time and becoming either a marginal factor, or the decisive 
factor of social development. Migration as such is a complex soci-
oeconomic and culturally predetermined phenomenon, which is 
rather unpredictable and ambiguous in its consequences, since a 
range of various factors is affecting it at the same time.
These days research on migratory processes is getting more and 
more important due to intensification of social interactions which 
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now often disregard national borders and are becoming global. 
The same applies to the research too, globalizing the research 
provides new opportunities to use different statistical and soci-
ological approaches and data and makes it possible to perform 
comparative analysis in new dimensions. Thus, today in many 
humanities and economic disciplines new, more specialized sub-
disciplines arise to study cross-border migration. A good example 
is limology (from the Latin “limes” – border, limit). Such inter-
disciplinary synthesis is very much determined by the interest of 
public and political circles in thorough studies of migration pro-
cesses and the possibilities for their further forecasting.
The most topical trends of today’s global development create 
preconditions for academic revision of international migration. 
These include, inter alia: the dismantling of the global bipolar 
system, the consequences of which are still influencing many 
countries; gradual formation of the global labour market, which 
partially eases migration regimes in many countries; constant 
attempts to find a reasonable balance between migration policy 
and national policy, which is a rather sensitive problem for both 
sending and hosting countries.
In the historic perspective, countries have been demonstrating 
rather diverse approaches to regulation of migration processes. 
Some approaches are restrictive, when migration is seen as a 
threat to local labour market or even to state security. In such a 
case public authorities try to control, limit or even stop migra-
tion as such. In more open models of migration policy, authori-
ties encourage and stimulate external migration. In each specific 
case migration should be considered, applying a wide range of 
research disciplines and constructing integrated methodologi-
cal approaches. From the standing point of public authorities, 
the focus must be on regulation of migration flows, and then on 
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integration and adaptation of migration communities, on inter-
action between migrants and hosting societies and the growing 
role of sociocultural factors in international migration. All of this 
clearly demonstrates the need for a brand-new vision and new 
public policy created and supported by experts in the field who 
can assess and forecast both opportunities and threats from exter-
nal migration.
Before we turn to the specifics of academic discourse on exter-
nal migration, we need to settle on the key notions used in our 
study. From the statistical viewpoint, a migrant is a person chang-
ing his/her place of residence due to relocation to a different 
country. According to the recommendation of the UN Statistical 
Commission (1998), a migrant is “anybody who is changing the 
country of usual residence”. The research object in this study is 
external migration, which we understand as voluntary or forced, 
repeated or one time, legal or illegal crossing of a border of a sov-
ereign (at least formally speaking) political unit; and this crossing 
becomes the precondition for the following interrelated processes 
of economic and sociocultural nature. In this study specifically we 
are interested in labour migration; however, we are not trying to 
narrow down this term. Migration is a complex and multiaspect 
phenomenon, and we do not want to narrow it to the only dimen-
sion of human functioning. A migrant’s key intention may be get-
ting a university education or getting married abroad, but at the 
same time he/she is performing paid or unpaid work in a host 
country, regularly or from time to time. In the case of repeated 
migration the key goal of such travel may also change.
External migration is a study object for many sciences, like sta-
tistics, geography, demography, law, sociology etc. However, the 
largest corpus of studies on migration obviously belongs to eco-
nomics. The central notions used in economics to study migration 
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are: demand and proposition at labour markets of donor and host-
ing countries; workforce flows; professional and qualificational 
structure of the workforce.
The contribution of economics in migration studies would be 
hard to underestimate; however, it also has its limitations. Eco-
nomic analyses of migration focus mostly on voluntary labour 
migration with a range of specific, purely economic factors. Many 
other factors are left ignored, namely, forced migration, migra-
tion determined by cultural and/or social factors, migration 
intentions and planning, specifics of migrants’ adaptation to a 
new sociocultural environment, non-economic consequences of 
migration (including changed social status, shift in values, change 
in behavioral patterns etc.). Let us consider the key stages in aca-
demic discourse on external migration in its historic perspective.
The origins of external migration studies can be traced down to 
the eighteenth century and Adam Smith. Being a liberal thinker, 
Smith formulated the so-called mercantilist approach to external 
migration (Engl. “merchant” – trader), according to which unre-
strained international movement of the workforce promotes eco-
nomic growth and reduces poverty. The priority in this context 
is given to attracting foreigners with specific qualifications and 
limitations on emigration of own citizens.
In the second half of the nineteenth century the classical the-
ory of migration was formed. Its origins are connected with the 
name of E. G. Ravenstein, who introduced the “laws of migration” 
and explained how migration determinants are divided into pull 
and push factors. After him, such authors as E. Lee, S. Eberg and 
W. A. Lewis studied the functions of external migration for both 
sending and hosting societies. Particular attention was placed on 
how external migration is balancing labour markets in both send-
ing and hosting countries. Any economy, despite the level of the 
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country’s economic developments, has its subsistence sector and 
capitalist sector. The former is the traditional source of labour 
resources for the latter which is usually much more profitable. 
Opponents of the classical approach found its weak points in the 
overestimation of the role of homo economicus, while ignoring 
the non-economic factors of migration behaviour and the dys-
functions which may potentially be caused by external migration.
Criticism of the classical approach in external migration studies 
has logically led to the formation of neoclassical approach, which 
dates back to the end of the twentieth century and is associated 
with the names of D. S. Massey, A. Palloni, J. Durand etc. Accord-
ing to the neoclassical approach, migration is based on individual 
calculations of benefits and losses. During such calculations an 
individual takes into account the opportunity to get a new work-
ing place, and in the case of illegal emigration, chances to avoid 
deportation. Also, attention is paid to such factors as cost of travel, 
savings to be spent while looking for a new job, stress related to 
cultural changes, loss of well-established social contacts etc. Lit-
erature has demonstrated a wide range of criticism of neoclas-
sical macro- and microapproaches. This criticism concerns both 
methodological grounds of the neoclassical approach as such, 
and also its local aspects. Most of this criticism is turned against 
the central idea behind both classical and neoclassical theories: 
migration as a mechanism of balancing and positive changes. At 
that, critics turn to the dysfunctional consequences of external 
migration, including primarily brain drain (Boucher et al., 2005).
This brain drain is caused by a range of objective reasons. 
As noted by B. Jałowiecki, J. Hryniewicz, A. Mync, motives for 
brain drain obviously come from the difference between the 
potentials of the more developed countries and those, putting 
it mildly, which are on their way. Emigrants are attracted to 
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Western countries by high wages, better working conditions, 
stability and political freedom, and also by the opportunity to 
get education for their children in better universities. In recent 
years, among the most frequent reasons behind migration are 
ethnical wars and lack of political stability in many countries 
worldwide (Jałowiecki et al., 1994, p. 7).
The major threat from external migration is that in cases when 
emigrating people are mostly well-qualified and educated, those 
are left behind simply are not able to keep the productivity of 
country’s economic activity at a decent level. This interpretation 
of migration threats is often present in political and everyday dis-
course; however, scientific analysis clearly demonstrates that it is 
not that simple: in some cases positive changes happen too (the 
so-called brain gain instead of brain drain). Reverse migration 
can have significant positive consequences for sending countries; 
however, those would be rather long-term.
Interestingly, this political concern about the negative conse-
quences of emigration in practice translates, for example, into 
the so-called “tax on brain drain”, which is supposed to compen-
sate for a country’s previous investment in one’s education and 
professional training (Bhagwati, 1976). In a much lighter form 
this is translated into the creation of a high-profit economic sec-
tor which prepares and recruits for working abroad. For exam-
ple, such newly industrialized countries as Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore or Taiwan establish companies which prepare pro-
fessionals in high demand abroad and then provide their own 
labour resources, thus getting both direct and indirect profit 
(including remittances later sent by these migrant workers back 
to their families) (Angsuthanasombat, 2008).
The destroying influence from the brain drain is overestimated 
as such and today definitely has the signs of politically inspired 
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alarmism. Besides, as it was very well noted by Angsuthanasom-
bat (2008, p. 103), brain drain from emigration is causing much 
less staff losses in science and higher education as compared to 
specializations’ changes inside the country.
All in all, functions of migration as described by the neoclas-
sicists are not always visible in real life. For example, migration is 
not always correlated with economic growth, and even when this 
growth is indeed observed, it may be not enough to turn migra-
tion in the opposite direction. Thus, in a longer perspective we 
may not observe levelling in development; however, there is some 
sort of balance restoration between capital and labour resources 
(Goss et al., 1995).
Concerning financial transfers from labour migration to the 
countries of origin, this may be negated by the following: First, 
migrants’ savings sent home are not really invested in economic 
development of their home countries (for example, capital devel-
opment or creation of new work places). They are mostly used on 
consumption, and thus, stimulate inflation only. This especially 
concerns the cases when emigrants come from poor families 
and later “sponsor” those who have large consumption needs. 
Speaking in wider institutional terms, transfers from emigrants 
are sources for less-efficient economic systems, because they are 
aimed at households which would further spend them on improv-
ing their own material and financial status, but not on develop-
ment or capital accumulation. Thus, migrants’ financial transfers 
are supporting the economic system but do not cause innova-
tions. Moreover, incoming into rather closed, very much cor-
rupted and rent-seeking economy, these resources get involved 
in the financial circulation channels which basically only reserve 
pathologies of the economic system. Secondly, even though most 
of migrant-sending countries usually have rather high levels of 
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unemployment, those who become migrants are very seldom 
unemployed before their decision to migrate (Bustamante, 1979; 
Zazueta et al., 1982). This means that external migration does 
not help solve the unemployment problem, in fact, it aggravates 
it. Thirdly, the Philippines’ experience, as described by the above 
authors, clearly demonstrates that even years of rather intensive 
external migration do not bring in the desired growth of salaries 
inside the country. Besides, there are no grounds to assume that 
external migrants from the Philippines, after getting new qualifica-
tions and external knowledge, have returned home and enriched 
their national economy, simply because the vast majority of them 
have been involved in low-paid and low-qualified work in hosting 
countries (and this usually leads to losing some professional skills, 
rather than to their accumulation or enrichment).
Besides the already described gaps in neoclassical approaches, 
there are also difficulties with explaining the reverse migration in 
cases when migrants do not reach the level of wages and/or wel-
fare they were expecting (or sometimes there is a difference, but it 
is a reverse one, favouring the sending country).
There exists a false but frequent assumption that most migra-
tion flows come from the poorest countries. If this was true, the 
migration leaders would have been the countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and also Bangladesh and Haiti, as well noted by Portes 
(1983). However, the actual macrolevel situation analysis clearly 
demonstrates that the largest “suppliers” of migration are not the 
poorest countries of the world, but those the level of welfare in 
which is about the world’s average, the so-called middle income 
countries, like Mexico, Morocco, Turkey or the already men-
tioned Philippines. In these and other countries the most impor-
tant push factor is not as much poverty, but inequality (Morrison, 
1982, p. 8). Therefore, in our analysis we can surely include the 
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notion of subjective deprivation, meaning the mass perception of 
unfair social distribution of resources and values. This phenom-
enon has both psychological and social elements and is most defi-
nitely far beyond the model of homo economicus.
The criticised theories also do not consider the institution-nor-
mative aspect of the subject matter. The neoclassical theory (and 
the system of push and pull factors as such) does not take into 
account that individuals do not determine the migration policy of 
states, while this factor often determines the migration decision 
the most. It is not for the migrant to decide whether he/she gets 
the legal status of migrant or must remain in shadow, but for the 
state and migration regime in it. At the same time a migrant can 
take into account the specific features of this regime in a potential 
hosting country, also considering difficulties while crossing the 
border, deportation risks and other factors which might influence 
the migration decision.
And overall, the solely economic model of migration is very 
much criticised by many researchers, since in it we see only a per-
son of no consequence who is using a calculator to account for 
benefits and advantages from migration to various places (Bohn-
ing, 1978, p. 10). Also, as noted by Fevre (1984), numerous soci-
ological studies demonstrated that many people are simply not 
ready to make a migration decision, and even under the worst 
possible economic conditions they do not make it. The major rea-
son for it is that people are not always rational in this important 
choice and consider much wider range of factors, many of which 
are not economic at all.
In order to overcome the limitations of the neoclassical model 
J. Harris and M. Todaro offer a somewhat modified interpre-
tation of it, according to which individuals are making migra-
tion decisions basing not on the objective knowledge about the 
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current state of the markets and their chance to improve their 
own well-being, but coming from certain perceptions and expec-
tations which are obviously not objective at all (Harris et al., 
1970). More specifically, instead of the notion of “difference in 
incomes” in this context we should operate with the notion of 
“the expected difference in incomes” (Todaro, 1976). However, 
even with all these modifications taken into account, the neo-
classical theory of migration is still being criticised as one-sided 
and oversimplified, reduced to the economic dimension only. 
Instead of “static” understanding of self-balancing labour mar-
kets in sending and hosting countries, external migration should 
be treated as a choice, often not rational and rather contradictory 
(Kearney, 1986).
Considering the theories of external migration in their chrono-
logical order, the next should be the structural approach repre-
sented primarily by the world-system theory. Its key difference 
from the theory of push and pull factors is that the former empha-
sizes the voluntary nature of humans’ movement, while the latter 
concentrates on the role of large organizations (corporations and 
states) in the formation of migration flows.
The theories of migration combined under the title “structural 
approach” focus on macrosocial processes which result in ine-
qualities and limitations on the life chances of individuals. The 
structural approach explains migration as a consequence from 
the exploitative relations between sending and hosting countries. 
The most well known theories within this approach are those 
related to neo-Marxism – the world-system theory and the the-
ory of underdevelopment by A.G. Frank. The predecessor of the 
world-system analysis was French historian F. Braudel who actu-
ally introduced the very notion of world-system, understanding 
it as a regional self-sufficient and autonomous economic system, 
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the world inside2. Sending and hosting societies are compo-
nents of the same world-economy system which is comparatively 
autonomous from the rest of the world, having at the same time 
economic, sociocultural and institutional similarity and correla-
tion within. The most explicit and obvious example of this world-
system approach is external migration from former colonies to 
their former metropolicies. In the course of world-system anal-
ysis development during the 1990s the theory of international 
migration system was formulated by Kritz (1992). This system is 
formed by migration flows between two or more countries that 
exchange migrants. Such a system rests upon the system of his-
toric, political, economic and cultural connections.
For example, labour migration from Morocco to France is pre-
conditioned by a rather complex set of relations and depend-
encies which include: sociocultural features (the Moors know 
French language and are comparatively familiar with French 
culture, and this eases their adaptation in French society); struc-
tural and institutional factors (social networks of already settled 
Moor immigrants in France; numerous French-Moroccan joint 
enterprises which mostly combine French capital with Moroccan 
labour force); political factors (many government agreements and 
comparatively favourable migration regime). All of these factors 
have been gradually formed during the decades of French colo-
nial rule in Morocco. The same interpretation can be also applied 
to the Ukrainians who opt to migrate to the Russian Federation 
 2 In Braudel’s interpretation world-economies existed since ancient time 
(Phoenisia, Carthage, Rome, India, China, the Islamic world) and they have 
a range of common features: territorial limits in their stability (the bor-
ders of world-economies are changing very seldom and very slowly); each 
world-economy has its center, usually a capitalistic city (in European his-
tory those were Venice in 1380–1500, Antwerp in 1500–1550, Genoa in 
1560–1610, Amsterdam during 1610–1815, London during 1815–1929, 
and finally New York became such a world-economy in 1929).
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(especially to Moscow, the former mother city). Therefore, the 
world-system approach shifts the emphasis from the level of indi-
vidual decisions and actions, to the objective facts which create 
conditions important for labour migration.
The world-system has certain structural zones (the narrow cen-
tre, semi-peripheries and peripheries). The periphery is essen-
tially archaic and underdeveloped, and this makes it an easy 
catch for exploitation by others. The most attractive destinations 
for migration flows from former colonies (or putting it in more 
neutral terms, dependent territories) are the centres of world-
economies, their cores. These are always metropolis cities, which 
are dynamic, rich in resources, culturally diverse and compara-
tively liberal.
At the same time the countries of periphery are involved in 
the complicated process of “development of underdevelopment”, 
the participation in which only worsens the situation inside the 
sending country, while migration of valuable human resources 
deepens the dependency. Migration flows enlarge when the key 
features of the involved territories reveal themselves more (the 
periphery demonstrates its underdevelopment, while the core 
shows high rates of development) and also when specific political 
or economic acts influence the situation. For example, subjects 
working from the core (the state itself or large business) may try 
to attract the most valuable resources by means of setting con-
venient migration regimes for them.
Most of today’s sociologists agree with this interpretation, 
including M. Burawoy who thinks that the countries of the former 
socialistic camp (countries “of the second world” using the termi-
nology of the Cold War period) obtain the features of the third-
world countries, that is, they demonstrate higher dependencies 
and more explicit underdevelopment. Interestingly, this concerns 
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both the dependency from the former core of the Soviet Union as 
well as from the comparative new core inside the European Union 
(when it comes to Central European countries) (Burawoy, 1999).
Thus, international migration is the consequence of the capital-
istic formation of the market in developing countries, while global 
economy’s intrusion in the periphery regions usually catalyzes 
migration processes in them. Capitalistic investments provoke 
changes, and changes lead to population mobility in the periph-
ery. Years of close relations between the core and the periphery 
shape stable material, cultural, language, administrative, trans-
port and communication connections, and this naturally leads 
to the establishment of transnational markets and transnational 
cultural systems. Within the world-system theory, the phenom-
enon of cultural dependence is treated as a marginal one; this is 
explained in detail by Polish authors, among others (Fiut, 2003; 
Cavanagh, 2003; Korek, 2007). The key factor of international 
migration is first of all the structure of global economy, not dif-
ferences in wages or gaps in employment structure (Massey et al., 
1993).
The considered above approaches (both functional and struc-
tural) do not take into account that each action has its own bal-
ance of agency as defined by the free will of an individual and 
certain limitations on it (sociocultural, institutional, economic, 
legal and other “corridors” which set the limit on our behaviour 
in terms of the most and the least possible variants of it). While 
functional approach is overestimating the agency role, the struc-
tural approach overemphasizes the constraints’ role.
Now we can turn to the specifics of the contemporary stage of 
research on external migration. These specifics concern not the-
ories or methodologies, but the very choice of research object, 
methods and design of future research. In particular, contem-
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porary research on external migration treats it mostly from the 
standing point of hosting (receiving) states and considers first of 
all their demands and requirements for optimization of migration 
policy, taking into account both real and perceived (imagined) 
threats (national security threats, human trafficking, illegal migra-
tion, saturation of the labour market which disadvantages citizens 
in their employment opportunities, problems related to cultural 
adaptation, law abidance or identity of newcomers etc.). Research-
ers often leave out of scope the aspect of sending countries as 
such as well as complex migration trajectories in which an indi-
vidual travels in a serial manner, thus getting involved in social, 
proprietal and political relations on both sides. Such manner of 
migration, with its unique sociocultural, economic and political 
features, is known now as “transnationalism” (Schiller, 1992).
The widely acceptable way to solve the problem of the one-
sidedness of the research is to perform cross-national studies, 
which rebuke ethnocentrism and provide a wider view on both 
positions – that of a sending country and that of a receiving one.
Obviously, such a research strategy is closely related to the 
most recent challenges, as cross-national studies are also cross-
cultural in their nature, and this is even more challenging in terms 
of methods and tools used (Jowell, 1998). As noted by R. Jowell, 
there are two almost opposite answers to the question on ade-
quacy in cross-national research, and these would be: 1) the maxi-
mum quality approach according to which the research design, its 
methods and tools are maximally adapted to the context in ques-
tion; however, in this case the comparison would be difficult to 
perform; 2) the consistent quality approach according to which 
research design, its methods and tools are not adapted at all and 
are left unchanged; however, this increases the risk that true local 
specificity would be left behind the scenes.
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Obviously, both of these approaches have significant bottle-
necks, and our task here is to find the middle way between them, 
so as not to lose the quality of the research while keeping it truly 
cross-national.
The following critical point can be applied to all non-
sociological models of migration behaviour: a truly compre-
hensive, all-dimensional research on external migration must 
take into account that migrants, non-migrants and potential 
migrants are the representatives of various social and demo-
graphic groups, bearing important features, such as gender, 
age, confession, cultural and/or ethical identity, all of which 
significantly determine both the migration behaviour of indi-
viduals and the barriers to migration.
Thirdly, in non-sociological research, as a rule, mass percep-
tions, including motivations, aims and values are left out of scope. 
All of these factors are especially important in today’s world where 
communications’ development, logistics and transport technolo-
gies and mass culture create both the desire and the opportunity 
to emigrate. Motivations, discourses and the symbolic side of our 
sociocultural reality in a wider sense are often left ignored. While 
the sociocultural aspect of any migration process can be under-
stood first of all through such notions as the “migration project” 
and “geographical imaginations” etc.
Finally, in the studies on migration the general shift is on the 
side of economic factors analysis, and those do not actually 
explain migration, but merely describe it. Statistics on wages or 
quality of life in both sending and receiving countries are part of 
basic descriptive research. There is an obvious gap between stud-
ies on migration and the analysis of the related social changes, 
and this gap needs to be bridged. Moreover, there is hardly any 
really long-term research on migration which would reveal the 
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major trends and explain what social innovations may follow 
from the “waves of migration”.
1.2 Institutional aspect of studying external 
labour migration: the research potential of 
neoinstitutionalism
There is a range of integrative approaches which are aimed at 
overcoming the limitations of structural and functional models. 
In particular, these are the economic approach, the migration 
systems approach, the network approach and the neoinstitu-
tional approach. Besides those, significant disciplinary specif-
ics are observed in the research on external migration. In this 
subchapter we will concentrate on the essence of the theories 
mentioned above, their critics and opportunities to form some of 
sort of metatheory which would enable systemic, all-sided con-
ceptualization of external migration.
The new economic approach is refocusing research from indi-
viduals and their personal decisions on the level of households. 
As noted by E. Jaźwińska, an approach which represents a house-
hold as a whole is somehow reducing the role of lesser units in 
decision-making, but at the same time it allows for a better under-
standing of the conditions in which these decisions are made 
(Jaźwińska, 2007, p. 16).
Considering households in the conditions of the so-called sub-
sistence economies, the key motive behind households’ behaviour 
is minimization of losses and risks (Stark, 1991). In poor house-
holds the income level is low and also changing. Thus, during cer-
tain long-term periods (sometimes longer than one generation) 
certain rather specific socioeconomic strategies for survival are 
being formed (Collins et al., 2009).
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Households are able to manage their risks by means of own 
resources. Households as units of production and consumption, 
unlike autonomous individuals, are the true units for analysis 
in migration processes research. And the difference between 
wages’ level is not the key decisive factor for migration here: 
households often have other more powerful stimuli to engage 
in external migration, even in cases when the difference in wage 
levels is not significant. One of the most important predictors 
of households’ migration behaviour is the socioeconomic state 
of the environment in which a households exists. And the bet-
ter the household looks against the general backgrounds (neigh-
bours, for example) – the less intentions it will have to migrate. 
Thus, it would be logical to assume that high migration indica-
tors are observed not in the poorest societies but in the societies 
with significant differentiation in life quality levels (Stark, 1991).
Poor households can borrow from friends and relatives, thus 
building a certain network of rather stable relations based on 
mutual help and non-economic resources exchange, investing in 
the so-called economy of favours. They can also try to increase 
their incomes by means of finding alternative jobs with better pay, 
or start their own business, or invent other ways to increase their 
overall welfare status. External migration is in any case consid-
ered along with a range of alternative options.
Migration as a form of investment in human capital has been 
rather metaphorically described by M. Clemens and T. Ogden in 
their article “Мigration as a Strategy for Household Finance: A 
Research Agenda on Remittances, Payments, and Development”:
“What is the human capital of a Russian professional ballerina? 
Her human capital is much more than the classes she has taken … 
Her earning potential is also lower if she has rarely performed 
publicly, if she knows no ballet directors, if she is obese, or if 
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she lives in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. That is, her income is directly 
affected by her knowledge, experience, connections, physical 
condition, and location – all traits of her person, and all change-
able. She can improve all of these traits … to raise the value of her 
time and labour next year. One of the best investments she could 
make in her human capital would be to pay for changing her 
location – to Novosibirsk or Moscow. In fact, without that invest-
ment in changing her location, her investments in other personal 
attributes might be nearly worthless” (Clemens et al., 2014).
From this viewpoint, external migration is seen as a household 
strategy, a form of investing in human capital, aimed at diversifica-
tion of incomes, and at the same time minimization of unemploy-
ment risks, changing (unfavourably) economic environment etc.
A new economic approach indeed has shifted the emphasis in 
research (for example, on such issues as whether households use 
transfers from abroad on investment; whether households form a 
dependency from such aid; what could be the optimal tax on such 
remittances etc.), but still, this approach was not able to overcome 
the limitations of classical and neoclassical approaches. In par-
ticular, this theory does not take into account the influence of 
migration institutes, the related social networks, the role of inter-
mediaries etc.
The next approach in question is the theory of social networks. 
Transnational social networks increase the probability of external 
migration, mostly because they reduce the costs and the time for 
obtaining necessary information, and they also decrease the risks 
related to relocation.
The network approach emphasizes that external migration is 
predetermined by the migration at the preliminary stage; that is, it 
has the signs of autoregression process (the indicators of which in a 
given moment of time depend on the previous indicators linearly).
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Primary migration is caused by various reasons, like difference 
in wages, labour market conditions etc. Thus, the first migrants 
usually have very high costs of relocation due to lack of informa-
tion and many uncertainties. For the next wave of migration the 
costs are already lower because there already exist certain net-
works of relatives and acquaintances in the new country. And this 
situation may be progressing up to the point when nearly any-
body in a sending country who has the desire to emigrate can 
actually do so comparatively easily.
Such social networks form the capital of behavioural ori-
gin which would further reduce losses and prevent unneces-
sary spending, thus optimizing income at early stages already 
Figure 1: The influence of social networks on external migration 
dynamics.
Source: Reichlova, 2004
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(Massey et al., 1993, p. 448). Social networks (which are being 
formed by former and current migrants, their families and some-
times also local friends) represent an important resource with the 
help of which migrants can find a place to live, a job, necessary 
information, psychological support etc. With the growing size 
and density of social networks, losses and risks related to reloca-
tion are decreasing  – and thus, the probability of migration is 
increasing. Therefore, availability of social networks in a receiv-
ing country becomes an additional factor of external migration, 
and this factor is always an encouraging one (Boyd, 1989).
Former migrants which today are residing in the receiving coun-
try are the best information source for newcoming and potential 
migrants in terms of all possible benefits and losses, best practices 
and problems experienced. Sometimes they also provide direct 
financial support, help finding a job and assist during the adapta-
tion period in other ways (Arango, 2000). Potentially, every new 
wave of migrants would become the supporting one for the next 
one to come. In this way, a chain of interrelated repeated events 
and actions is formed. Once started, migration is reproducing 
itself. The key advantage of the migration networks theory is that 
it explains migration between countries in the most general man-
ner, whatever were the reasons for the first wave of migration. The 
very presence of the migrants’ community in a receiving location 
already creates preconditions for continuing migration.
The theory of migration networks is able to explain different 
volumes of migration to the countries which are equally attractive 
in economic terms, and also the cases when intensive migration is 
observed despite quite restrictive migration rules (including the 
legal mechanism of family reunification) (Arango, 2000).
The bottleneck of this theory is that it does not consider eco-
nomic factors as such and thus, is unable to explain the reasons 
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behind the very first wave of migration. Also, the weak side of 
this theory is the neglect of sociocultural context around the 
migrants’ community. Namely, in literature on the subject there is 
a phenomenon described as “downward levelling pressure”. This 
sort of pressure occurs when migrants’ community in a receiving 
country exists at a rather low level of the social stratification sys-
tem. This can be caused by a range of reasons, including formal 
and informal discrimination of this particular ethnical commu-
nity; failures to adapt to the existing labour market requirements 
etc. In such a situation the migrants’ community becomes a rather 
closed system with its own subsistence economy, and the rela-
tional resources inside the community compensate for the lack of 
economic resources. In such communities families usually consist 
of several generations living together, located in one, ghetto-like, 
area; small and medium businesses in these areas are family- and 
ethnic-based. Informal structures in these areas also have dis-
tinctive ethnical features, and this concerns both support insti-
tutes and criminal circles. Zero-interest personal loans “inside 
one’s own circle” are widely spread in such communities, as well 
as intensive exchanges of services and non-economic resources. 
Marriages are arranged inside the same ethnic minority group.
In such a situation, a bright representative of the community 
who is able to move forward in the social hierarchy (get better 
education, better job, higher overall status) ceases to be the native 
element of this community. The reason is that usually the succes-
ful member of such community will be overloaded by numerous 
requests from the least succesful members of community (lend 
money, help with employment or business contacts, share experi-
ence etc.). At the same time the community applies this “down-
ward levelling pressure” on its brighter representative, demanding 
a share in the newly acquired resources. This pressure makes 
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anybody who managed to reach a certain level of success in life 
leave his or her community. These community members are forced 
to cut short their friends and family connections, or at least reduce 
the intensity of such contacts (along with the related obligations). 
They usually move from the ghetto and try to build their own 
social networks based on personal contacts but not on the require-
ment of resource redistribution in favour of the most needy.
The migration systems approach is applicable to all international 
structures of both macro- and microlevels which have some sort 
of exchange in resources, capital and people. Macrolevel com-
ponents of migration system include: political structures which 
set migration regimes; structures of economic domination and 
dependency; cultural and language structures and other struc-
tures manifested through network connections (Fawcet, 1987). 
This theory emphasizes the importance of pull factors in highly 
developed economies (including primarily the demand for for-
eign workforce and the corresponding targeted recruitment by 
both enterprises and public institutions).
Within the migration systems approach lies the theory of the 
dual market which explains external migration through macro-
economic specifics of labour markets in receiving societies (Piore, 
1979). In the countries with high level of welfare there always 
exists some shortage of workforce for unpopular, low-paying jobs, 
which do not require specific qualifications but may sometimes 
be unsafe. Thus, these markets perceive migrants as a necessary 
element of the total workforce (Arango, 2000; Cohen, 2017). In 
such a situation migrants are actually stabilizing the labour mar-
ket in a receiving country. This problem cannot be solved in any 
other way, since the only way to attract local residents to such 
work is to increase the pay, and this would not be economically 
feasible due to potential inflation growth (Massey et al., 1993).
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This situation can be described by means of a mathemati-
cal model which takes into account the qualitative features of 
labour resources. According to this model, labour resources sup-
plied by migration flows into a receiving country can be of two 
types – qualified and unskilled. When we consider a situation in 
which the receiving country is getting both types of new labour 
resources and they influence the wage level, we need to take into 
account the limitations on the lower margin of wages set by trade 
unions or local legislation. The model is based on the hypothesis 
that in the labour market filled with an unskilled workforce, the 
level of wages is set by monopolistic trade unions and it is higher 
than the equilibrium level, Wu. Wages in the unskilled workforce 
market can be reduced due to pressure coming from the proposi-
tion of extra workforce, that is, emigrants. In the labour market 
of the qualified workforce, wages are at the market level, with no 
artificial intrusion of trade unions. The effects of the unskilled 
workforce migrating to a country are demonstrated in Figure 2, 
while the effects of the qualified migrants’ inflow is presented in 
Figure 3. Figure 2 shows that migrants without specific skills sub-
stitute local unskilled labour force, and thus, along with quali-
fied residents, form the total labour resource of the society. The 
key effect of this situation would be that the curve of proposi-
tion in the unskilled workforce market is moving from Ls1 to Ls2. 
This would force trade unions to agree on lower wages from Wu1 
to Wu2, since otherwise unskilled residents would have to face 
mass poverty because employees would prefer non-residents (the 
same unskilled workers ready for lower pay). Then the employ-
ment rate would go up from L1 to L2 since both types of work-
force (unskilled and qualified) supplement each other. Growing 
employment of unskilled workers would lead to a similar trend 
for qualified workers, and therefore, the curve D1 would move to 
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D2. Since the labour market of the unskilled workforce is compet-
itive and the proposition on it did not change, the current situa-
tion would lead to higher demand for qualified workers and their 
wages’ growth, from W1 to W2 level (Bauer et al., 1999).
In the case when, due to the immigration process, the receiv-
ing labour market is experiencing the growing proposition of 
qualified new workers, there is the growth in qualified workforce 
proposition, from Ls1 to Ls2. This will lead to a new point of equi-
librium being at E2, and the growth of demand of the qualified 
workforce market would lead to the similar demand growth at the 
market of unskilled workforce from D1 to D2. Since wages of the 
unskilled workforce are higher than the market ones, the employ-
ment rate would drop from L1 to L2. The growth of unskilled 
Figure 2: Model of economic effects from unskilled workforce 
proposition growth resulting from external migration.
Source: (Bauer et al., 1999).
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workforce employment would lead to higher demand for quali-
fied workers (the curve of demand for qualified workers would 
move from D1 to D2), thus, the new point of equilibrium would 
be at E3. In this model, economic effects from external migration 
for the receiving country are not unambiguous. Positive effects 
dominate; however, in certain regions, for sectors of certain cat-
egories of workers, external migration may still decrease wages or 
may lead to jobs being cut (Boeri et al., 2001).
The major drawback of the migration systems approach is that 
institutional factors, migration regimes, political activity and the 
like come forward, while individual and small groups’ effects are 
almost totally neglected. The latter are considered only as passive 
participants in the migration process.
Figure 3: Model of economic effects from qualified workforce 
proposition growth resulting from external migration.
Source: (Bauer et al., 1999).
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One of the integrative approaches which aims to combine the 
most essential features of the considered theories is the theory of 
cumulative causation. Cumulative causation is a complex inter-
connection of social phenomena due to which system repro-
duction takes place by means of functions being performed by 
its components. This notion to some extent corresponds to the 
notion of autopoiesis, introduced by Niklas Luhmann. In his 
interpretation autopoiesis stands for such organization of the 
elements in a system (social system, for example) under which 
its components are the consequences of this system functioning 
(Luhmann, 1995).
The theory of cumulative causation states that each act of 
migration changes the social context in the frames of which fur-
ther migration of more people becomes more probable. Within 
this theory the following socioeconomic factors of migration 
are considered: income distribution; land resource distribution; 
organization of agriculture works; regional distribution of human 
capital and the social value of labour. Eventually migration flows 
are getting stable and an opportunity to determine the interna-
tional system of migration appears.
One of the most prospective theoretical and methodologi-
cal directions which can positively impact the conceptualiza-
tion of external migration is neoinstitutionalism. This research 
vision is rather heterogeneous in representation, for example, 
both H. White (1981), the representative of the new economic 
theory, and P. Di Maggio (1988), the representative of sociocul-
tural approach to studying organizations are considered to be 
neoinstitutionalists.
Explaining rather wide representativeness of this direction, 
N. Fligstein defines the subject of neoinstitutional theories as: deter-
mining the regularities in functioning of social realia fields and in 
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complexes of social practices which regulate the functioning of 
these fields (Fligstein, 2001). It is worth noting here that these fields 
are constituting in the situation of already available social practices 
and structures. The above-mentioned notions of “practices and 
structures” are used in a rather flexible manner. Thus, practices can 
be collective actions according to a set pattern – as in emigrating, 
looking for a job in a new place etc. Or, for example, typical verbal 
and/or cognitive practices of knowledge and attitudes distribution 
concerning external migration. A good illustration of the latter is 
the existence of cognitive frameworks which help individuals in 
their assessment of current situation and what is to be done (or 
not). This interpretation of structures in neoinstitutionalism is very 
similar to P. Bourdieu’s idea of “habitus”.
Accordingly, we can interpret external migration as one of 
comparatively autonomous fragments of social reality, formed 
by stable structures of perception and actions which manifest 
themselves on the level of institutionalized and informal rules: 
from legal frameworks of government agreements and national 
legislation on external migration through more specific rules of 
employment offices’ functioning, passport registration offices and 
customs offices up to informal structures of perception and action 
which reveal themselves on the group level, on the level of social 
groups and society in general (moral norms, traditions and hab-
its, codes of conducts, patterns in social networks’ formation and 
functioning, social discourse as such etc.).
We fully agree with D. North, who stated that informal practices 
and structures are the most stable and socially supported ones 
(and thus, also the most socially reproduced). They quickly spread 
within and beyond social networks, while a majority of them are 
actually formed based not on group interests but on personal ones, 
and thus, from time to time they can stimulate illegal activity 
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(North, 1990). For example, this includes fraud for getting a visa, 
transporting prohibited products, illegal employment, violation of 
visa conditions, negligence at work etc. Such models of action are 
reproducing themselves in time and thus, become sort of cultural 
heritage for a certain part of society, constituting the sociocultural 
grounds for socioeconomic and political underdevelopment.
Variety in the neoinstitutionalism vision also reveals itself in 
the research scope on external migration. Analyzing the corre-
sponding academic discourse we can differentiate two key direc-
tions of neoinstitutionalism in the external migration research: 
one direction is concentrated on the organizational aspects of 
social systems functioning; another one covers mostly symbolic 
(value and normative) structures.
The subject field of the first direction (which can be called here 
formal neoinstitutionalism) includes the regularities of organiza-
tional and legal mechanisms which influence the migration pro-
cesses; the target orientation on optimization of formal institutes’ 
design. The second direction is more sociologized, more attention 
being paid to sociocultural dimension of rules, structures and 
practices (and this direction can be called constructivist neoin-
stitutionalism).
Within the first direction, it is worth paying attention to the 
research of institutional factors which generate migration flows. 
This direction is concentrated on institutional design, for example, 
on the mechanism of rotating presidency (Tallberg, 2006) or on the 
procedure of co-decision (Farrell, 2007). In particular, F. W. Scharpf, 
in the middle of the 1980s, was already grounding the idea that the 
system of institutes in the EU creates the so-called trap of common 
decisions, in which the institutional design of the Union weighs 
more than the political will of its separate components – political or 
social ones (Scharpf, 2014). From the neoinstitutionalism standing 
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point, the evolution of liberal democracy has been considered as 
being embedded in the activities of international organizations, in 
agreements and contracts, all of which lead to setting certain insti-
tutional frameworks with the intention to expand personal rights, 
including the right for free movement and freedom of residence. 
For example, Y.N. Soysal emphasizes that the popularity and global 
spread of ideas of human rights puts certain pressures on govern-
ments and thus makes them provide equal rights to citizens and 
non-citizens (Soysal, 1994). A few authors also note that the migra-
tion policies of Western established democracies demonstrate the 
so-called embedded liberalism which is a specific feature of nearly 
all policies in these countries in the period after World War II 
(Jacobson, 1996; Hollifield, 1998). Discourse concentrated around 
human rights is very popular today – on the levels of democratic 
governments and their citizens, and as applied to migrants too. This 
discourse is operating with rather specific terminology in discuss-
ing the related issues. In particular, within it there is no place for 
populist statements appealing to ethnic solidarity and homogene-
ity (at least in discussions about ethnical majority groups). Insti-
tutionalism in this context concentrates on such institutes, values, 
norms and practices which guarantee reproduction of this embed-
ded democracy in various spheres of societal life, including external 
migration. In the historic perspective this can be seen as a trajectory 
which creates a corridor of new opportunities for societies (Steinmo 
et al., 1992).
Apart from the analysis on the societal level this direction also 
covers more local research. For example, on the level of firms and 
organization, both non-profit and for-profit, which arise to satisfy 
the needs of past, current and potential migrants. Part of such 
organizations are completely legal, other are shadow ones (Mas-
sey et al., 1993).
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This direction has been criticized mostly because along with 
studying the complexities of bureaucratic mechanisms of decision-
making “in the offices” (that is, along with formalized and top-down 
impact on migration processes), there is also a necessity to pay 
attention to down-top processes and informal structures, to mass 
consciousness in both sending and receiving countries, to public 
discourse and media reflections on external migration etc.
It is worth noting here that such division (formal and construc-
tivist neoinstitutionalism) is very much schematic, though it can 
be useful in terms of scientific discourse codification. Obviously, 
there is a whole range of softer variants, in between the first and 
the second directions. In the second variant the researchers rep-
resenting it can go beyond organizational analysis and constitu-
tional right, as does, for example Moravcsik (2000), who applies 
R. Putham’s metaphor of the prisoner’s dilemma to demonstrate 
the influence of trade preferences on institutional design.
In general, neoinstitutionalism as such originates from the 
attempts to overcome the excessive attention to homo economi-
cus, which exists only as an ideal type of human, and at the same 
time, in order to reveal the rooting of economic actions in social 
ones (Granovetter, 1999) and wider – in sociocultural structures. 
And at the same time neoinstitutionalism serves to avoid the 
spread of economic factors’ dominance in explaining those fields 
of social reality the very existence of which are defined by non-
economic structures (Zafirovski, 1999). The new generation of 
researchers appears to concentrate more on individual and col-
lective actors, not on formal organization, and at the same time, 
to use qualitative, interpretative methods more widely (Favell 
et al., 2010).
The sociological variant of neoinstitutionalism (or as above, 
constructivist neoinstitutionalism) has been also criticized. The 
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major emphasis from the critics is on the dangers of anthropo-
morphizing identity, practices, values and norms, understand-
ing their essence as the key features of the society, community or 
social group. According to this position, we could, for example, 
state: “the Ukrainians have European values, thus, Ukraine’s place 
is in the European Union”. However, the homespun truth of real 
life is that there is also a powerful intermediary involved (maybe 
even the most powerful one in this particular context) that pro-
motes values, norms, practices and identities in the political-
institutional dimension. This is the political elite, interest groups, 
national government and supragovernmental structures3.
For the analysis of the phenomena of mass consciousness and 
practices (such as migrational ones) the simple, oversociologized 
scheme would require further corrections and detailed provisions, 
and in particular, more attention to the institutional dimension. 
Mass consciousness, for example, arises not quite naturally – it is 
partially formed with certain purposes (especially on its upper, 
rational level). Therefore, when we consider public sentiment and 
public opinion, we would need to concentrate our attention on 
the central “interpreters of knowledge” which have “the symbolic 
rower” to nominate (Bourdieu, 1989), which set the agenda and 
 3 In this context we need to remember the important feature of political 
systems, or more accurately political regimes and elites – the level of their 
responsiveness (the ability to correspond to population demands, to be 
sensitive to the changing requests of citizens). This level of responsiveness 
of the public bodies determines whether the actions of the mass conscious-
ness and the political elite are moving in the same direction. This is not al-
ways the case, as e.g. it was during the mass protests in Ukraine in late 2013 
through the beginning of 2014: political destabilization was caused by un-
precedentedly massive protest movement supporting Ukraine’s course on 
Eurointegration, while the government was planning to abandon this idea. 
This is a perfect illustration of a low level of public power responsiveness. 
In such a case, separate research on institutional situations and on the 
mass consciousness would have completely irrelevant results.
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priorities in it, approve the list and the composition of central 
players, topics, alternatives, problems and prospects. This first of 
all means media and media representation.
Media representation means the power to set the mean-
ing of social relations, to represent one’s interests and discuss 
them publicly (Jensen, 1990). Media coexists along with other 
“producers of meaning” in their various modalities: from con-
flicting and conquered to equal and well-balanced in case of 
harmonious social development. In a situation of a high level 
of civil society development, media is a comparatively autono-
mous producer and retranslator of interests for all influential 
actors, such as the state, political parties, international corpo-
rations, ethnical and religious communities, the third sector 
etc. In the chapters that follow we will consider the influence of 
both formal and informal structures and institutes which may 
determine the nature and the course of migration processes, 
including state policy, media representation, features of mass 
consciousness etc.
The neoinstitutional approach, on one hand, is still focused on 
institutional and bureaucratic (political) realia which determine 
migration processes. On the other hand, it also concentrates on 
the multiple levels of discourses, values, practices and norms 
which also influence migration processes on the individual level, 
group level or on the level of the whole society (including popula-
tion, political elite, media, experts etc.)
1.3 Sociological theories in the research on 
external labour migration
The sociological theories within external migration research 
turn researchers’ attention to important issues which are out of 
Material and Non-material Factors of  External Labour Migration 33
scope in many other disciplines, namely: the issue of sociocul-
tural adaptations and changing identity of migrants; social and 
psychological barriers and consequences from migrants’ adap-
tation to new sociocultural environment; possible dysfunctions 
related to migration, like social exclusions and discrimination; 
isolation of newcomers in the receiving societies etc. Other top-
ics covered by the sociological theories within external migration 
studies may also include mixed transnational families, sociocul-
tural changes in societies brought in by the returning migrants 
once they get back to their original societies (the so-called return-
ers, as noted by Ivankova-Stetsiuk (2012)); problems specific for 
migrants families, specifically, the problem of social orphanhood 
and forced active aging of the grandparents who are left behind 
to look for children, while their parents are working abroad etc. 
Overall, sociology interprets external migration as, first of all, 
a sociocultural phenomenon that means changes in the social, 
cultural and personal life of migrants and their communities, as 
well as for various other representatives of institutes in the receiv-
ing societies (Volodko, 2011). Aside from very specific topics, 
which cannot be covered by any other discipline, sociology can 
be involved in the research of those aspects in external migra-
tion which are traditionally within the economic science subject 
field. For example, sociological verification may require the fol-
lowing hypotheses which concern the factors of migration behav-
iour of “non-economic character”: growing migration numbers 
are observed for those countries in which human rights and 
self-fulfilment are among the state priorities. This is applicable to 
those receiving societies where the postmaterialistic nature of the 
whole system of values essentially promotes self-actualization, 
efficient functioning of institutes and a higher sense of the exis-
tential security of the population.
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People who experience labour migration usually have more 
progressive, advanced views, especially in terms of postmateri-
alistic values and gender models. People with the experience of 
labour migration are more inclined to start their own business, 
and they also have more innovative minds. They do not expect 
much from the social protection system and do not demonstrate 
paternalistic behaviour (however, there might be political excep-
tions to this, since sometimes people with the experience of 
staying in the countries with established democracies tend to be 
proactive in political life; they highly value their political rights 
and freedoms). People with experience in labour migration are 
also more socially active; they often participate in various volun-
teer and charity projects. Overall, people who experience labour 
migration have higher expectations in terms of life achievements 
and prospects.
It is noteworthy that, when we talk about sociological research 
on external migration, we mean, first of all, the use of sociologi-
cal methodologies, theory, categories and tools etc. Secondly, all 
these sociological methods, tools and instruments are used to 
process the results of empirical research (more details on this in 
the subchapter 3.1.).
In this chapter we will consider the contribution of sociol-
ogy into the theoretical and methodological aspects of external 
migration studies. The flows of migrants directed to Western 
Europe and the USA since the early twentieth century caused the 
appearance of rather large communities of non-autochthonous 
population, with their quite specific social values and norms, 
different cultural competencies and distinct behaviour models, 
in the receiving countries. Thus, the receiving countries had to 
face the problem of these communities’ integration. The specific 
feature of this socially tense situation was a new phenomenon of 
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ethnocultural segregation in large cities. The first generation of 
emigrants were usually able to occupy very specific (mostly low 
or mid-level) niches at local labour markets and thus had a very 
special rank on the overall social structure of the receiving socie-
ties. They were mostly involved into unqualified or low-qualified 
labour which was not considered to be prestigious for the local 
population. Thus, these very groups of migration also faced the 
largest risks related to unemployment in case of economic down-
turn in the receiving economies. Obviously, under such condi-
tions a new object field has been formed which soon became the 
focus of many sociologists’ attention. The central questions of this 
arising discourse were related to the social factors of migration 
behaviour and migrants’ adaptation to the new environment, 
their integration into the receiving societies.
The origins of sociological research on external migration 
date back to 1918 – the year when W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki 
published their study “The Polish peasant in Europe and Amer-
ica” which analyzed the letters of Polish migrants to America 
addressed to their relatives back in Poland (Thomas et al., 1918). 
Another representative of the Chicago school, R. Park was work-
ing on the theory of migrants’ assimilation, also known as the the-
ory of the race relations cycle. This theory had a rather significant 
impact on the further development of this research school overall 
(Park 1950 [1913]). According to Park’s concept, there exist four 
stages of assimilation, and all migrants are going through these 
stages in any receiving society. The first stage is establishing con-
tact, getting familiar. It is followed by a conflict or competition, 
then an attempt of accommodation. In case all these attempts 
turn out to be unsuccessful for an emigrant, he or she has nothing 
left but to assimilate in the receiving society. Interestingly, nei-
ther Park nor his follower E. W. Burgess differentiated between 
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ethnical minorities and migrant communities originating from 
European countries, considering them as similar social groups. 
We can agree on this similarity, because, for example, African 
Americans and Polish migrants, studied by Thomas & Znaniecki 
(1918), both moved from rural agrarian areas to city ghettos; thus, 
their social situations were indeed nearly identical.
The next big contribution into sociological research of exter-
nal migration became the work of J. S. Lindberg (1930) on 
social networks of Swedish migrants to the USA and also, the 
auto-ethnographic research by L. Adamic (1932). Also important 
was the ethnographic-sociological study by W. Whyte titled “Street 
corner society” in which he studied the life of Italian community 
in Chicago, its internal structure and hierarchy (Whyte, 1943).
One of the classical sociological studies on emigrants in receiv-
ing societies belongs to W.L. Warner and was titled “The Social 
System of American Ethnic Groups” (published in 1945 at Yale). 
This book was very much criticized for its rather ultra-right and 
conservative discourse and vision of the ethnocultural policies in 
the receiving countries. The author took the stand that migrants 
simply must assimilate in the American society due to its univer-
sal laws and its open system of social mobility. Further, the author 
also stated that migrants would have to leave their own values and 
perceptions, which are second-rate to the receiving society, and 
fully adopt the new culture.
In contrast, a much more flexible position was the generation 
theory of assimilation by H.G. Duncan. According to Duncan, 
migrants enter the life in the receiving societies gradually, gen-
eration by generation. The first generation is responsible for the 
economic entry and had only formal signs of belonging to a receiv-
ing society. This means economic and social integration only, 
while the emotional component and life values, just as before, are 
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determined by the group to which this migrant still belongs. The 
second generation is responsible for emotional and psychological 
entry. This generation is already able to overcome emotional and 
psychological barriers which previously were insurmountable for 
their parents due to education, professional skills etc. This second 
generation of migrants intakes the values of the new society, but 
at the same time they are still the carriers of the culture belonging 
to the first generation, their parents. Only the third generation of 
migrants is fully ready to grasp the life values of the receiving soci-
ety and thus assimilate. The important element of this theory is that 
it differentiates between various types of assimilation and integra-
tion, namely, economic, social and cultural ones.
Also valuable in the context of sociological research of migra-
tion is the theory of three phases in the process of migration by 
S.  Eisenstadt (1954). This author studied the migrants incom-
ing to Israel during the 1950s, and in this research he divided 
the migration process into three phases from the standpoint of 
migrant’s socio-psychological condition.
The first phase is the formation of migration motivation. Eisen-
stadt wrote that at this phase there arises and quickly develops the 
feeling of uncertainty and inadequacy of life circumstances for 
a potential migrant. The author emphasizes that the very fact of 
migration for a migrant himself become the only way to improve 
one’s life situation, and not only economically, but also psycho-
logically and socioculturally.
The second phase is relocation as such, movement to a new place 
of residence. A migrant changes not only his or her place in space, 
but also gets brand-new social and cultural surroundings. This 
relocation is accompanied by the process of desocialization: most 
of previously attributed life skills, in a new place, become low-
priority. There, this feeling of uncertainty already formed during 
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the first phase often gets only stronger. Besides, other negative 
socio-psychological reactions arise: fear of the future, uncertainty 
about tomorrow etc. Thus, the migrant faces the need to resocial-
ize, that is, to master new social norms and rules, necessary in the 
receiving society.
The third phase is entering the receiving society. Eisenstadt ini-
tially used the term “assimilation” for that matter; however, later 
in the text he switches to “absorption”. According to Eisenstadt, 
this phase covers three aspects: 1) institutionalization of daily 
social roles and daily social life of migrants by means of learning 
the language, adjusting to new social norms etc.; 2) adaptation 
to the requirements of the receiving society, and in turn, receiv-
ing society’s adaptation so that to accept the migrant; 3) finally, 
we can talk about migrant’s integration into the receiving society 
when the migrant loses his or her previous ethnical and cultural 
identity.
Furthermore detailed description of migrants’ assimilation in 
the receiving societies was suggested by M.M. Gordon (1964) in 
his famous “Assimilation in American Life: the Role of Race, Reli-
gion and National Origins”. In this work the author introduced 
seven types of assimilation: acculturation (adopting norms, values 
and way of life in the receiving society); structural assimilation 
(engagement in the local society’s institutes); marital assimilation 
and identification assimilation (when there arises the sense of 
unity with the receiving society, but not with the society of ori-
gin), and then behaviour reception assimilation, attitude recep-
tion assimilation and finally civic assimilation.
Gordon also paid attention to such phenomena as xenophobia 
and discrimination of persons and groups due to their foreign 
origin. His research and observations mostly concern migrants 
in the USA during the 1960s, and he came to the conclusion that 
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belonging to a particular ethnical group very much determines 
career and overall life opportunities, and to describe this feature 
and its influence on life chances of an individual he introduced 
the notion of “ethnoclass”.
M.M. Gordon viewed the process of assimilation as being com-
posed of certain stages. Migrants’ entry to the new society starts 
with cultural assimilation, the aim of which is to attract migrants 
to the core values of the receiving society. Structural assimilation 
means joining the most important institutional structures of the 
society. The assimilation process ends with cross-ethnical mar-
riages, when migrants lose their ethical identity.
A number of later sociological studies on the migrants’ adap-
tation to receiving societies actively use the notion of social 
capital. In particular, the authors apply it while considering the 
differences in children’s upbringing in different communities of 
migrants and how this upbringing determines the life chances of 
younger generations (Hirshman, Wong, 1986, pp. 1–37). In par-
ticular, they came to the conclusion that children coming from 
the families of Asian migrants have significantly higher levels 
of education achievements than, for example, the children from 
Latin American families of migrants.
In the same regard, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) came to the 
conclusion that nationality or ethnicity may be a powerful pre-
dictor of the successful adaptation of migrants. The same authors 
also outlined three types of resources which migrant communi-
ties may use for this matter. The first one includes various state 
programs (this resource is, of course, first of all applicable and 
accessible for refugees). In some cases there exist the so-called 
programs of positive discrimination of such communities, pro-
viding their members with convenient opportunities to get bet-
ter education and thus later achieve a higher social status. The 
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second type of resource is intergroup integration and solidarity 
of migrant community. Within the separate groups of migrants, 
especially when they are economically diversified, there are the 
relationships that provide mutual help and the so-called social 
elevator as well as ethnical entrepreneurship (Brettell, Altstadt 
2007 pp. 383–397).
The above-mentioned Portes and Rumbaur, in their book Lega-
cies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation, also described 
the phenomenon of downward social mobility within migrant 
communities. The authors stated that migrants’ adaptation in 
receiving societies should be viewed with special attention to 
which segment of the receiving society these migrants are being 
“built in”, since there are certain risks related to marginalization 
and ethnic criminality. Also, within the complex processes of 
assimilation and adaptation, the personal features of migrants as 
well as specific features of migrants’ communities and the selected 
features of receiving communities are important.
One of the mostly intensively developed directions in socio-
logical research on emigration issues focuses on cultural depend-
encies and supranational hierarchies of cultural and political 
loyalties. Numerous studies have demonstrated that common 
colonial past which, inter alia, leads to similarities in education 
systems as well as to language and cultural hegemony of the lead-
ing nations on the territories of their ex-colonies may become a 
truly powerful predictor of migration flows’ division (Behdad, 
1994; Blunt, 2007).
Overall, American researchers have demonstrated to be highly 
productive in sociological research of migration, which is rather 
self-explanatory, considering the very history of the United States.
The European school of external migration research differs 
from the American one significantly, first of all, by the general 
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context which determines the subject field. The European school 
in sociological research of migration had its truly solid studies, 
with application of qualitative methods, providing classification 
of migration types and determining its patterns. In particular, it 
was the European school which introduced the notion “ethnical 
migration” as then applied to the Germans, Turks, Greeks and also 
various groups from the post-Soviet territories and the Balkans. 
The typology which differentiates between pendulum migration, 
cross-border commuting and transit migration is popular today; 
it was first used in a European case study by Duvell (2006).
German researchers have provided a significant contribution to 
the sociological research of migration. One of the most funda-
mental studies of the latest decades created by German research-
ers under the leadership of J. Alt was titled “Life in the world of 
shadows” (“Leben in der Schattenwelt” in original) and it con-
cerned the problems of illegal migration (Alt, 2003).
The contribution of sociology in the research of interaction 
between the hosting society and migrants and the adaptation of 
migrants to new environments is also solid. Modalities of such 
interaction may include: assimilation (the process which leads to 
identifying oneself with a new group, which is usually accompa-
nied with the gradual loss of elements from one’s own original 
culture and attributing new features from the hosting society); 
acculturation (the process of cultures’ interaction in which the 
receiving culture accepts the elements from the donor culture); 
isolationism (this type of interaction is specific for conflicting 
parties; in it certain ethnocultural distance is formed and limita-
tion of cultural contacts is observed).
One of the most important contemporary concepts to explain 
regarding the migration processes is the theory of transnational-
ism, originating in Europe in the 1990s. Its essence lays in the 
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statement that there are no diasporas or ethnic groups anymore, 
at least not in the meaning we used to attribute to them. With 
the development of technologies and lowering of air ticket prices, 
cheaper and better-connected phone calls, and especially with 
the development of Internet technologies, relatives’ relocation to 
other countries does not mean the full end of connections with 
the sending society anymore. As a result, today it is pointless to 
consider diasporas, rather we can talk about transnational net-
works and communities. Therefore, a new term is introduced, 
which is more adequate in its description of the new properties of 
today’s migration – transmigrant.
Transmigrants are the people whose life activity is tightly con-
nected with their country of origin but also with the receiving 
society. Having both, transmigrants are developing economic, 
institutional, cultural and interpersonal relations between the 
countries (Click Schiller, Basch, Szanton Blanc, 1995 pp. 48–63). 
Transmigrants may move between the two countries, thus engag-
ing in circular migration, or they may stay on the territory of a 
receiving society but communicating only with the country of 
origin, actively using today’s means of communication. Trans-
migrants can be physically already in a new country, but at the 
same time their engagement and interest in the events back in 
the origin country is too high, thus, they in fact never cease to 
be the active members of their previous community. Accordingly, 
the theory of transnationalism emphasized that such a migrant is 
not fully detached from the country of origin and thus is forced 
to assimilate and to adapt to a receiving society. This migrant can 
be treated as the bearer of two identities, two political loyalties, as 
a participant of economic relations in two countries at the same 
time (Baubock, 2003).
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In order to illustrate the peculiarities of the sociological 
approach to the analysis of migration processes at the theoreti-
cal and methodological levels let us consider an illustration – the 
theory of migration as a response to professional stigma. The 
theory of migration as response to professional stigma considers 
the motivations behind migration decisions with the emphasis on 
migration as a means to avoid social humiliation. Social humili-
ation as stated by C. S. Fan and O. Stark is felt when others who 
are important to the individual people think he or she is doing 
something unworthy. In this case migration enables this indi-
vidual to avoid social humiliation, and under such circumstances 
migration will happen even if the economic benefits from it are 
not significant. And if those benefits are significant, then the indi-
vidual gets even more stimuli to relocate. C. S. Fan and O. Stark, 
interestingly, provide the example of Ukraine, where in the early 
1990s ship-building companies in the city of Mykolaiv did not 
have demand for engineers, but welders were in high demand. 
Engineers who lost their jobs massively became welders but not 
in their own companies, where they used to work as engineers. 
They were shifting companies to avoid social humiliation due to 
the despicable change from white-collar to blue-collar work (Fan 
et al., 2011).
The conceptual difference between experienced stigma and 
perceived one is important here. Perceived stigma comes from 
real or imagined stigmatization, while experienced stigma is an 
objective case of discrimination (Jacoby, 1994). This difference 
is rather similar to the one between subjective and objective 
discrimination.
B. Link and J. Phelan have presented the internal structure 
of the stigmatization process as a range of stages which on the 
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operational level can be recorded as social facts (Link et al., 
2001). The five stages of components of stigmatization include: 
1) labelling – people identify and symbolically mark the differ-
ence related to prestige, “normality”, level of pay, working condi-
tions etc.; 2) stereotyping  – labelled individuals are attributed 
similar features of the whole category, for example, profession4; 
3) separation  – distancing from labelled individuals, dissocia-
tion of “they” from “us”; 4) “loss of status” – labelled individual 
are somehow “devalued” in the attitude; and 5) discrimination – 
systemic disapproval and exclusion.
Thus, external migration can be interpreted as a way to avoid 
stigmatization: firstly, one can have a “not cool” profession, but 
this would be not at home, somewhere far away, where nobody 
knows him or her; secondly, low social status of the profession 
would be compensated by comparatively high pay (this especially 
concerns migration from poor countries to richer ones, with sig-
nificant difference in wages for similar jobs) (Link et al., 2001).
The factor of social stigma is an important addition to the sum-
mary of non-economic factors of external migration.
 4 A good example here would be numerous media presentations of the ste-
reotype of migrant works from Central Asia in Russian newspapers, Mos-
cow ones especially. There is even the term “emigrant criminality” – when 
without any statistical or legal proof high rate of criminality is related to 
migrants. However, in certain cases, similar to ethnical organized crime, 
ethnical origin can be indeed an influential predictor for engagement in 
illegal activity.
CHAPTER 2
Factors of External Labour 
Migration of the Ukrainians in 
History and Today
2.1 Historic retrospective of the factors in 
external migration of the Ukrainians
Intensive processes of external migration from Ukraine during the 
whole twentieth century have lead to the creation and active devel-
opment of one of the world’s largest diasporas. The largest shares 
of it reside today in Russia (over 4 million), the USA (2 million), 
Canada (1 million) and Kazakhstan (around 900 thousand) (Dias-
pora yak chynnyk…, 2008). Researchers outline four waves of 
external migration from the territory of Ukraine, each having its 
specific features due to different historic and political contexts and 
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diverse migration factors. We would like to explore these waves of 
external migration using, wherever possible, the analytical pattern 
suggested by Polish sociologist P. Sztompka in his study “Sociology: 
Analysis of Society” (Sztompka, 2002). According to Sztompka, 
social practices are being formed by two groups of factors – insti-
tutional and discursive. Besides these two dimensions, which are 
a constant focus of sociology, it is also necessary to remember the 
economic dimension of external migration.
Social practices we consider here are external migrations of the 
Ukrainians during the whole twentieth century and today, in the 
new century already. The related institutional realia include insti-
tutional, political, legal and organizational features of sending 
and receiving societies; the discursive realia include perceptions, 
commitments and values of migrants which actually provoke 
them to leave the territory of Ukraine.
We base our research mostly on Ukrainian historiographic 
sources since they have studied migration from Ukraine most 
thoroughly, with much attention to each migration wave. It is 
noteworthy that Ukrainian historiography, in its analysis of 
migration processes, is deeply ethnocentric. Such processes as 
Jewish emigration from Ukraine and the forced migration (basi-
cally deportation) of the Pols and Crimean Tatars are left totally 
out of research scope. These topics have their corpus of historical 
works, but they are considered as separate phenomena, not in the 
general context of external migration from Ukraine during the 
twentieth century.
Interestingly, one of the least considered aspects of external 
migration from Ukraine in its historical retrospective is the esti-
mation of external migrants’ numbers as such. Contradictions in 
such estimations are caused primarily by the fact that in all official 
documents and reports in the receiving countries these migrants 
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were identified by the country of origin. However, during the 
three (of four) waves of external migration from what is today 
the territory of Ukraine, migrants – though they were ethnically 
Ukrainian – were often affiliated with Russians, Austrians, Slovaks 
or Pols. Besides, we need to remember that in the early twentieth 
century the ethnonym “Ukrainian” was not widely spread as such, 
and was hardly ever used in official documents. Obviously, this 
was one of the negative factors of influence on preservation of 
Ukrainian ethnocultural identity.
Let us consider external migration wave by wave paying special 
attention to its institutional and discursive factors. The first wave 
of Ukrainian external migration covers the period of 1870–1914. 
The receiving countries in those times were the USA (since 1877), 
Brazil (since the 1880s), Canada (since 1891) and also Siberia 
(after the first Russian revolution, 1905–1907). Additional direc-
tions, insignificant in volumes though, during the first wave were 
Argentina, Australia and New Zealand (Veryga, 1996).
Halychyna, Bukovyna and Zakarpattya in those times were the 
least developed agrarian Austrian provinces. Ninety percent of 
their total population were engaged in agricultural works only; 
80% of all Halychyna peasants had lands plots smaller than 
5 hectares (in Bukovyna such plots amounted to 85% of the total, 
and in Zakarpattya, up to 73%). In the Eastern part of Halychyna 
only 5% of all peasants had plots over 10 hectares, in Bukovyna, 
also 5%, and in Zakarpattya, 10%. About 70 thousand rural 
households did not have land at all. Lack of land and extreme 
poverty were the key features of the Ukrainian regions under 
Austria those days, while their agrarian population constituted 
about 1.2 million people (Kacharaba, 1995).
Traditionally, Soviet historiography described Austria-Hungarian 
policy in relation to Western Ukrainian lands as the one aiming 
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to conserve its agrarian status of raw supplier only, a permanent 
appendage to more developed provinces of the Empire. West-
ern Ukraine in those days was the source of cheap raw materi-
als, first of all; however, certain industries were still developing 
in this region, namely, wood processing, food industries and also 
oil extraction. There is a widespread idea, constantly repeated in 
literature, that the technological development of Western Ukraine 
was artificially hindered by the metropolis. However, in our opin-
ion it was not just an evil plan of Austria-Hungarians, but more 
about the poor resources of the region as such and the constant 
conflicts of the regional elites for their use, since this periphery 
of the Empire was always financed by the leftover principle, thus 
leaving no chances for innovations of any sort.
This way or another, within the borders of Austria-Hungarian 
Empire, the economic system had both segments – the capitalistic 
one and the so-called subsistence economy, as described by the 
neoclassical theory of external migration. At the same time that 
economic system also had certain barriers which hindered the 
mobility of labour force. Thus, in many cases external migration 
turned out to be the only way possible to not only increase one’s 
welfare level but merely to survive.
Industrialization on Western Ukrainian lands developed rather 
slowly but still the share of population engaged in industrial pro-
duction gradually increased. This new working class was multina-
tional from the very beginning. The Ukrainians in this new sector 
constituted only a minority, mostly due to a low level of necessary 
skills and qualifications. The majority of industrial workers in the 
regions were Pols, Germans, Hungarians, Romanians and Czechs 
(Petriv, 1993).
The elements of political discrimination and marginalization 
were added on the top of all the social and economic hardships 
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of Ukrainian population at the periphery. For example, Western 
Ukrainians had very limited representation in the Austro-
Hungarian parliament due to the specific curial election system. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century in Eastern Halychyna 
only 7% of the general population were able to vote, while in Buk-
ovyna this number was even lower – only 4.9%. Thus, wherever 
in Austria one parliament member was representing 40 thousand 
people, in Bukovina one PM was representing 65 thousand of the 
population, and in Eastern Halychyna, 94 thousand. The situation 
remained like this till 1907 when general elections by the curial 
principle were introduced; however, certain inequalities in ethni-
cal and social class representation remained (Chornovol, 2002).
Already during the first wave of external migration from 
Ukraine we can clearly observe two very distinct migration 
vectors – Euroatlantic and Eurasian. This was predetermined by 
Ukrainian lands’ inclusion in two different political orbits, or 
two different world-systems, in the terminology of F. Braudel, 
A. G. Frank and І. M. Wallerstein.
The most thoroughly studied segment of the first migration 
wave is Canada and the USA directions, during 1891–1901 about 
80 thousand Ukrainians emigrated there from Eastern Halychyna 
only. During 1901–1911 224 thousand more Ukrainians relo-
cated in the same direction. Such a massive flow was provoked 
not only by the push factors described above. There were also 
pull factors contributing to that. First of all, these receiving 
countries had targeted governmental programs encouraging 
immigration. Canada, for example, founded a special migra-
tion syndicate at the very end of the nineteenth century which 
sent groups of recruiters to Western Ukraine. In 1872 the liberal 
government of Canada headed by J. A. MacDonald approved 
the law according to which any male of full legal age entering 
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the country could pay ten dollars and get a plot of land up to 
65 hectares in size. In Canada the Ukrainians settled mostly on 
the virgin lands of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, where 
Ukrainian hunger for land could be entirely satisfied. Besides, 
apart from 65 hectares for only ten dollars, one extra hectare 
cost slightly more than two dollars which was a hilarious price 
even for those times. However, the mandatory condition for get-
ting the land was also constructing a house on it, which would 
cost no less than 300 dollars additionally. The mandatory term 
of stay on this newly acquired land was three years; during this 
period, the settlers were supposed to spend at least 6 months 
on grubbing and plowing, so that by the end of the third year at 
least 14 hectares would be cultivated. If these conditions were 
not fulfilled, the immigrants lost their right to the land. There 
was, of course, a range of benefits and preferences for these 
newly-minted Canadian farmers; however, if an immigrant did 
not invest enough efforts in his land during the first six years, the 
plot was reverted to the state (Gutsal, 2005).
At those times the key news distributors about the benefits of 
emigration to Canada were the agents of shipping and railways 
companies who were hoping to profit from migrants’ travels. 
These agents usually got about 2–5 dollars for each immigrant to 
Canada (Kacharaba, 2002).
The average Ukrainian emigrant of those days was a young man 
from Eastern Halychyna, Bukovyna or Zakarpattya, he was illit-
erate and did not have any specific qualifications but was ready 
for any low-paid job. However, the names of the first Ukrainian 
migrants to the New World became known in a very different 
setting. One of the first Ukrainians in the USA was Atypiy Gon-
charenko, the former monk of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra who had to 
escape the country because he was followed by the Czar authori-
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ties for his active participation in the anti-serfdom movement. He 
came to the USA back in 1865 to later become the publisher of the 
Alaska Herald, a newspaper with certain influence on American 
social life (Varvartsev, 1996, p. 116).
Overall, clergy and public figures participated quite actively in 
Ukrainian diasporas, in many, founding news places and docu-
menting its activities in particular. In 1885, Rev. Volyanskyi 
organized the first Ukrainian fellowship of solidarity in America. 
At that time it had only several dozen members, and its primary 
aim was to compensate funeral losses to the families of deceased 
migrants.
The economic life of Ukrainian migrants in the New World 
was mostly within the borders of the subsistence economy; that 
is, it was concentrated on labour intensification under the con-
ditions of rather limited resources, with some support within 
Ukrainian migrant communities. Entrepreneurship with all of 
its risks was new for the Ukrainians, and thus, quite a rare case 
in the community. There were many reasons for this: low level 
of cultural competences in the new sociocultural environment; 
undereducation and absence of qualifications; poor knowledge 
of English; certain distance from the receiving society which 
was not quite ready to integrate with the newcomers. In general, 
among the first-wave migrants who came before 1914, the share 
of those who spoke English (at least to some extent) was 40.8%, 
however, among the Ukrainians their share was much lower. The 
level of literacy was one of the lowest among all ethnical groups 
in Canada (Grabovych, 1992).
During this period the institutionalization of Ukrainian dias-
poras in the receiving countries took place. Already then Ukrain-
ian diasporas had their institutional structures, with financial and 
cultural infrastructure, with its own public and even political life.
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The initial intention of the majority of Ukrainian migrants 
was to earn money and then return home. However, eventually 
advantages and benefits of the New World persuaded many to 
stay for good. The history of Ivan Pylypiv is quite illustrative in 
this sense. Once a peasant from the village Nebyliv in the Sub-
carpathians, in 1891 he arrived at the Canadian port Quebec and 
then moved to Manitoba. After his first harvest in a new place, 
Pylypiv returned home for his family and told many his success 
story5. At the end of his life Pylypiv already had 324(!) hectares of 
arable lands, which was definitely a fantastic career for a Western 
Ukrainian peasant who at home could have had 2–3 hectares at 
best. Interestingly, during his rather short trip back home, Pylypiv 
was such a successful propagandist of migration to Canada, that 
the local authorities had to intrude. At that time Austria-Hungary 
was already realizing the related risks, and passport procedures 
for peasants very soon got much more complicated.
The first Ukrainian migrants in Canada lived on a standalone 
basis. This was not only because they did not speak the language 
and were trying to “restore Ukraine” in a new place. This hap-
pened due to their place in the new social hierarchy – at the very 
bottom of it. For the next waves of immigrants, the situation was 
already different (at least for part of them): they had better educa-
tion overall and certain professional skills too, and this allowed 
them integrate in Canadian society more freely, moving up the 
social ladder but keeping elements of their Ukrainian identity at 
the same time.
Meanwhile, the inclusive character of the Canadian political 
system allowed the Ukrainians to politically integrate into the 
 5 This clearly shows that during the first migration wave already the so-called 
multiplicate effect occurred, when one migrant was first followed by his 
close family, and gradually the whole settlement migrated
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new society, keeping away bad memories about national and reli-
gious discrimination in Austria-Hungary. In 1912 the representa-
tive of Ukrainian community Teodor Stafanyk was elected to the 
municipal council in Winnipeg. In 1913 two more Ukrainians were 
elected to the provincial level parliaments – T. Forlei in Manitoba 
and A. Shandro in Alberta.
Other Western directions in the first wave of Ukrainian migra-
tion were Argentina and Brazil. Despite the limited sources avail-
able, we still know basic statistics on these directions too. The 
massive relocation of the Ukrainians to these countries started in 
the 1890s, and during the first three years (1895–1897) 20 thousand 
Ukrainians migrated to Brazil; a majority of them settled in Parana. 
During the next ten years 7–8 thousand more Ukrainians moved 
to this country, and then again 20 thousand until 1914. Thus, at the 
beginning of World War I in Europe, the Ukrainian colony in Brazil 
was already as large as 45 thousand people.
As for Argentina, we know the exact date when the mass immi-
gration of the Ukrainians began – August, 27, 1897, when the first 
12 Ukrainian families arrived in Buenos Aires. In 1914 around 
15 thousand Ukrainian migrants lived in Argentina (Vasylyk, 1982).
The opposite direction in external migration from the territory 
of today’s Ukraine was the Eurasian one. The Ukrainians living 
then in the territories belonging politically to the Russian Empire 
were also oppressed, the same as in Austria-Hungary. The abo-
lition of serfdom in 1861 led to the situation when numerous 
Ukrainians of the peasant class were left without land, and 
this logically increased their mass migration to the other side 
of the Ural Mountains. South Siberia was the most preferred 
location because lands plots were distributed there for further 
grain farming. Migration in this direction became massive after 
the Siberia railway was constructed (1891–1905). During the 
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period from 1987 till 1916 around 900 thousand people moved 
from Ukraine to distant regions of the Russian Empire (Siberia, 
Kazakhstan, Far East). The largest Ukrainian community was 
in Tomsk guberniya (“province” equivalent in Russian); about 
100 thousand Ukrainians lived there. The second largest was in 
Omsk guberniya. Many new settlements on these territories got 
typical Ukrainian names (which are still used now) – Poltavka, 
Odeske, Maryanivka, Ukrainka etc. During the whole first wave 
of migration (1850–1916) almost 490 thousand people moved to 
the lands of Far East; of them about 56% were originally from 
Ukraine. However, other sources state that during the twenty 
years before World War I over 2 million Ukrainians relocated to 
the Far East (Veryga, 2002).
Thus, we can state that institutional push factors that forced the 
Ukrainians to emigrate were the following: economic underdevel-
opment of Western Ukraine under Austria-Hungary, lack of land 
plots, heavy tax load, and high percentage rates on credit, politi-
cal and social discrimination. In this regard, famous Ukrainian-
Canadian historian M. Marunchak wrote: “Social and political 
pressure which was forming in Ukraine during several centuries 
created a situation when the owners of this land, this country, 
which is called ‘the breadbasket of Ukraine’, were forced to leave 
their own land, and as one Ukrainian lyricist wrote, ‘go over the 
hills and far away’. Obviously, political and social pressure left its 
imprint on the consciousness of those leaving the country for 
better economic and political conditions” (Marunchak, 1991, 
p. 17–18). In the discursive dimension V. Chopovskyi describes 
the push factors in the following way: “The press of those days 
paid attention to the gloomy connection between poverty and 
emigration. Poor peasants were forced to emigrate by their mate-
rial needs. High taxes, lack of lands, and most of all – lack of jobs. 
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No factories – thus, no work… Emigration is the escape from a 
powerful enemy” (Chopovskyi, 2011).
In the meantime the institutional pull factors were represented 
first of all by the activities of numerous emigration agencies, cre-
ated by both governments and large businesses of the receiving 
countries. In Western Ukraine, the Austria-Hungary government 
only began to restrain the activities of such organizations at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, when their destructive demo-
graphic and economic impacts were already too obvious.
As for the discursive dimension we can assume that rumours 
about the countries across the ocean were spread by those who had 
more inclination to migration behaviour: those were neighbouring 
Pols, Slovaks or Hungarians, who started their external migration 
earlier than the Ukrainians. Such information was spread through 
letters and they also returned for the families. There is evidence 
that the first Ukrainians moved to Canada having heard rumours 
only or having read personal letters from that country (for exam-
ple, Pylypiv, mentioned earlier, heard about the advantages of emi-
gration to Canada from school teachers and also from the relatives 
of some German settlers who already were in Canada). Therefore, 
we can state that even long before rapid development of global 
communications, mass imaginations of the advantages of emigra-
tion and its potential directions were quickly spread through per-
sonal communications, including those with recruiters, and this 
stimulated the migration processes of the first wave.
The chaos of World War I and the extremely complicated 
period between the wars had tragic large-scale consequences for 
Ukraine. Millions of human lives, sacrifices to the communist 
gods of industrialization and collectivization, establishment of 
the totalitarian regime (which lasted, as we know, for many dec-
ades, until the 1990s) – this was the horrible price Ukraine paid 
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during that period. Not surprisingly, migration in that period was 
the relocation of those people who today would have been called 
“the creative class”.
The second wave of external migration of the Ukrainians cov-
ered the whole period between the world wars and was caused by 
a complex combination of social, economic and political reasons. 
For this wave, obviously, the push factors dominated and fully 
explained the migration behaviour.
After the end of World War I, migration potential fed on the 
ruins of both monarchies – Austria-Hungarian and Russian – and 
more specifically, in the countries which arose from these monar-
chies. In 1918 Poland was restored, inheriting Eastern Halychyna 
from Austria-Hungary, and also Western Volyn and Western 
Polissya from Russia. Mass mobilization, increasing quantities of 
refugees from both sides, frequent ethnical deportations, political 
oppression – these were the reasons behind the migration inten-
tions of this period in history.
A part of the migrating Ukrainians did not agree with the 
Soviet authority and ideology due to the Soviet terror against 
large and medium farm owners, merchants, clergy and intelli-
gentsia. A large chunk of the second wave migration was formed 
from the liberation movement participants: the supporters of 
Simon Petlura, or Hetman Skoropadskiy, or Central Rada, or the 
Western Ukrainian People’s Republic.
At the same time, emigrants of this wave were much more edu-
cated; these were professionals in many fields, researchers, econ-
omists, writers etc. The latter were especially prominent; many 
of them later became famous in Poland, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, France, USA or Canada – 
these were the receiving countries of the second wave.
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Apart from the obvious social differences from the first-wave 
movers (higher literacy rate and better education, first of all), 
another key change was that the second wave settled mostly in 
cities. They did not form closed ghetto-like communities; many 
of them had enough education and skills for a good start in a new 
place. There were also a lot of activists among the migrants of 
the second wave, and this was the reason for the strengthening of 
organizational structure of the diasporas, with numerous clubs, 
cooperatives, newspapers etc. to appear very soon.
Remigration was also one of the features of the second wave, 
just like with the first one. However, during the second wave it did 
not have any economic reasoning, nor the aim to recruit further. 
The key reason for remigration was actually quite sad and naïve 
at the same time: many believed in the idea of the Soviet Union 
and were hoping for a fresh start there, under changed condi-
tions. Probably, the most famous case of such remigration was the 
story of the former President of the Ukrainian People’s Republic 
Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who returned to the Soviet Union in 1924 
to be politically followed later on, accused in nationalism and 
die ten years later under unclear circumstances after a surgery 
on an anthrax-related small carbuncle. The vast majority of those 
who returned to Ukraine during the 1930s died in concentration 
camps or were politically oppressed in some other way as “the 
enemies of the state”.
As for the Ukrainians in the territories of the restored Polska 
Rzeczpospolita, several researchers state that during the 1920–
1930s, the government of Poland was actively stimulating the 
external migration of the Ukrainians, mostly because the latter 
were seen as a threat to national security. The potential advan-
tages of Ukrainian emigration for Poland were many: getting rid 
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of excessive workforce in the country; intensified sea ports’ per-
formance; promotion of passenger fleet development; additional 
opportunities for foreign trade development; avoiding social 
tensions between social and ethnic groups inside the country 
(Kacharaba, 2002).
The migration policy of the Polish government between the 
two world wars was developing in the context of its ethnona-
tional policy aimed at strengthening the national components in 
all regions in favour of the Pols and encouraging Ukrainian and 
Jewish emigration to Brazil, Argentina and Palestine (Kacharaba, 
2003, p. 416). With such aims, a range of migration affairs offices 
were created in Western Ukraine, namely, the Commissariat for 
Emigration Administration (1920), the Administration for Labour 
Intermediation and Emigrants Support (1921) and the Navy and 
Colonial League (1924) (Stending, 1935, p. 13–15).
These organizations were so successful that already in 1938 the 
countries of Latin America, first of all, Brazil and Argentina, had 
to turn to immigration limitations  – from Europe overall and 
from Poland specifically. However, this did not stop Poland from 
encouraging emigration of minorities further on, since the Pols 
continued to see emigration as the key to harmonization of social 
relations. In 1939 the State Secretary М. Arciszewski affirmed that 
“it is necessary to continue developing overseas emigration, and 
especially emigration of national minorities” (Kolodziej, 1982).
Since the Soviet migration regime was totally closed, even such 
powerful institutional push factors as the repressive policy of 
the Bolsheviks government (the so-called “red terror” (Bilokin, 
1999)), collectivization and dekulakization (the campaign against 
individual farming), prohibition of peasants’ mobility (in the 
Soviet Union peasants did not have the right to relocate inde-
pendently from the assigned village until the 1960s), constants 
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campaigns against the so-called “enemies of the state” etc. did not 
manage to cause mass emigration from the country. Mass dis-
courses on the inability to perceive and “digest” the policies and 
ideology of the new state are manifested in a great deal of details 
in numerous memoirs of political and cultural figures of those 
times (Petrov, 1959).
As for the institutional pull factors (related mostly to the activi-
ties of numerous organizations and institutions encouraging 
emigration using a range of positive stimuli), we can mention 
networks of emigrant organizations (for example, “Promethe-
ism” established in 1926 to work with the Ukrainians, Georgians, 
Turkmens, Karels etc. in their joint fight for creation of independ-
ent states on the territories of the USSR). European governments 
also often used political emigration from the Soviet Union as a 
card in the game against Soviet regime.
The third wave of external migration from the territories of 
today’s Ukraine was, similarly to the second one, caused primar-
ily by political reasons. It started at the end of World War II. The 
vast majority in this generation of migrants were the so-called 
DPs – the displaced persons in French, German or British zones 
of temporary occupation. These were former slaves (ostarbeiters) 
and/or prisoners from concentration camps who were left in the 
territories under the Allies’ control once the war was over. These 
were also the guerrillas who fought against the Soviet Army, Nazi 
collaborators and/or participants of the national freedom move-
ments, who knew that Stalin camps were waiting for them in the 
Soviet Union. These were the people who joined Ukrainian dias-
poras in Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Latin America, and 
also formed the new diaspora in Australia.
Once the war was over, the vast majority of them clearly refused 
to return to Ukrainian lands and settled down in Canada, the USA, 
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Great Britain, Australia, Brazil, Argentina and France. Quite a large 
share of these new emigrants travelled to the USA (80 thousand), 
fewer chose Great Britain (35 thousand) and Australia (20 thousand). 
Brazil was chosen as the destination point by 7 thousand people; 
Argentina, 6 thousand; France, 10 thousand. The political context 
of that period was favourable for the Ukrainians; they were seen as 
political refugees (Yevtukh et al., 2010).
Social trends of the second migration wave remained valid for 
the third one. Many of the newcomers were researchers, clergy 
and political and civil activists. They contributed a lot to the 
blossoming of political, cultural and religious life in Ukrainian 
diasporas. It is noteworthy that the third wave was very much 
politicized, for obvious reasons; however, the political orientation 
was not univocal – the political segments of the third wave migra-
tion were in constant confrontation, and this, of course, did not 
contribute to the sense of unity within the diaspora.
Later on, after those who left Soviet Ukraine straight after the 
war, there was also a minor wave of dissidents who occasionally 
managed to escape from the Stalin regime to the West. A sepa-
rate group was formed by Ukrainian protestants (mainly Pen-
tecostals with their families with multiple children) (Zakharov, 
2003). These were included in the economic and political life of 
the receiving societies more freely and quickly due to the com-
mon religion factor.
The Western direction of Ukrainian external migration was not 
the only one. After World War II 100 thousand of the Ukrain-
ians were sent to Siberia. Not all of them were political prisoners, 
though. Many were simply forced to relocate in the context of the 
state policy of creating a homogenous ethnocultural mix, which 
was supposed to serve as a foundation for the “nation of Soviet 
people”.
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The institutional push factors of the third wave are quite com-
parable with the same during the second wave. The key factor was 
the Stalinism threat, reinforced by the factors of after-war ruins 
and general social disorganization.
It would be wrong to state that the Soviet Union was trying to 
limit emigration. Officially, there was no emigration from the 
Soviet Union in the post-war years as such. Moreover, external 
affairs and intelligence offices of the Soviet Union were carrying 
out a lot of active secret work to return those citizens who “were 
lost in the West” during the war. Thus, in October 1944, the Repa-
triation Committee was founded, the aim of which was to return 
home those Soviet citizens who, for some reason, were relocated 
outside Soviet territories during the war. Its representatives, often 
accompanied by defence intelligence, were paying visits to many 
European countries, including Germany, which was then home 
for a quite numerous Ukrainian community (Danylenko, 2002). 
Most often such “returnings home” were forced ones, strongly 
resembling kidnapping.
The situation changed in 1947 when the International Relief 
Organization (IRO) was founded with the aim of taking care of 
and supporting the displaced persons. The IRO’s activities were 
based on the agreements with new European authorities and their 
American allies, and in fact, the IRO became the diplomatic pro-
vider of legal and political protection for the displaced. Speaking 
strictly legally, all affairs related to displaced persons until 1949 
were in the competence of the military occupation authorities 
of the Allies; however, both Canada and the USA already had 
civil organizations functioning in this field – the Support Fund 
for the Ukrainians of Canada and the United Ukrainian Ameri-
can Help Committee. These organizations helped those willing 
to leave Germany; they provided invitations for entry, explained 
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what procedures and documents would be needed to do so etc. 
(Podobed, 2008).
A good example of how mass discourse explained the push 
factors of the third wave can be found in the pamphlet “Why I 
did not want to return to the USSR” (1946) written by Ukrain-
ian writer Ivan Bagryanyi and translated very quickly into many 
European languages (Bagryanyi, 1946).
Among other works on Ukrainian emigration during and after 
the World War II we can mention the well-known I. Stebelskyi 
work “Ukrainian population migration after World War II” 
(1992) and O. Subtelnyi “Ukrainian political refugee: an historical 
overview” (1992).
Therefore, the first and all following historical waves of migration 
from Ukraine are very different in terms of both push and pull fac-
tors forcing Ukrainian population to go looking for a better place. 
The first migration wave from Ukraine can be described as reloca-
tion for land and for welfare. This wave is a good illustration of the 
importance of economic factors of migration and how migration 
decisions are made by the whole household (even in cases when 
only one person was moving abroad, it was so expensive that the 
whole family was gathering money for that). From the theoretical 
viewpoint, the first wave of Ukrainian external migration can be 
the best described by the neoclassical theory of migration, operat-
ing, in particular, under the notion of dual economy, which con-
sists of the capitalist segment and the economy of subsistence.
In contrast, the second and third waves of migration from 
Ukraine were first of all forced and deeply political; they were least 
of all influenced by economic factors and household decision-
making. These migration waves can be described as relocation in 
search of life and freedom. Such migration was not planned in 
advance; it was drastic, often under extreme circumstances.
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It is curious to compare the first wave on one hand and the 
second and the third waves on the other, from both standing 
points – economic and sociological. Such a comparison reveals 
the specific features of institutional influences and the differences 
in migrants’ mechanisms of adaptation to receiving societies, 
including the processes of ghettoization or, on the opposite, suc-
cessful integration into the receiving society.
2.2 Socioeconomic factors of the fourth wave 
of external labour migration from Ukraine 
at its two stages: “escaping from misery” and 
“searching for better life”
During the Soviet Union times, Ukraine, like other Soviet repub-
lics, had a very closed migration regime. At that stage, the migra-
tion behaviour of all citizens was first of all determined by the 
institutional political factor. During the Soviet times there was 
no such phenomenon as labour emigration as such. In the late 
years of the Soviet rule, tourism spread, heading mostly to other 
countries of the Socialist camp. And in such rare occasions, the 
procedure of getting an international passport was extremely 
complicated as well as all other arrangements related to travelling 
outside the Union, and this stopped many from even thinking 
about it. Besides, any hint about travelling abroad immediately 
caught the attention of the Soviet secret services. There was a spe-
cial list of documents to get an approval for travelling abroad and 
it included: a reference letter from the local branch of the Com-
munist party (and it was supposed to be signed by the three top 
persons  – the head of the enterprise, the secretary of the local 
trade union and the secretary of the local party branch); the so-
called “objective data” – a detailed life story listing all places of 
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work and residence; the statement of good health, including a 
detailed blood test; the written grounding of the travel aim; the 
invitation letter (in rare cases when the travel was private); the 
detailed calendar plan of travelling(!); and also, after the travel, 
the citizen had to write the travel report to be submitted to the 
controlling bodies.
After all these documents were ready, the potential traveller had 
to pay a visit to the local party unit to be instructed on proper 
Soviet behaviour abroad. Besides, there were also several catego-
ries of Soviet citizens which were banned from travelling abroad, 
mostly those working for the military sector and “politically 
unstable” citizens.
The fourth wave of external migration from Ukraine started in 
the second half of the 1980s, when first gradual democratization 
and later the Soviet split had liberalized the migration regime. 
Comparing this wave with the two previous ones, the fourth one 
can be called (relatively) voluntary; even though there were still 
rather powerful push factors, external migration was not seen as 
the only way to save life and freedom, as it was before.
Apart from more favourable institutional and political environ-
ments, the external migration from Ukraine was stimulated by 
the worsening economic conditions inside the country: the GDP 
drop was a dramatic one, by 60% from the end of 1980s till the 
mid 1990s. This was worse than during the Great Depression in the 
USA 60 years before. Additional contributing negative economic 
factors included: growing unemployment due to serious changes 
at the labour market; galloping inflation; concentration of money 
capital in big cities only and degradation of rural life; the loss of 
production potential (in fact, nearly total deindustrialization) etc.
The first migrants of the fourth wave were mostly the rep-
resentatives of ethnic minorities which relocated under the 
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programmes of family reunions, using the support of receiving 
countries. These were first of all Jews, Germans, Hungarians and 
Greeks. According to the state statistics, out of 95.4 thousand 
people leaving Ukraine in 1990, 92% moved to Israel (Vovkanych, 
2004, p. 117). According to the data of Jewish organizations in 
the USA, in the period from 1989 to 1994 more than half of the 
legal immigrants from Ukraine were of Jewish origin. Later on, 
their share in the total migration flow was gradually decreasing: 
from 54% in 1994 to merely 8% in 2001.
Socioeconomic determinants of external migration from 
Ukraine at its fourth wave always have to be considered in the 
more general socioeconomic context of Ukrainian society – from 
the early 1990s till now, actually. There were two specific periods 
in this wave which were different in terms of socioeconomic con-
text around the migration decision and also in terms of external 
migrants’ motivations.
The first of these periods lasted from the beginning of 1990s 
and till the beginning of the new millennium. It was defined by 
the severe socioeconomic crisis, dramatic drop in the welfare level 
in the country, depreciation of nearly all savings due to inflation 
and also due to mass fraud with accounts within the Sberbank of 
the USSR (Bank of Savings). It is noteworthy that crisis phenom-
ena in Ukrainian economy did not appear with the proclamation 
of country’s independence (as it is often interpreted in certain 
politicized discourses) but long before that. The growth of the 
Soviet economy (of course, not the official one, but according to 
alternative calculations) was 6% during the 1950s, then 3% only 
during the 1960s, 2% for the 1970s and finally 1% in the 1980s 
(Popov, 2006). Reconstruction (now known as “Perestroika” in 
Russian) was initiated by the Soviet leaders in the mid 1980s as 
an attempt to save the country from the huge, unmanageable and 
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self-destructing economic system, which was absorbing all pos-
sible resources, being oriented only on military production and 
totally ignoring the existence of the consumer sector as such.
The majority of the population in the late Soviet times were liv-
ing with two key notions in mind – deficit and “blat” (a Russian 
slang word for cronyism, necessary connections). Deficit meant 
constant absence or very limited availability of consumer goods 
of any sort, while “blat” meant the opportunities to solve the 
problem of deficit through the intricate system of necessary con-
nections. During the very last years of the Soviet Union even the 
most simple food products became deficit, including sausages, 
coffee, tea or sugar (Ledeneva, 1998). Ironically, having the larg-
est agricultural potential in the world in terms of agricultural land 
size, the country was suffering from extremely low labour produc-
tivity, poorly developed logistics and disorientation in consumer 
preferences and needs. Unfortunately, the state authorities envi-
sioned the ways to solve the socioeconomic problems only in the 
context of the established command system. One of the decrees 
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, dated 1988, obligated 
all local authorities “to liquidate waiting lines and end up viola-
tions and abuse related to deficit products sales” (Postanovlenie 
Sovmina RSFSR…, 1988), while no specific economic measures 
were ever developed.
Thus, independent Ukraine inherited quite a heavy load of eco-
nomic problems from the Soviet Union split. Sadly, Ukraine did 
not solve those problems but rather multiplied them. In the con-
text of catastrophic socioeconomic problems, the liberalization of 
migration regime naturally led to a dramatic increase of emigra-
tion flows.
The first half of the 1990s was the period of recession for the 
Ukrainian economy, and this recession was only speeding up. 
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Overall, the recession lasted till 1999; however, in its last two 
years it was quite moderate. The gross product decreased signifi-
cantly: its fall in 1992 was 16.5%, 14.2% in 1993, and even 23% in 
1994. According to the official statistics of 1992–1993, the infla-
tion index in Ukraine was ranging from 2100% to 10256% which 
was an unprecedented case considering that the country was not 
engaged in a war (Ganusyk, 2013, p. 47).
The radical transformation of the labour market led to the loss of 
millions of jobs. After the decades of traditional Soviet paternalism, 
people lost all guarantees regarding their job placement. Despite the 
numerous economic bottlenecks of socialism, the Soviet Union had 
a rather stable employment system which guaranteed many things, 
including: the first place of employment for all graduates, rigid 
standards on labour security, strict timing of working hours etc. The 
typical social package for any working Soviet citizen included free 
medical support, a once-a-year opportunity to use the Union-wide 
system of resorts and sanatoriums, guaranteed pension minimum 
etc. Under such a highly paternalistic system the employment rate 
in the country was almost 100%, employee turnover was nearly 
impossible and the difference in wages country-wide was not that 
significant. After decades of living “in an ivory tower of social pro-
tection” Ukrainian population was simply not ready for the changed 
socioeconomic conditions of the harsh 1990s.
It took quite some time to decrease the rate of social expecta-
tions on guaranteed jobs, long vacations, free-of-charge medical 
and education services, labour rights protected by default etc. 
And even till now, both in mass consciousness and in political 
discourse there is a certain place for sentiments about returning 
to the system of state socialism. Paternalistic habits are very sta-
ble, people get used to them too easily, and it will take some time 
to change this attitude (Susak, 2007).
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Overall, in the post-Soviet and post-socialist countries there 
have been two radically different approaches to state manage-
ment of the reforms. The first one involved the so-called “shock 
therapy”, according to which in a short-term period of profound 
socioeconomic changes, all necessary elements of the free market 
economy were introduced at once, and this short-term shocking 
period was then followed by economic recovery. This approach 
was chosen by the majority of Central European countries from 
the former socialist camp, including Poland.
The second approach involved gradual and rather slow reforms, 
taking into account the current level of welfare and the public opin-
ion. This approach was chosen by the majority of Central European 
postsocialist countries, including Poland, and also by Baltic coun-
tries. The second approach included gradual, rather slow reforms, 
taking into account the issue of welfare and life quality and also 
public opinion. These gradual reforms were, inter alia, carried out 
in Bulgaria and Romania. Both of these approaches could have been 
efficient, actually, if applied wisely; however, the case of Ukraine 
does not fall into any of them. After 1991, the year of Ukraine’s 
independence declaration, the new political leadership did not 
manage to choose any consistent strategy for further development 
(Kovalskyi et al., 2012). To be more precise, the approaches to the 
process of reforms, their vision and their aims were changing all the 
time, in parallel with changes in the political environment. There is 
a range of reasons behind this situation, the key of them being the 
polarization of the political and ruling elite in the country: part of 
the politicians were thinking about the free market and European 
vector of the development; however, a significant share of the rul-
ing class were still the representatives of the former Communist 
nomenklatura or people with rather leftist views, still oriented on 
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establishing the socialist-like economic model and on a Eurasian 
vector of geopolitical integration.
Two key features of societal reform in Ukraine were on one 
hand, the neoliberal way, chosen just as it was by many developed 
Western countries, and on the other hand, the system of state 
socialism stayed. Lack of unity inside the political elite, domi-
nance of pragmatic interests of certain business groups, constant 
pandering to populism and frequent political changes, all have 
led to the emergence of a hybrid economic and political system 
in Ukraine.
Similar processes were happening at the labour market and 
within labour policies which influenced accordingly the migration 
phenomena and intentions. Removal of nearly all state guaran-
tees at the labour market led to massive precarization of labour in 
Ukraine. Changing regulation of Ukrainian labour market made 
it rather flexible, on one hand, but on the other, the whole load 
of risks and uncertainties was now on employees, not employers. 
As a result – just as in many Western societies, but many years 
before – a new social class emerged, the precariat (from the Latin 
word “precarium” – not stable, not trusted, threatening, the one 
which is in the state of uncertainty).
This term was introduced by G. Standing (2011), and accord-
ing to Standing, precariat consists of those people who feel the 
lack of labour security; they are not sure that in case of workplace 
loss, they would be able to find a new one. This also concerns the 
lack of security at a workplace; lack of opportunities to improve 
qualifications and develop one’s career further; lack of guaran-
teed income for a longer term; the fear to stand for one’s position 
in a workplace; and the fear to communicate one’s vision to an 
employer (Standing, 2011).
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Labour migration from Ukraine is undoubtedly a precarious 
phenomenon. Legal, long-term and guaranteed employment 
under social security protection and with further opportunities 
for career growth is a very rare case for the Ukrainians work-
ing abroad. Overall, the dynamics of illegal employment of the 
Ukrainians abroad is relatively positive, at least if compared with 
the first half of the fourth migration wave.
During the first period of the fourth wave in external migration 
from Ukraine, human trafficking was a frequent phenomenon. 
Two major forms of human trafficking were females’ trade for 
sexual services, and human trade for labour purposes. The typical 
situation with such trafficking was when a person left the country 
completely legally and voluntarily, but was later, when already 
abroad, forced into restriction and further labour exploitation. 
The number of the Ukrainians who became the victims of human 
trafficking during the 1990s, according to some estimations, may 
have been as many as 100 thousand people (Vasylyeva et al., 2012). 
The situation with illegal employment became much better after 
the so-called “migration amnesties” in a range of countries typical 
for Ukrainian labour migration (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece), 
after the new legislation was introduced extending the opportuni-
ties for legal employment of foreigners (in Poland). According to 
Ukrainian state statistics, in 2008 35.1% of labour migrants had 
work permits, 39.3% had temporary registration, while 25.6% of 
labour migrants did not have any official status abroad. The larg-
est share of unregistered migrants from Ukraine resided that year 
in Poland – 56.2% (Ensuring…, 2012, p. 10).
This data is confirmed by similar information from the State 
Labour Inspection of Poland: in 2014 they checked around 
15.5  thousand foreigners working in Poland, among whom 
9.5  thousand were citizens of Ukraine. Among all working 
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foreigners, 870 cases of illegal employment were detected, of 
which 777 concerned the Ukrainians (Mihranty…, 2015).
What is the share of precariat in the general structure of the 
society then? Many authors suggest their own criteria by which 
certain citizens can be attributed to this social group:
• Market criteria (unemployment, forced part-time char-
acter of the job, participation in seasonal work);
• Legal criteria (non-official employment; not determined 
legal status of stay in a country);
• Social and labour criteria (instability of work; flexible 
forms of work; overload and high technical risks);
• Social-psychological criteria (uncertainty about keep-
ing the current job; social exclusion or stigmatization; 
uncertainty about the future);
• Economic criteria (low level of income as such) 
(Grishnova et al., 2014).
Using these criteria and the official data of the State Commit-
tee for Statistics and also the data from the International Labour 
Organization (Profil…, 2012) we can assume that the share of pre-
cariat in Ukraine is about 50% of the whole gainfully employed 
population.
An additional proof that precariat phenomenon was one of the 
push factors in external migration is the data obtained during the 
ESS, Round 6 (European Social Survey. Round 6 was carried out 
in 2012). The survey confirmed that the respondents who have the 
experience of unemployment also have much more experience 
with external migration, as compared to those who were never 
unemployed (ESS, Round 6, 2012). In the group of the respond-
ents who declared the experience of labour migration during the 
last 10 years, the share of those who also had been unemployed 
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is 56.5%, while in the group with no labour migration experience 
the share of those who were once unemployed was 41.7%.
For Ukraine, this trend would be similar, however, with cer-
tain clarifications. The specifics of the socioeconomic situation 
at Ukrainian labour market makes uncertain the status of not 
only precariat, but also those of salariat and professionals too. 
The phenomenon of poverty among the employed, delays of 
wages, high rate of inflation, frozen indexation of wages and 
general decrease of consumer spending  – all of this makes 
the well being of the vast majority of all gainfully employed 
in Ukraine uncertain, despite the nominal status at the labour 
market (Mishchuk & Grishnova, 2015).
Precariat as a social group exists in most economic systems and 
at nearly all labour markets today due to the global shift in public 
administration to the side of neoliberalism. The problem of pre-
cariat among Ukrainian labour migrants remains quite serious; 
however, during the recent several years there has been a notice-
able rebalancing in favour of legal employments (mostly due to 
“migration amnesties” and bilateral agreements of Ukraine with 
the migrant-receiving countries).
In Ukraine a large share of the population (according to our 
estimations, about 50% of the gainfully employed population 
in the country) experience precariatization. Under such condi-
tions the absence of labour rights guarantees in Ukraine serves 
as the push factor, however, employment abroad is not consid-
ered as the way to get long-term legal employment and guar-
anteed social benefits. Labour migrants often agree to abandon 
their labour right only for the sake of higher incomes, albeit 
temporary ones.
All of the described socioeconomic, institutional and politi-
cal preconditions have created a rather favourable context for 
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the formation of migration intentions among a large share of the 
Ukrainians. Motivation of external migrants relocating during 
the first decade of the fourth wave can be called “escaping from 
misery”, since most frequently their primary goal was not enrich-
ment, but satisfaction of their basic needs. The first to appreci-
ate the advantages of the migration regime liberalization on the 
background of socioeconomic collapse back at home were pro-
fessionals with quite a high level of education and qualifications 
(Leontenko, 1999). Gradually, external migration became more 
and more common practice, expanding to other social stratas, 
including escapers from rural life and blue-collar labourers.
During 1995–1996 the Ukrainian economy experienced rela-
tive stabilization and even some sort of revival. The inflation 
went abruptly down, and the price growth rate demonstrated 
a decline – from 400% in 1992 to only 40% in 1996. The gen-
eral economic situation had favourable effects on the salaries 
of all citizens; in the period from October 1994 to April 1997 
the average salary grew more than fourfold (recalculated in 
the American dollar equivalent, this was from 22 to 90 USD) 
(Voronyanskyi, 2012).
Significant changes in migration intentions motivation took 
place during the second half of the fourth migration wave. The 
beginning of this period coincided with the beginning of the new 
millennium. It is worth noting that it was in also in 2000 when 
Ukraine had its first real growth recorded since the independence 
in 1991. The real GDP grew by 6% as compared to the increase 
by 0.4% back in 1999. The maximum level of GDP growth in 
Ukraine was recorded in 2003, and it was over 15%. In 2006 the 
GDP of Ukraine was 63% to the level of the year 1989, and in 2007 
it was already 68%. That was the period of gradual improvement 
of the socioeconomic situation in Ukraine.
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At the beginning of the 2000s the key reasons for external 
migration of the Ukrainian population were low wages, unem-
ployment, the desire to improve life conditions, unsatisfactory 
workplace conditions etc. Therefore, during the second half of the 
fourth wave, external migration of the Ukrainians was motivated 
mostly by the desire to increase the general level of welfare, to 
solve the housing problem, to finance university education for 
children etc. The survey “External labour migration of Ukrainian 
population” carried out by the State Committee for Statistics and 
the Ukrainian centre for social reforms, under the support of the 
Open Ukraine Foundation and the representative offices of the 
International Organization for Migration and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Ukraine, demon-
strated that in the hierarchy of emigration motives the second 
most important place is occupied simply by salary, which is sup-
posed to satisfy the basic needs – food, primary consumer goods 
(clothes etc.).
This finds its manifestation in the quantitative indicators of 
external migration. At the beginning of the 2000s the quantity of 
people leaving Ukraine was quite large, for example, in 2002 alone 
the emigration was 76.3 thousand people. However, according 
to the data of the State Committee for Statistics, in 2003, due to 
improving socioeconomic conditions, there was a decrease in the 
quantity of emigrants, and in 2005 their quantity was half on the 
previous number. The recorded minimum of Ukrainian emigrants 
of the fourth wave was in 2012 – 14.5 thousand. However, already 
in 2013 there was again recorded a growth of emigration which 
was, most probably, caused by the worsening socioeconomic con-
ditions and also by the political turmoil at the end of that year.
Considering the most recent developments, we can assume 
that since the end of 2013 and through today we are experiencing 
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the third period of the fourth wave in external migration from 
Ukraine which probably would later be called “the escape from 
political turmoil and war threats”.
Data on the structure of household spending in Ukraine dur-
ing the first half of the 2000s demonstrated the economic growth 
of the country which started in 2008 and lasted till the beginning 
of the world financial and economic crisis in 2009. Already in 2008 
the GNP of Ukraine went down by almost 15%. However, dur-
ing the first half of the 2000s the dynamics of household spend-
ing showed a gradually improving balance of food and non-food 
spending. As previously, in the country as a whole the key spend-
ing item was still food; however, its share in the total spending was 
gradually decreasing – from 70% in the middle of the 1990s to 50% 
in 2008. Along with the decreasing share of food spending, during 
19999–2008 the share of spending on non-food products and on 
services was gradually increasing.
Economic growth, which started in Ukraine in 2000, sadly, had 
very little positive influence on the most vulnerable social groups. 
The rural population was still living under hardcore poverty, and 
the socioeconomic gap between urban and rural life was only 
enlarging. The specific feature of the Ukrainian economy is the 
poverty of the working population. Today, just as in the 1990s, the 
availability of a job does not mean better life conditions.
An important financial phenomenon in the Ukrainian econ-
omy during the second period of the fourth migration wave was 
(and still is) international remittances sent by Ukrainian labour 
migrants. The key feature of such remittances is that they are 
delivered mostly informally, via friends and/or relatives, and also 
through drivers employed on regular transits between Ukraine 
and the receiving countries. According to the World Bank study 
(2010), 40% of Ukrainian external migrants are using the help 
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of friends or relatives to transfer financial funds to their families 
at home; 32% of them are using the services of a carrier (most 
probably the bus driver), and only 25% entrust their remittances 
to official companies which transfer funds internationally. The 
key reasons behind such distribution are low cost of transfer and 
also relative quickness. Ninety-eight percent of such transfers are 
done in USD, the average amount of one transfer is 200 dollars. 
As compared to other ethnical groups of labour migrants, the 
Ukrainians transfer home a comparatively small share of their 
incomes (around 7–9%) (World bank. Migration and Remit-
tances Factbook, 2011). At the same time, the National Bank 
of Ukraine made an attempt to recalculate the actual volume of 
all private remittances to Ukraine from abroad, and their final 
conclusion was that only 13.7% of all personal money transfers 
from abroad come to Ukraine through informal channels (Remit-
tances…, 2014).
Data on this can be seen in the table below. As the table shows, 
as of 2013, over one-third of all private remittances from abroad 
to Ukraine were from the Russian Federation, and the rest were 
from European countries, that is, belonging to the Euro-Atlantic 
vector in Ukrainian external migration. We can assume that since 
then the structure of these private remittances (as the overall 
structure of external economic activity of Ukraine) has changed 
by means of widening the Euro-Atlantic share and lowering the 
share of the Eurasian vector.
Overall, the dynamics of private remittances to Ukraine dem-
onstrates its drastic increase since 2006, and the influence of the 
global financial crisis which started in 2008 was not so important.
Today in Ukraine there is a specific category of citizens for 
whom these remittances are the key means of survival (and 
in some cases, the only one). This phenomenon is especially 
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important for those regions which have both high unemploy-
ment rates and an international border; thus, naturally, these 
regions would have all preconditions for the well-established 
practice of external labour migration. These are the Transcar-
pathian region, Ternopil, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsks oblasts and 
also for Eastern Ukrainian regions which, in terms of external 
migration, are oriented in the Eurasian direction. During the 
periods of worsening economic situation in the country, these 
private transfers from abroad are mostly spent on the consumer 
needs of households, but when the general economic situa-
tion gets better, they can also be spent on real estate, transport 
vehicles, university tuition fees and also on starting one’s own 
business (Varetska, 2005, p. 35). This regularity has also been 
detected by Ukrainian researcher Ella Libanova, and she also 
noted: “while the poorest households forced by their economic 
Table 1: Country division of private remittances to Ukraine using 
official channels, 2013.













Source: data of the National Bank of Ukraine.
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troubles spend the obtained funds on consumption or medical 
services, those which are better-to-do, often invest these funds. 
First of all, this can be investment in real estate construction… 
the second option is education for family members… and the 
third one is starting own business” (Libanova, 2011, p. 17).
In 2012 Czech researcher B. Weyskrabova also wrote that: “The 
process of transformation after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
cannot be probably declared as finished. The country is still fight-
ing high unemployment, slow economic development and high 
inflation. Overall development of the country is hampered par-
ticularly by political environment and situation of dependency on 
Russian energy sources and struggles for power” (Weyskrabová, 
2012, p. 43).
The recent events in the social and political life of Ukraine have 
given the country new hopes, in particular, those related to speed-
ing up reforms. Namely, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
was signed; the free trade zone was introduced; the state policy 
on corruption fight and prevention has been significantly rein-
forced; also, important steps have been made in the direction of 
local self-government role’s strengthening and business deregula-
tion; in order to reduce the energy dependency on Russia certain 
measures have been taken on diversification of energy sources’ 
use etc.
At the same time new challenges arise creating new prob-
lems for the socioeconomic development of Ukraine. A signifi-
cant part of economic potential has been lost in the result of 
the Crimea annexation and the military conflict in the Donbass 
region. These events also contributed to the large-scale flow of 
forced relocations. According to the data of the Cabinet of Minis-
ters of Ukraine, as of March 2015 Ukraine had 1.1 million forced 
internal migrants, and this is a significant load on the system of 
Factors of  External Labour Migration of  the Ukrainians 81
social protection and on the labour market (Kilkist…, 2015). 
The general level of life quality got worse not only for those relo-
cated but for the whole society: according to the most optimistic 
government numbers, inflation in 2015 was at the level of 54% 
while all salaries were frozen and pensions for those who keep 
working after the retirement age have even been reduced. Drastic 
depreciation of the national currency has led to significant loss 
of population savings’ value and the consequent increase of the 
national poverty level.
Obviously, such a situation has created the conditions for addi-
tional growth of migration intentions and the consequent increase 
of external migration flow. One of the recorded consequences in 
this context is the increase in the number of Ukrainian citizens 
applying for asylum in other countries.
The number of asylum seekers from Ukraine in the EU in 2015 
went over 22 thousand (this is 33% more than in the previous 
year and 20 times more than back in 2013). The largest number 
of asylum applications were registered in Italy, Germany, Spain 
and Poland.
Data available on separate national cases adds to this picture. 
Thus, from the beginning of 2014 through February, 18, 2015, 
2318 Ukrainian citizens turned to Polish government for asylum 
requesting the refugee status (Verner, 2015). Poland is among the 
most popular destinations among potential refugees from Ukraine.
The dynamics of this indicator indeed testifies to the growing 
number of Ukrainian refugees to Poland, and by percentage, this 
growth is rather impressive. However, if we pay attention to the 
absolute numbers, it becomes clear that this phenomenon is not 
large enough to become alarmist about it, as many media are.
We also need to mention that the number of the Ukrainians in 
the overall flow of refugees in the European Union back in 2015 
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was only 1.7% of the total number. Moreover, even fewer of them 
actually got a positive response from European governments (in 
2015, refugee status in the EU was obtained by 415 Ukrainian 
citizens) (Eurostat, 2017).
At the same time, not all popular destinations in external 
migration of the Ukrainians remained equally hospitable to them. 
The largest problem is with the Eastern direction of migration, 
Russian Federation specifically. Due to aggravation of Ukrainian-
Russian relations in March 2015 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Ukraine recommended all Ukrainian citizens to “evaluate real-
istically the existing risks and threats and to estimate thoroughly 
the actual necessity to travel” to this neighbouring country. The 
same statement also mentioned that “recently there were frequent 
cases when the citizens of Ukraine were retained without an actual 
cause on the territory of Russian Federation, and Russian law 
enforcement authorities were treating them in a not humane way, 
demonstrating despicable behaviour and even using absolutely 
inappropriate methods of physical and psychological pressure, 
including tortures” (MZS poperedzhaye…, 2015). On its side, the 
Russian Federation introduced the restrictive migration rules for 
Ukrainian citizens (apart from those who reside in Crimea and 
Donbass). For those Ukrainian citizens who were still choosing 
Russia as a labour migration direction, the only option left, under 
these changed conditions, was temporary, seasonal work.
Ukraine also introduced a range of measures aimed to 
strengthen the control on the state border with the Russian Feder-
ation. In particular, Ukraine unilaterally cancelled the agreement 
on small transborder movement with Russia (Uryad rozryvaye…, 
2015) and added the new requirement on passport control: now 
all citizens of the Russian Federation have to demonstrate inter-
national passports at the border (before they were able to cross 
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the border using national passports). Considering that only 17% 
of Russian Federation citizens have international passports, this 
change will significantly reduce the migration flows between Rus-
sia and Ukraine. This is also confirmed by the data of the All-Rus-
sian survey by the reputable Russian sociological research centre 
“Levada centr” (Obshchestvennoye…, 2012, p. 172).
For obvious reasons the Russian direction of external migration 
from Ukraine quickly died out while liberalization of the migra-
tion regime with the EU, the second largest migration direction 
from Ukraine, which was so widely discussed, still did not happen.
Separate countries in the EU are issuing significantly larger 
quantities of visas for the Ukrainians these days though. For 
example, Poland in 2014 issued 15% more visas for Ukraine than 
back in 2013, the total quantity being 831 thousand visas, with a 
very low rejection rate of 2.66% (Polshcha torik…, 2015). How-
ever, such positive changes are not recorded formally and do not 
happen at the institutional level. As noted in this relation by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin: “European Union is con-
cerned with the uncontrollable state border of Ukraine and the 
possibility that after the visa-waiver agreement the gunmen from 
the East can easily pass the EU border” (Klimkin…, 2015). This 
concern seems to be quite grounded considering the fact that as 
of today about 400 km of the Ukrainian-Russian border remains 
under the control of illegal armed groups.
Therefore, all socioeconomic push and pull factors for the 
fourth wave of external migration from Ukraine are both internal 
and external. The internal factors of external migration include:
• High unemployment rate under changing economic 
conditions, which is especially threatening in certain 
regions and sectors of national economy;
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• Significant decline of the general welfare level, up to 
miserable, hardcore poverty in some regions, rural areas 
especially;
• Impossibility of having a salary high enough to improve 
life conditions: unattainability of buying an apartment 
or house, buying a car or starting one’s own business, 
even for those citizens who are constantly working and 
getting a salary which is considered as average in the 
country;
• The so-called “envelope salaries”, hidden wages, often 
without legal employment record; lack of or limited 
social protection of working population. Hidden wages 
also undermine the possibility for decent pension in 
the future and also increases the risks related to labour 
capacity loss. All of this stimulates Ukrainian population 
find alternative ways of saving;
• Radically lower levels of salaries in Ukraine than in any 
potential country for migration (in fact, qualified labour 
in Ukraine is often paid less than any non-qualified 
blue-collar labour in the receiving countries);
• Political instability and the Ukrainian-Russian military 
conflict on the East of the country, in which over 1 mil-
lion people lost their homes and became forced internal 
refugees with a significantly decreased quality of life.
• External socioeconomic factors for migration from 
Ukraine include:
• The growing demand for low-qualified labour in the 
construction sector, agriculture, services in the major-
ity of European countries because their residents refuse 
to perform such work due to low pay and/or low social 
status;







































88 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
• Significantly higher salaries and much better work con-
ditions than in Ukraine;
• Availability of demand for Ukrainian labour migrants in 
both legal and illegal sectors of the receiving economies;
• Potential opportunities to legalize one’s status in a receiving 
society and thus get access to social and legal protection.
Let us consider now the dynamics of macro-, microeconomic 
and social processes taking place in Ukraine throughout the 
fourth wave of external migration.
The migration saldo dynamics (thousand persons) demon-
strates the negative correlation between incoming and outgoing 
migration flows during the socioeconomic crisis, while in the 
year of economic upturn this indicator is improving. Overall, the 
dynamic is wavelike.
The presented data on the dynamics of migration saldo as well 
as on macro-, microeconomic and social indicators of Ukrainian 
society throughout the fourth wave of external migration dem-
onstrates a rather obvious picture. During the period in question, 
the dynamics of most indicators was wavelike. After the deep eco-
nomic and social crisis which reached its peak in the middle of 
the 1990s and was accompanied by the largest external migration 
from Ukraine, the situation then got gradually better, starting with 
the year 2000. The next stage in the development of interrelated 
dynamics of these was connected with the period of relative eco-
nomic growth and decline in external migration numbers in the 
period from the early 2000s through the beginning of the world 
economic crisis in 2008. Furthermore, we observe the next stage 
of external migration dynamics and again, the growth in migra-
tion numbers, though this time migration was not that rapid and 
in absolute numbers it was much lower than back in the 1990s.
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2.3 Discursive factors of external labour 
migration: media discourse on labour migration 
of Ukrainian population
Since migration processes in the contemporary history of Ukraine 
became more active with the Soviet Union split, all the related 
phenomena (including, first of all, the socioeconomic crisis) have 
their impact on mass perceptions and media representations of 
external migration. External migration, just like any other large-
scale social phenomenon, has a rather ambiguous nature and 
unpredictable consequences, and thus, its social and media repre-
sentations often fail to describe it fully, in all the aspects, concen-
trating only on its dysfunctional features.
In this subchapter we would like to concentrate on media repre-
sentations of external migration in Ukrainian mass media, special 
attention will be dedicated to printed media. Obviously, today in 
a wide range of mass communication means printed sources are 
not the most dynamic and definitely not the most innovative one. 
However, under the conditions when Internet availability is still 
very much correlated to the level of socioeconomic welfare of a 
particular household, printed media in Ukraine remain rather 
egalitarian, that is accessible to many. Thus, printed media to 
some extent evidence the current perceptions, worries and inten-
tions of the general population.
Here we will consider the results of the interpretative content 
analysis of several Ukrainian newspapers along with the visu-
alization of these results6. The following newspapers have been 
 6 In this particular case we prefer interpretative analysis to the quantitative 
one, since quantitative indicators which describe the contents of publications 
in certain newspapers would reflect mostly the editorial policy and vision of 
these newspapers, and only indirectly, the information space of the country. 
That’s why our conclusions do not set rigid quantitative limits on media rep-
resentation of external migration, but rather outline the key trends in it.
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chosen for analysis: Golos Ukrainy (“The Voice of Ukraine”) 
and Uryadovyi kurier (“The Government Herald”) as the official 
media representations since these are the newspapers of the Verk-
hovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
accordingly; Dzerkalo tyzhnya (“The Weekly Mirror”) and Den 
(“The Day”) as Ukraine-wide analytical expert papers which 
often contain the media representations of various expert com-
munities; and finally the newspapers Vysokyi zamok (“The High 
Castle”), Express and Vesti (“News”) – the papers oriented on gen-
eral reader and representing the most widely spread media rep-
resentations on external migration (the latter of all the papers is 
published in Russian).
Let us start with a terminological note: writing about labour 
emigration from Ukraine, all of these newspapers really seldom 
use the notions “immigrant”, “emigrant”, “migrant” or “labour 
migrant”. The most frequently used word is “zarobitchanyn”. This 
word, in the academic thesaurus of the Ukrainian language, has 
two meanings. The first is: “one who moves for labour purposes, 
works on a daily or other timely basis”. The second, which is more 
colloquial is: “one who works for money only, having purely self-
serving interests”. Thus, from the stylistic viewpoint, this word 
has explicitly negative connotations that can be also sometimes 
contemptuous, sometimes sympathizing.
After studying in detail the whole corpus of publications in 
the  selected newspapers concerning our subject matter we can 
outline the key topics related to external migration coverage: 
1) positive and negatives aspects of external migration; 2) selected 
biographical narratives, analysis of real life situations, causes and 
aims of migration, consequences from migration experience; 
3) migration policy in potential receiving countries for exter-
nal migrations from Ukraine (legislation and its changes, visa 
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options, the issues of crossing the border); 4) criminal activity 
and migration (illegal migration, various fraud cases related to 
external migration). Some of these topics, especially those related 
to the history of external migration from Ukraine and describing 
the cross-cultural interaction of external migrants in destination 
countries sometimes have the marginal character.
Among the positive aspects of external migration the media 
usually mentions the following: new employment opportunities 
for the population from economically depressed regions; prob-
ability that money earned abroad would be further invested in 
small and medium business development in regions and/or for 
capital construction, but not just on family consumption. It is 
also often noted that, potentially, migration means less load on 
the state system of social protection: a large share of external 
migrants are potential unemployed, and if they stay in Ukraine, 
they would either occupy workplaces or apply for unemployment 
benefits.
Besides, migrants relieve the state from many other social obli-
gations, since this social group is very dynamic, innovative, able 
and ready to learn, capable of quickly gaining experience borrow-
ing from many technological, economic and business fields.
The experience of working abroad increases the life chances 
at both the individual and societal levels. Once migrants return 
home, they become the agents of changes: after the experience 
they gained they know very well how the real market economy 
works, what the employer-employee relations should be like, how 
institutions work in a more efficient way, what the communica-
tions standards are between the state and its citizens etc.
The articles which analyze the economic consequences from 
external migration usually concentrate on the macrolevel – the 
level of financial remittances and other impacts on the national 
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economy. Individual success stories of migrants currently work-
ing abroad or those who already returned are seldom seen in 
media.
However, overall, negative aspects of external migration are 
covered in media representation in a much wider way. At the per-
sonal level the media usually mentions such negative feature as: 
problems in family life, distancing of partners up to divorces, poor 
communication with children, ruining family connections, lack 
of desire to return to Ukraine (the so-called Italian syndrome – 
lack of desire to be back in Ukraine due to inability to adapt after a 
long stay abroad) (Yeryomin, 2010). Also frequently mentioned is 
the phenomenon of social orphanage in relation to migrants’ chil-
dren who are left without the needed support and care, while the 
sent remittances actually only aggravate the problems instead of 
solving them (Uzarashvili, 2006). “They [the children of migrants] 
become uncontrolled, start smoking, drinking alcohol and using 
drugs” (Express, #139, 28–29.11.06); “They lose interest to studies, 
skip classes without a good cause, get aggressive” (Express, #139, 
28–29.11.06). The children of migrants “usually stay at some 
relatives, for example, at grandparents’, a brother, neighbours… 
Sometimes their labour can be used by their ‘guardians’ in farm-
ing, and nobody even assumes that this can be harmful for child’s 
health” (Express, #139, 28–29.11.06).
In this way the perception is formed about migrants as “missing 
people”, first of all, for their families, in which their presence is felt 
only financially, via remittances or occasional parcels.
There is also a widely spread media representation about the 
“wasted time” of migrants. And it is not about migrants’ families 
only, in general, time spent abroad is perceived as “wasted”, and 
in particular, in connection to employment history. This is mostly 
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discussed in relation to female migrants of pre-retirement age 
(Farion, 2009; Voronovych, 2011). Another discussed topic is the 
absence of appropriate legal status of labour migrants and thus, 
their social and legal exposure. Also, according to this negativistic 
discourse, external migrants risk to lose qualification, since they 
are mostly working outside of their diploma profession, addition-
ally, they risk becoming the victims of labour rights violations 
(Ukraiina stala…, 2013).
Concerning the level of social changes the negativistic discourse 
emphasizes the following aspects of external migration: the deep-
ening dysfunctions in the demographic conditions (population 
ageing, outflow of population in the most economic active and 
reproductive age, depopulation of the economically depressed 
areas); wasted state investments in education of citizens accord-
ing to certain professions (which are not used after or used in 
favour of a different country); “stripping” of the labour market – 
there is a range of vacancies which potentially would be taken by 
non-residents for which Ukraine is not the sending country but 
the receiving one; these would be mostly migrants from Central 
and South-Eastern Asia. These perceived threats have their eco-
nomic, social and political manifestations (increasing xenopho-
bia, outbursts of different diseases, formation of cross-national 
ghettos etc.).
According to the research carried out by the Institute of Soci-
ology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the Ukrainian 
population has very high indicators of distancing from such eth-
nonational groups as the Arabs and the Afghans, and this, poten-
tially, may create the preconditions for tensions in case external 
migrants belonging to these groups opt for vacancies in the 
Ukrainian labour market (Shestakovskyi, 2010).
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Also, as noted by (Parkhomenko, 2012), there are other defor-
mations in Ukrainian media presentation of the external migra-
tion phenomenon. For example, Ukrainian media workers do 
not always check the information that appears in foreign media; 
they simple translate it. Polish newspapers, for example, are often 
a source of information about Ukranian migrants violating vari-
ous laws. However, even in such cases Ukrainian papers translate 
much more negativism in presenting the information they got 
from their Polish colleagues. Here we can assume that Ukrainian 
media are subject to certain alarmism as an element of editorial 
policy in relation to external migration.
In absolutely all analyzed printed media, negativism in rela-
tion to external migration significantly dominates over the pres-
entation of positive aspects of migration, and this concerns both 
factual information and the emotional load on top of it. Moreo-
ver, newspapers oriented toward the general public tend to form 
the negative attitude toward labour migration as such, describ-
ing mostly the negative experience of migration, the cases when 
the Ukrainians became the victims of human trafficking, fraud 
etc. The motivation of migrants is usually presented as very 
much one-sided – as a complicated economic background, fam-
ily troubles and/or other catalysts of such a “bad decision”. Curi-
ously, the guilty side in such interpretations is never a person, 
but “complicated times”, “crisis”, “the state” and also loss of job, 
delays in salary payments etc. As well noted by V. Volodko: “To 
describe labour migrants and their experience mostly pessimistic 
emotional expressions are used, such as ‘deprived people’, ‘back-
breaking work’, ‘pushed into the corner by unemployment’. Such 
metaphors are used frequently” (2007). Quoting just some of the 
newspapers: “Hemp as the best job Ivan can get!”, “From street 
cleaner to a millionaire”, “Breaking-back work of labourers” etc.
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Media representations also somehow show a range of more and 
less “worthy” motivations for migration. External migration with 
purely economic motivation (when the migrant’s family has seri-
ous financial problems) is perceived as more worthy, more val-
ued than external migration for personal reasons (due to family 
breakup or plans to marry abroad).
Media presents the external migrant from Ukraine as a person 
for low-paid jobs and/or for such works which do not require any 
specific qualification (agriculture, construction, home services, 
looking after the elderly or the disabled).
The institutional mechanisms of migration processes regulation 
also have their media coverage. The most widely discussed topic is 
the migration and visa regimes with the EU and Russia. For exam-
ple, the article titled “Euroorphanage, Ukrainian style” stresses 
the following: “The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has to take care of 
easing the border passing procedures, so that, most importantly, 
our migrants could come home more often. This would be pos-
sible if the visa procedures… would not have been so tiresome, 
if the Ukrainians would have had the visa-free regime…” (Iev-
rosyritstvo…, 2011). The presented above fragment of typical dis-
course contains the whole range of geopolitical and sociocultural 
imaginations up to more practical advice on how to get visas to 
different countries with the description of individual experiences 
(both successful and failed ones).
After the Agreement on Association was signed, Ukrain-
ian media started demonstrating some sort of careful optimism 
concerning the prospects of visa regime liberalization. Several 
printed media were covering all the related agreements and nego-
tiations. In November 2014 Dzerkalo tyzhnya published an article 
titled “Foreign Affairs promise visa free regime to all holders of 
biometric passports till 2015” which, inter alia, stated that already 
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in January 2015 it would be possible to get biometric passports, 
and this would open the way to negotiations on visa-free regime 
with the countries of the Schengen zone (MZS obitsyaye…, 
2014). Later that same month the same newspaper published one 
more article, but with a significantly more cautious title: “Abo-
lition of visa regime with the EU: opportunities and risks for 
Ukraine. Why should we prepare for consequences already now” 
(Hajdutskyi, 2014).
Despite new hopes and relatively optimistic news on the West, 
the migration regime with Ukraine’s Eastern neighbour still 
remains a big problem. At the end of 2014, after yet another esca-
lation of the military conflict on the Donbass, the Russian gov-
ernment declared its intent to introduce a new system of work 
permits for Ukrainian migrants; previously, Ukrainian citizens 
were allowed to cross the border using their domestic passports, 
and now the general rules were applied to them and they had to 
get permits for work in Russia.
Media representations of “criminality and external migration” 
can be grouped by the following topical categories: 1) topics 
related to crimes while crossing the border (illegal crossing and 
contraband mostly); 2) criminal activity of foreigners in Ukraine, 
criminal activity of the Ukrainians and other foreign nationals 
in other countries (visa fraud, illegal employments, violations of 
labour and human rights by employers etc.); 3) human trafficking.
Visa fraud is mostly covered in media with the emphasis on the 
situations when potential migrants became the victims of preda-
tory intermediaries or dishonest employees of embassies and 
consulates (Desiatky…, 2013). Other cases describe the situations 
when migrants and/or their families were threatened by criminals 
who wanted to profit on their account (Reketyry obkladaly, 2011). 
Representations describing unfair practices of potential migrants 
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are very rare. There were several cases when known and quite rep-
utable newspapers were publishing information which contained 
direct recommendations on migration fraud.
Probably the most frequent topics in the general public media 
are those related to constant humiliation of labour migrants 
abroad, their deprived status, poor life conditions, constant 
fear caused by the illegal status, in particular, fear of police 
(Herasymchuk, 2009).
In 2014 media news on the topic “migration and criminal-
ity” got a new modality. For example, the official newspaper of 
the Verkhovna Rada Golos Ukrainy published the following: 
“Tempted by high pay in Russia, you can join the terrorists in 
the military conflict zone…” (Rybalchenko, 2014). This article 
was using the data from the State Security Service of Ukraine to 
analyze the phenomenon of recruitment and training of gunmen 
among Ukrainian citizens, which are first trained and prepared in 
Russia and then sent back to Ukraine to fight on the Donbass on 
the separatists’ side.
The increased intensity of external migration coverage by 
Ukrainian media is explained by the current political situation, 
and more specifically, by constant discussion about the geopoliti-
cal and cultural vector of the country’s further development.
Ukrainian media representations of external migration con-
tains certain implicit emphasis which forms a negative and rather 
biased attitude of the general population toward the phenomenon 
of external migration. The very notion of “gastarbeiter” which 
is widely used in relation to this social group implies that these 
people are “victims” of their complicated life conditions and they 
will definitely demonstrate the whole range of threats, risks and 
insecurities that are waiting for all migrants once they cross the 
border while their family life back in Ukraine is tearing apart.
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External migration representations in general public newspa-
pers have a mostly speculative nature; the conclusions are often 
based on rather fragmentary, out-of-context experience; research 
tools are not used for analytical purposes, and in those rare cases 
when experts are engaged, their contribution is very much sim-
plified. Often the problematic side is emphasized just to attract 
the reader’s attention. Objectivity is often sacrificed, and prefer-
ence is given to laconic, rather metaphorical, exaggerated state-
ments which sometimes have a nearly apocalyptic tone.
However, it is worth noting that emphasis in media discourse 
on external migration is shifting. New topics are now being cov-
ered, for example, the communities of migrants abroad, their 
institutionalization via formal organizations, manifestations 
of their civil and political activism abroad and at home (Bilan, 
2014a). Very often these institutional forms of migrants’ associa-
tions are affiliated with religious organizations. The Ukrainian 
Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) is probably the most active 
among them, since this confession group has the largest share of 
people with certain labour migration experience. Thus, back in 
2013 Dzerkalo tyzhnya published an interview with H. Seleshuk, 
the head of the UGCC commission on migrants’ affairs, and its 
title was: “Ukrainian migrants today put active pressure on our 
politicians” (Odynets, 2013).
We would like to analyze the peculiarities of media discourse on 
the highest level of its generalization, using visualization meth-
ods as applied to the results of content analysis, known as “con-
cept cloud”, or “tag cloud”. On one hand, this method of discourse 
field description requires certain cultural competence skills to 
read the data correctly; on the other hand, we need to remember 
how rapidly changing and dynamic such raw data is – besides, 
Factors of  External Labour Migration of  the Ukrainians 103
it is actually constructed by both producer and consumer of the 
discourse. Thus, we think that in the context, quantity-oriented 
methods of empirical research are not completely trustworthy 
when it comes to media discourse on external migration. Below 
we present a comparison of the two relatively homogenous media 
discourses on external migration. As a means of visualization we 
use a content cloud, which enables a brief presentation of the cen-
tral concept in the texts of large volumes and allows us to compare 
them. German researchers T. Melles and R. Jaron describe the 
methods of concept clouds and tag clouds as grouping of identi-
cal language units and constructions for further visualization of 
the central idea of the text based on the most frequently used 
language units, which are presented in larger fonts (the larger the 
font size – the more frequently this concept was used in the ana-
lysed text) (Melles et al., 2009).
Overall, there are significant differences in the discourses 
between official newspapers of public bodies and also special-
ized, expert newspapers on one side – and popular newspapers 
for general public on the other. These differences can be pri-
marily explained by these newspapers’ orientation toward cer-
tain target groups of their information products’ consumption. 
Official governmental discourse is concentrated on political and 
legal information mainly; it also avoids expressing emotions 
and attitudes, and it is very careful in wording. Mass discourse 
is directly the opposite: it tends to have flamboyant headings 
and to use metaphors, and at the same time it is rather shal-
low in content; many complex phenomena are presented in an 
extremely simplified way.
The most significant difference between these two discourses 
is related to the “female topic” in external migration: in official 
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and expert newspapers this issue is almost absent, while for mass 
newspapers it is one of the most popular topics. The situation with 
the topic of Ukrainian citizens’ deaths abroad is similar: hardly 
mentioned in official newspapers, but very important in popular 
discourse.
Overall, popular media discourse on external migration is 
represented mostly by the topics related to female, children and 
family issues. Interestingly, the topic of human trafficking is 
rather underrepresented in mass discourse (however, migrants’ 
involvement in sex services is mentioned rather often). On the 
other hand, popular newspapers favour “serious” social topics, 
like demographic consequences of migration and/or analysis of 
migration regimes in different countries.
It is noteworthy that during the whole studied period, all three 
types of media discourses (official, expert and mass) tend to 
shift the attention from the problems of external migration from 
Ukraine to the problems of illegal migration to Ukraine from the 
countries of Asia and Africa.
As we can see above, there are quite distinct differences between 
official, expert and mass media discourses concerning external 
migration. Official media discourse is concentrated on such issues 
as cooperation with the EU, common projects at borders and 
private remittances to Ukraine from abroad. Expert media dis-
course chooses the most important issue to be illegal migration. 
For mass media important discourse includes the topics related 
to migrants’ daily life abroad, in particular, female experiences 
among Ukrainian migrants, criminality and sexual exploitation. 
For all three types of media discourses the of Russian vector in 
Ukrainian external migration is the leading one, along with the 
topic of European vector in migration.
Factors of  External Labour Migration of  the Ukrainians 105










e Name (circulation 
volume a week, 
quantity of the analyzed 
publications)8





















e Golos Ukrainy  
(150 thousand;  
121 publications);
Uryadovyi kurier  



















Dzerkalo tyzhnya  
(57 thousand;  
59 publications)


















Vysokyi zamok  
(500 thousand;  
930 publications)
Express (160 thousand;  
382 publications)
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314 publications)
Source: Author`s own data.
 7 For this purpose the online service TagCrowd.com is used, created by 
D. Steinbock (Stanford University). Visualization covers the words which 
were present in the headings at least three times.
 8 We have analyzed the publications from January 2005 to April 2015, using 
those headings which contained the words “migrant” or “gastarbeiter” in 
their various grammar forms.
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2.4 Institutional and legal regulation as a factor 
of impact on external labour migration during 
the fourth migration wave. The possibilities 
for its improvement
Within the general system of factors which determine migration 
behaviour, along with economic, sociocultural, political and other 
factors, there is the factor of institutional and legal regulation. This 
group of factors is usually denominated under the notion “migra-
tion regime”. In a wider sense migration regimes are understood 
as the set of rather stable factors of economic, sociocultural, polit-
ical and institutional nature that define the character of migration 
flows between sending and receiving societies. In more speci-
fied terms (like in this subchapter, for example) under migration 
regime we understand the set of legal and administrative means 
which regulate the status and the social protection of Ukrainian 
migrants in the receiving countries (Strielkowski et al., 2016).
Each migration regime has its history and its own specific and 
stable political, economic and cultural factors; thus, migration 
regimes may vary – from completely closed ones (like the milita-
rized border along the Berlin Wall in Germany during the Cold 
War, or the 38th parallel dividing the peninsula into North and 
South Korea) up to completely open migration regimes (like the 
migration regime inside the Schengen group).
This aspect is very much understudied in external migration 
studies. One of a few authors to fill in this gap is D. Massey, who 
combined all his propositions in his theory of state influence on 
migration. In his work “A Missing Element in Migration Theories” 
D. Massey stresses the necessity for more theoretical attention to 
politicians, media experts and bureaucrats, who often act in their 
own interest and get certain advantages from social constructs 
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and “crisis production” related to migrants, in the situations when 
in fact there is no crisis as such (Massey, 2015, p. 281). The author 
specifically points to those aspects of political and administrative 
activity and competing interests at bureaucratic, legislative and 
public arena which further define the scale of migration and the 
key features of migrants (Massey, 2015, p. 284).
The general logic of connecting political, administrative and 
public fields to migration regimes is the following: “in the peri-
ods of economic growth and expansion the permissive migration 
policy is applied, and in the time of decline – the restrictive one” 
(Massey, 2015). The key subjects for migration regime change 
are employees and employers. Thus, “in the time of economic 
growth the unemployment indicators go down, salaries go up 
and employers are lobbying to allow more labour migrants in the 
country, while in times of crisis the employees demand from their 
governments to decrease the scales of labour migration into the 
country” (Massey, 2015). At this, politicians and public servants 
are representing the interest of these two key economic subjects.
Another factor of the general socioeconomic environment is 
the total quantity of external migrants in a country: the larger this 
quantity is, the louder the demands for restrictions in the migration 
regime in order to weaken the migrants’ inflow. There is an addi-
tional factor to that – the cultural distance between local population 
and external migrants. Massey (2015) also turns attention to the 
political-ideological and value dimensions: stronger conservatism 
in the society and greater conformism usually lead to restrictions in 
migration regimes, while the popularity of liberal ideas and values 
provoke more permissions in the migration regime.
While political and economic circumstances (factors) in the 
receiving economies which define the nature of a migration regime 
are very much changing, institutional factors tend to be much 
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more stable, as noted by D. Massey. For example, such features 
of institutional efficiency or modality of institutes’ functioning 
have rather deep historic roots, thus, are more stable. Here sev-
eral features are combined together: efficiency of local (national) 
bureaucracy; rights protection as guaranteed by the constitu-
tion and citizens’ equality before the law; historical traditions in 
relation to external migration. For example, in the countries of 
the Arabian Gulf there is very little tradition of external migra-
tion; the local political system (monarchy) is not competitive 
in its nature, and many legal aspects are extremely traditional, 
going against standard democratic practices and today’s vision 
of human rights. Thus, rather restrictive local migration regimes 
comply ideologically and culturally to the state systems overall. 
In contrast, in traditionally liberal democracies radical restric-
tive political and administrative measures are hard to imagine, 
since they would be limited by human rights practice, presence 
of political competition and a long tradition of having external 
migration.
In Ukraine one of the most significant changes in the migra-
tion regime (which actually enabled the fourth wave of migration 
as such) happened in the late 1980s and was related to internal 
changes in the Soviet regime. That resulted in two key trends: first, 
the revival of migration flows from the periphery to more central 
territories, which was provoked by the economic dependency and 
also the increasing economic inequality under the new conditions 
of a hybrid economic system with its rather specific sociocultural, 
economic and sometimes personal relations; secondly, there was 
a revival of the migration flow in the Western, Euroatlantic direc-
tion, which was known from the previous migration waves and 
now was nourished by the presence and activities of diasporas 
and the related social networks.
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At that time the Eurasian direction in external migration was 
not restricted at all; there were no legal or institutional barriers in 
it, plus there was a well-established tradition related to the dec-
ades of common Soviet history. While the Euroatlantic direction 
of the external migration of Ukrainians from the very beginning 
of the fourth wave was much more complicated, some research-
ers of that period even called the EU then “the Union of closed 
doors” (Tsapenko, 1998).
The migration systems of European countries started to obtain 
their current features after World War II when the quantity of the 
foreign population and the foreign labour force radically increased. 
Before the war European countries had been migration flows’ 
donors only and used to have negative migration saldos, but dur-
ing the two post-war decades they quickly became the recipients 
of migration flows, thus, their migration saldos became positive.
Labour migration to Europe straight after the war was unprec-
edented as such, and for European history especially. During the 
period of 1955–1974 the quantity of foreigners in Switzerland 
grew threefold, and twofold in France and Belgium (Yuskiv, 2009, 
p. 235).
This growth was caused by the targeted migration policy of 
European governments. A good example of such policy was the 
labour market regulation in Germany. In this country the gov-
ernment was managing migrants’ recruitment from the very 
beginning, signing agreements with other countries. This policy 
in particular opened the door for large migration inflows from 
Turkey to Germany. During the 20 years of this policy the share 
of foreign workers in the German economy increased signifi-
cantly: back in 1952 the German economy was using the labour of 
merely 50 thousand foreigners (0.4% of the country’s total labour 
force), and in 1973 already 2.4 million foreigners were working 
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in Germany. A significant contribution to the migration inflow 
to Germany was made by the policy of German repatriation from 
Eastern Europe. As a result, in 2000 Germany had the largest 
share of all European migrants, including 700 thousand unem-
ployed (Okolski, 2004, pp. 215–216). One of the sources of migra-
tion inflows to Germany was the migration of Polish citizens of 
German origin. More specifically, those from the Opole voivod-
ship, those who since 1993 got an opportunity for free employ-
ment not only in Germany, but elsewhere in the EU as long as 
they were able to verify their German origin and thus, German 
citizenship which (at least according to German legislation) was 
always theirs (Jończy, Rokita-Poskart, 2014).
During the two decades after World War II, migration to Euro-
pean countries was of a controlled nature and was mostly initiated 
by the governments of the receiving countries. However, in the 
1970s, migration to Europe gradually became rather uncontrolled 
and unregulated. The major reason for this was the processes of 
family reunification in many migrant cases. Additionally, the 
inflow of refugees from the “third world” countries also increased.
Family reunification became an important source (and often 
the only legal one) of increasing numbers of migrants to Western 
European countries during 1970–1990. In Germany only in 
the middle of the 1970s the members of such reunited families 
formed the 90% share of all migrants (Yuskiv, 2009, p. 281). 
Diasporas and informal social networks of migrants eased the 
migration processes for hundred of illegal migrants, inter alia 
(Tsapenko, 2009, p. 54).
Temporary (as the governments and registration authorities 
saw it) labour migration turned out to be a completely different 
phenomenon leading to a range of new economic, political and 
cultural problems for the receiving societies. Migrants mostly 
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aimed to settle in urbanized territories; thus, their presence in the 
society became much more visible, like all the related problems.
All these processes starting in Western and Northern Europe, 
have gradually shifted to the rest of the European continent, 
including the newest members of the EU in Central and Eastern 
Europe. As of 2006 the largest quantity of foreigners were work-
ing in Germany (3.528 million people), Spain (1.824 million peo-
ple), Great Britain (824 thousand people) and Italy (802 thousand 
people).
Further, we will consider first of all, the theoretical grounding 
of the major migration policy models; secondly, we will analyze 
the development and the key features of the contemporary migra-
tion policies of the EU Country Members and that of the CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) since these are the two 
key directions in external migration from Ukraine. And thirdly, 
we will describe the establishment and the specific features of the 
migration regime between Ukraine and the EU Members, and 
also between Ukraine and the CIS.
Researchers usually distinguish the following migration policy 
models: pluralistic, class model, realistic and neocorporatist. In 
its pluralistic model migration policy is considered as the pro-
cess in which a certain group of subjects (entrepreneurs, religious 
organizations etc.) are trying to get certain benefits for themselves, 
disregarding the common interest (Freeman, 1979). According to 
the class models, migration policy is determined by group inter-
ests and is aimed at achieving the stability in relations of capital 
owners with the employed (Cohen, 1987). Realistic and corporat-
ist models of migration policy take into consideration the acts 
of state as a political institute (geopolitical factors, power struc-
tures, influences from inside and outside of the political system, 
and also the influence of liberal norms established by the inter-
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national legal regime). According to the corporatist models, the 
state is the intermediary between conflicting socioeconomic cir-
cles; however, it also acts in its own political interests (Hall, 1989). 
Another classification presents the models of policies not by their 
motives and aims, but according to their consequences, and thus, 
it distinguishes between restrictive and permissive models.
On the level of practical policies within the EU, initially two 
models dominated in external migration regulation; both were 
formed after World War II. According to Vidyakina (2008, p. 13), 
these were: the model by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and the model described in the framework of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The former was applied 
from the beginning of the 1950s until the oil crisis of the 1970s 
and it was based on bilateral agreements concerning labour force 
attraction from the countries of Southern Europe and third 
countries, namely, Turkey and former colonies in Africa. Exter-
nal migration in those times was perceived in purely economic 
terms and was used as a mechanism for achieving the balance 
between demand and proposition at the labour market. Various 
humanitarian aspects of external migration (families’ reunifica-
tion, adaptation and integration of migrants in receiving socie-
ties) were totally disregarded in this model (Medved, 2003, p. 139; 
Gallardo et al., 2016, p. 245).
The latter model, which existed within the GATS framework, 
was based on regulation of migration flows by companies and 
states which are to cooperate economically. Just as with the ILO 
model, humanitarian and social aspects of migration were again 
ignored.
Considering the bottlenecks of these two models, early in the 
1990s the EU offered a new model of joint regulation of inter-
national migration, according to the EU Agreement. This model 
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guaranteed the freedom of movement for people and services 
within the borders of the European Union. However, the model 
was oriented mostly toward integration within the EU itself and 
did not cover third countries.
Today, concerning the citizens of third countries, the EU poli-
cies demonstrate three functional directions: 1) migration policy; 
2) measures on incoming population integration; 3) counteract-
ing the factors which induce external migration (Tsapenko, 2009, 
p. 191).
The process of joint migration policy development for the whole 
Eurounion was initiated back in 1986, with the creation of special 
groups consisting of the internal affairs ministers from the EU 
country members. This group was created to write out the agree-
ments on external border control, visa unification, repatriation 
procedures for illegal migrants etc.
In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was signed, and since then any 
citizen of any country member within the EU became a citizen 
of the EU, thus got the right for free movement and free choice 
of residence within the whole territory of the EU (Christian-
sen et al., 2012). Rules of crossing external borders and control 
over these borders, migration policy, including the conditions of 
entrance, length of stay, family reunification conditions, foreign 
employment, prevention of unsanctioned migration – according 
to this Treaty – became the issues of common interest to be settled 
on the intergovernmental level (Yuskiv, 2009, p. 309). Concerning 
the migration from third countries, this period became the time 
for wide intergovernmental debate. Most migration issues were 
left within the competence of separate countries. The Maastricht 
Treaty, inter alia, noted: the governments can take measures to 
control migration from third countries, in order to prevent crimi-
nality and contraband (Population and migration…, 1996). Those 
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few decisions of the EU common institutions related to external 
migration were treated as recommendations only.
A vision of the common strategy of migration management in 
Europe was offered in 1998 by the Advisory Group of the Euro-
pean Commission. It was based on the following four principles: 
order (measures promoting migration aimed at maximizing 
opportunities and advantages for each migrant and the receiving 
societies); protection (guaranteeing migrants’ rights and prevent-
ing unsolicited relocation of population); integration (creating 
such an environment which would help integrate into the receiv-
ing society); cooperation (state-level cooperation between receiv-
ing countries and country donors aimed at harmonization of 
external migration causes and related migration policies) (Solt, 
1999). Besides that, additional elements in migration manage-
ment were suggested as follows: stimulating qualified migration; 
encouraging business migration; attracting temporary and sea-
sonal labourers; regulating migration of family members; the 
selective approach to refugees; preventing illegal migration; the 
social protection of migrants.
Within this framework agreement, all the EU members, includ-
ing all Schengen group members, approved the so-called policy of 
“controlled migration” which was the system of measures related 
to border control and selective limitation of migration as well as 
control over international transport and migrants’ deportation 
(Tsapenko, 1998, p. 38–40).
The next stage in the formation of all-European migration pol-
icy was marked by signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. This 
document declared that the EU must develop a joint policy on 
asylum in particular and migration in general, keeping in mind 
the necessity for constant control at external borders in order to 
prevent illegal migration and fight against those engaged in it. 
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To follow this policy, the European Commission suggested the 
contingence mechanism for the migration policies of the coun-
try members. It covers the four fields: management of migration 
flows; receiving economic migrants; partnership with third par-
ties; and integration of third countries’ citizens into the receiving 
societies (Malynovska, 2006).
Unfavourable demographic situations and labour force defi-
cits have led the European Commission to the thought which 
was voiced in 2000: the external inflow of labour force is vital for 
economic growth (Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament…, 2000). Then, in 2003 the 
directive was approved concerning the legal status of third coun-
tries’ citizens which have stayed in the country members of the 
EU for at least five years. This directive guarantees migrants their 
key economic and social rights on an equal level with the EU citi-
zens, and it also guarantees the right to free movement and free 
choice of a place to live within the EU territories for those persons 
which have the permit to stay issued by any of the EU member 
countries (Council directive…, 2004).
In 2008 the European Commission published the communi-
cation “Common Immigration Policy for Europe: principles, 
measures and instruments” along with the “Policy plan on asy-
lum. An integrated approach to protection across the EU”. Both 
programme documents were aimed to become part of the new 
five-year programme on freedom, security and law. The com-
munication formulated the key principles of the future common 
migration policy. These principles were grouped in three direc-
tions: prosperity, solidarity and security. The principle of prosper-
ity implied exact rules and equal rules of the game; compliance 
of the professional level of migrants to the labour force demand; 
importance of integration as a factor of successful migration. 
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The  principle of solidarity covered the following: transparency, 
trust, cooperation between the member countries, overcom-
ing specific migration challenges in separate member countries; 
cooperation with third countries on the problems related to 
migration. The principle of security included: visa policy being in 
compliance with the EU interest, easing the entry for responsible 
citizens and at the same time taking measures to increase secu-
rity; comprehensive border management to maintain the unity of 
the Schengen space; taking radical measures against human traf-
ficking, protection from human trade and slavery; efficient fight 
against illegal migration and illegal employment; efficient policy 
on migrants’ repatriation (Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, 2008).
The latter of these principles was applied through a wide range 
of actions: information campaign aimed at discouraging poten-
tial migration; severe border control; strict visa requirements; 
sanctions against migrants’ transport carriers etc. Similarly to 
that, one of the instruments in migration policy became various 
visa regimes which served as counteraction against undesirable 
migration through the following requirements: grounding the 
travel purpose, providing financial, insurance and other docu-
ments, showing return tickets etc. Also, the system of work per-
mits became much stricter. In contrast to the policy of preventing 
and fighting illegal migration, there are also regular amnesties 
carried out by the EU member countries aimed to legalize those 
foreigners who stayed in the country for a long time already and 
are able to support themselves financially. Such campaigns on ille-
gal migrants’ status regulation are carried out mostly in Southern 
Europe, however, quite frequently. According to the official data 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Italy 294,744 applications 
on legalization were filed in 2015. At this, the Ukrainians are the 
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leaders by the quantity of these applications, their share is 12.61% 
(Ukraiinski trudovi mihranty…, 2015).
Therefore, in the development of the EU migration regime we 
can distinguish four stages. The first stage was the constituting one 
and it lasted till the beginning of the 1980s. This was the period 
of common economic space formation and relative unification of 
the migration policy, formation of common grounds concerning 
free movement on the EU territory.
The second stage lasted from the early 1980s till the begin-
ning of the 1990s. The key event of this period was the Schengen 
Agreement signing. At this stage the EU institutions’ responsi-
bilities and functions in the field of migration processes regula-
tion were specified; the customs control on common borders was 
abolished; and the harmonization of migration legislation was 
initiated.
The third stage lasted from the Schengen Agreement signing 
till the end of the 1990s. During this period all the related legal 
norms and rules were specified, including: common standards 
and rules on family reunification; guaranteeing equality in rights 
for citizens and foreigners; simplification of naturalization proce-
dures; promoting the participation of foreign citizens in political 
life; fighting discrimination on any ground etc.
At the fourth stage of its development the migration policy as 
such was shifted to the competence field of the European Union. 
This initiated wider cooperation between the member countries 
on the development of common policy concerning migration.
The current migration regime of the EU should not be treated as 
fully and finally established, it is still subject to further changes. As 
of today there is an ongoing debate concerning the model of com-
mon migration policy which has been provoked by the extremely 
numerous inflow of refuges from Northern Africa and the Middle 
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East. In this debate, on one side, there are voices demanding the 
guarantees of basic human rights for all migrants; on the other 
side, threats are voiced concerning the rising xenophobia in the 
receiving societies as well as risks related to certain conflicts with 
local national interests.
Today one of the key features in the migration policies in most of 
European countries is stimulation of highly qualified specialists’ 
immigration. There are certain principles aimed at their attrac-
tion and encouragement of this type of migration. These include: 
the scoring systems (used in Switzerland, Great Britain, Czech 
Republic); the system of entrance quotas for the deficit catego-
ries of professions (Great Britain, Italy); special programmes and 
simplified procedures of employment for specialists in demand 
(Germany); programmes which motivate foreign students who 
got higher education in highly required fields to stay in the receiv-
ing country; simplified entry for researchers who have “scientific 
visas”. In 2005 the European Council approved the directive that 
regulates the procedures of scientific exchange with third coun-
tries. Before that, in 2003 an all-European web portal on aca-
demic and scientific mobility was launched, supported by many 
related national portals and other sites of similar contents within 
the EU (Council directive…, 2005).
During the most recent decade Western European countries 
were much more active in using the labour force of seasonal 
foreign workers in various sectors, primarily in agriculture. 
Every year the Western countries of the EU recruit around 500 
thousand agricultural labourers outside the EU. Back in 2005 
Germany alone used the seasonal labour force of about 320 for-
eigners (Tsapenko, 2009, p. 65). Therefore, we can assume that 
attracting migrants became one of the ways to make the labour 
market more flexible and at the same time to reduce the problem 
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of precarization of its own citizens, since a large share of tempo-
rary and seasonal work is transferred to migrants. However, at 
the same time precarization of the sending countries’ citizens is 
ever increasing.
Today’s migration regimes in the EU countries, on one hand, 
fully comply with the general humanistic principles and all frame-
work agreements on the Eurounion level, but on the other hand, 
they also reflect the national interests of particular member coun-
tries and thus are aimed to protect the national labour markets, 
national social security systems and local sociocultural balance. 
The framework agreements acknowledge the right for free move-
ment and the right for family reunification. However, a range of 
countries established specific requirements which somehow limit 
these rights, e.g., the limitation on the maximum age of children, 
on the level of income for the migrant inviting family members 
into a receiving country, on the length of migrant’s stay in a 
receiving country etc. Thus, in the Netherlands the requirement 
on the minimum income level (which grants the right for family 
reunion) has been increased from 100% to 120% of the mini-
mum wage in the country. Also the requirement on the length 
of migrant’s previous stay (duration of stay in the country before 
the migrant is eligible for a family reunion application) became 
tighter. For example, in Switzerland, starting in 2004, a migrant 
is allowed a family reunion (with a spouse and children younger 
than 14 years old) only if he or she has already stayed in the coun-
try for at least five years. In Germany one of the requirements for 
family reunion is the migrant’s language skills – he or she must 
speak German at a certain level (Yuskiv, 2009, p. 282). All these 
selective protection rules and requirements are usually explained 
by the necessity to protect national economy and society from 
the inflow of “fake refugees”, which potentially might become the 
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cause for social destabilization due to excessive numbers of social 
allowance users.
Concerning the opposite vector in the emigration flows from 
Ukraine the key direction is the Russian Federation. The Russia-
Ukraine migration regime was formed gradually under the 
changing post-Soviet conditions. Its formation started with the 
President’s Decree of 1993: “On attraction and use of foreign 
labour force in Russian Federation…” (Ukaz prezidenta…, 1993). 
It set the first legal requirement on migrants’ employment  – 
having a work permit from a local representative office of the 
Federal Migration Service; also, a new document was introduced 
called a “migration card”. Later in 2001 the concept of demo-
graphic development of the Russian Federation was approved 
which formulated the targets of the migration policy: regulation 
of migration flows aimed at creating the efficient mechanisms for 
overcoming the problems related to the natural reduction of the 
population in Russia, while increasing the efficiency of migra-
tion flows’ use by means of reaching the compliance between 
their volumes on one hand and socioeconomic interests of the 
Russian Federation on the other. Also, the same concept men-
tioned the importance of migrants’ integration in Russian society 
and the necessity for a tolerant attitude formation in the society 
(Kontseptsiya demograficheskogo razvitiya… 2001).
In 2015 a new concept was approved – “The Concept of state 
migration policy for the period till 2025”. This was the first time 
Russian legislation mentioned the need to support the migration 
of qualified specialists and the necessity to establish the system to 
assess the actual need in the foreign labour force. Now amend-
ments to migration legislation are being considered, aimed at 
legislation of those labour migrants who work for private individ-
uals in the Russian Federation, namely through the mechanism 
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of patent on foreign employment (Kontseptsiya gosudarstvennoi 
migratsionnoi politiki…, 2015).
Russian researcher V. Mukomel notes that despite the declared 
targets, today the migration policy of Russia has a range of 
weaknesses. In particular these include: concentration of atten-
tion solely on fighting the illegal migration, that is, considering 
migration as a purely negative phenomenon only; selectiveness of 
migration policy and its heavy dependence on the current politi-
cal situation (for example, when relations with Baltic countries, 
Georgia or Ukraine got complicated, rules and general attitude to 
the migrants from these countries changed radically). In addition 
to that, Russian migration policy has very little support from the 
institutions and/or civil society; thus, all statements concerning 
migrants’ integration and tolerant attitude to them remain declar-
ative only (Mukomel, 2005, pp. 153–154).
Since 2014 the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Fed-
eration has new, very restrictive rules for Ukrainian migrants. At 
the same time, a preferential migration regime was introduced 
in relation to Ukrainian citizens residing in the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions. This policy is very similar to that used in rela-
tion to the Caucasian region of South Osetia where Russia has 
been supporting anti-Georgian separatists.
For all other Ukrainians, Russia introduced the limited term of 
stay in its territory – up to 90 days per year. These changes provide 
additional advantages to migrants from the countries of the Eurasian 
Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Armenia) since Russian 
legislation treats labour migrants from these countries as equal to 
Russian residents when it comes to labour relations.
The Ukrainian answer to the changed situation was quite sym-
metrical. Today Russian citizens entering Ukraine have to use 
their international passports at the borders. Additionally, several 
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documents are needed to verify the stay in Ukraine, including a 
notarized personal invitation.
Ukrainian migrants to Russian Federation have 90 days to 
define their status in the country. In case he or she does not want 
to receive the citizenship of Russia and/or is not asking for asylum 
as a refugee from the zone of military conflict, the length of stay in 
the country is limited to three months during half a year. Violation 
of this rule would lead to further rejection of entry to the country 
for the next 3–10 years. Therefore, the only choice for Ukrainian 
labour migrants to the Russian Federation is temporary (seasonal) 
work, and this logically leads to further precarization.
All these changes in the migration regime of the Russian 
Federation, which is one of the leading countries in Ukrainian 
external migration, have been caused by the worsening relations 
on the state level between Ukraine and Russia, and in particular, 
by bilateral political and economic sanctions. Additionally, if to fol-
low the grounding by D. Massey, these changes are caused by the 
new demands of the general socioeconomic situation in the Russian 
Federation, and according to many expert assessments, the country 
is now at the edge of a serious economic downturn.
D. Massey (1987) also analyzed the case of the migration regime 
restriction between the USA and Mexico. He emphasized that the 
large-scale public and political campaign of this restriction was 
initiated not as much because of economic reasons, but mostly 
due to panic stimulated among the American population. This 
panic was one of the derivatives of the American protectionist 
policy favoured by both politicians and some of the key employ-
ers. From D. Massey’s standing point, the aims of such migration 
policy is to create additional vacancies in the labour market, to 
smooth the social consequences of the economic crisis, to sta-
bilize the political situation through satisfaction of trade unions’ 
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demands. Similarly, we can also interpret all the restrictions 
described above in the migration regime between the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine.
After the overview of the theoretical grounds of the migration 
policy models and development of migration policy in the Euro-
pean Union and CIS countries, let us now turn to the analysis 
of the current state of legal and social protection of Ukrainian 
migrants in destination countries.
Within the internal legal relation and international regulation 
of the migrant processes, legal and social protection of Ukrainian 
migrants can be viewed in the context of regional and global sys-
tems of control over illegal migration flows. Throughout the whole 
period of Ukraine’s independence, its migration flows and migra-
tion policy have been asymmetrically mostly concentrated on the 
Eurasian direction. Today the political situation has changed in 
the diametrically opposite direction. On one hand, Ukraine has 
opted for a European vector of development, and on the other, 
meanwhile the Eurasian Economic Union has institutionalized as 
a structural unit. Therefore, the legislation on labour migration 
regulation and legal protection of migration on the post-Soviet 
territories is very much outdated and today it resembles more of 
an artefact of the most recent regional history9.
 9 Multilateral and bilateral agreements on social protection between the 
CIS countries were mostly signed in early years after the Soviet split when 
legislation, other terms and conditions, types of social payments in all of 
these newly established countries were almost identical. However, over 
the course of time significant changes took place, in the pension systems 
especially. Namely, pension age was increased, as were years of pension-
able service; a mandatory accumulation pension system was introduced. 
All these changes mean social guarantees related to pension are not as 
much affiliated to the country of permanent residence anymore and many 
of previous agreements between the CIS countries lose their sense.
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In the early 1990s Ukraine signed several multilateral agree-
ments within the CIS concerning pension provision, social pro-
tection for families with several children, compensations for 
industrial accidents or for professional diseases. Additionally, 
Ukraine also signed several bilateral agreements on social protec-
tion with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Moldova. 
All of them were based on the principle of responsibility on the 
country of residence. The agreement of the CIS countries “On 
cooperation in the field of labour migration and social protection 
of migrant labourers” was signed in 1994 (Soglashenie o sotrud-
nichestve v oblasti…, 2005). In it, the parties agreed on the recog-
nition of legalized documents about education, work experience 
and qualifications of migrant workers, on exclusion of double tax-
ation of their wages, on the opportunities for transmittances etc. 
The same agreement also stated that social insurance and social 
protection of migrant workers are to be carried out according to 
the legislation in the country of employment.
These positions were reinforced in 2008 when within the same 
CIS framework a new document was approved – “Convention on 
the legal status of labour migrants and their family members in the 
member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States”. 
According to this new convention, all labour migrants, including 
seasonal and temporary ones, have rights equal with the citizens 
of the receiving counties, including the right for appropriate work 
conditions, the right for fair wages etc. Labour migrants are also 
eligible for a range of social rights (apart from pension provision), 
again, on equal terms with local residents. They also have the 
right for social protection (social insurance), including the man-
datory insurance from industrial accidents and professional dis-
eases, compensation for the related losses as well as the right for 
free-of-charge medical help in case of emergency (other medical 
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services to be provided on regular financial grounds) (Problema 
sotsialnogo zakhystu…, 2013).
Concerning the European direction in migration outflows 
from Ukraine we should acknowledge that the issue of setting the 
migration regime with Ukraine was of interest for many politi-
cians and experts in European countries since the early 1990s. 
This interest came from the perception of Ukraine as a risky area 
which potentially could become the source of illegal migration 
from the East.
Thus, in 1998 the Migration Management Program was initi-
ated, aiming to counteract the unregulated transit migration. 
European countries provided assistance to Ukraine in the issues 
concerning registration of asylum seekers and transit migrants, 
and also while setting the Migrants Temporary Accommodation 
Centre in Pavlyshyno (Transcarpathia). Additionally, there were 
also special trainings for Ukrainian border officers and material 
and technical support was provided to cross-border stations (The 
cooperation process with Ukraine…, 1998).
Also in 1998, the European Union and Ukraine signed an agree-
ment on partnership and cooperation. This agreement included 
the establishment of special working groups for customs interac-
tion, transborder cooperation, fighting illegal migration etc.
For quite a long period of time the EU did not have an explicit 
concept of a migration regime with Ukraine, aside from the vision 
of Ukraine as a buffer state which could reduce part of the migra-
tion threats on the Eastern borders. Thus, for a long time Ukraine 
had neither an exact invitation for full-scale integration, nor an 
alternatively attractive offer (Fischer, 2008).
Significant changes came with the introduction of the Schen-
gen visa zone. First of all, the Ukrainians were forced to apply 
for a visa each time they travelled to a territory of the EU. This 
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became one of the major reasons Ukraine has had positive saldo 
of migration since 2004. Another reason for the different dynam-
ics of external migration was quite noticeable economic growth, 
which hindered the socioeconomic push factors.
In 2004 the migration regime between Ukraine and the EU 
got new features in the context of the so-called “neighbourhood 
policy” which was aimed at creating “a circle of friends” on the 
borders with the EU. One of the first practical steps in the direc-
tion of this neighbourhood was establishing the European Union 
Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in the Odesa oblast not far 
from the border with the internationally unrecognized Transn-
istrian Republic in order to counteract contraband and illegal 
migration in the region. In the framework of neighbourhood 
policy during 2007–2010 Ukraine got the financial assistance in 
the amount of 494 million EUR which, inter alia, covered the 
creation of five centres for temporary accommodation of illegal 
migrants (Speer, 2008).
In 2008 Ukraine and the European Union signed the Readmis-
sion Agreement. This agreement concerned the deported citizens 
of Ukraine and also citizens of third countries who entered the 
EU from Ukraine’s side.
Overall, we can say that during the long period of time between 
the 1990s and 2014 (the year when the Agreement on Association 
was signed) the European migration regime and migration policy 
had one leading line of motivation – the threats from uncontrolled 
and illegal migration from the East through the territory of Ukraine.
Throughout the analyzed period the European vector in the 
external migration from Ukraine was very much predetermined 
by the bilateral agreements of Ukraine with the receiving coun-
tries. For example, during 1993–1996 several agreements on 
employment were signed with Poland (and in 2005 a protocol was 
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added to that concerning seasonal employment). Similar agree-
ments were also signed with Czech and Slovak Republics, Lithua-
nia and Latvia (Streimikiene et al., 2016). All of these agreements 
were very much identical in content and overall were more of a 
framework.
Agreements on employments signed in 2003 with Portugal 
and Libya were much more specific. They, inter alia, specified the 
employment mechanisms, the candidates’ selection procedures 
and the key requirements to them, terms and conditions of labour 
contracts etc.
The agreement signed in 2009 with Spain mentions three cat-
egories of workers: constant, seasonal and interns. However, none 
of the Ukrainians was ever employed according to the conditions 
provided by all these agreements, primarily due to complex pro-
cedures which imply the participation of public authorities on 
both sides – Ukrainian and that of the receiving country (while 
both employers and workers usually try to avoid this).
According to a similar agreement signed with Czech Republic, 
the initial quota of Ukrainian employees was 25 thousand per-
sons; later this number was increased to 60 thousand. However, 
this country in reality managed to employ only 16 thousand peo-
ple. This demonstrates that all these agreements were more of 
declarative nature, not the automatic guarantee of wider employ-
ment opportunities.
On March, 16th, 2007, Ukraine also ratified the European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977). This 
document obliges the countries which signed it to provide social 
protection for migrant workers and their families at the same 
level with its own citizens.
Ukraine signed bilateral agreements on social and pension provi-
sion with Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and 
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Czech Republic. A similar agreement with Portugal was signed in 
2009 but only ratified in December 2011 (Problema sotsialnogo 
zakhystu ukrainskyh…, 2013).
According to Ukrainian experts, all the above-mentioned 
agreements were not able to regulate labour migration and/or 
guarantee migrants’ rights protection. All of them have one simi-
lar major drawback – the complexity of practical application.
Till now, the level of social protection of Ukrainian migrants 
abroad is unsatisfactory. The largest problems are observed for 
those migrants who work without any contract signed and those 
who work seasonally. Besides, there are no agreements signed 
with the governments of Greece and Italy (and both countries are 
important destinations in Ukrainian labour emigration). There 
are also internal Ukrainian problems related to the implementa-
tion of these agreements; they concern mostly the deficiencies 
of administrative mechanisms, the lack of appropriate staff and 
underfinancing10.
At the same time we can observe a gradual legislative process of 
Ukraine’s adjustment to the requirements of the European Union 
in the context of a potential visa-free regime. Late in 2015 the 
Ukrainian parliament approved in the first reading the laws of the 
so-called “visa-free package”: the Law of Ukraine “On the intro-
duction of changes to the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine 
 10 A lot of problems arise due to the absence of exact mechanisms for these 
agreements’ implementation. The agreements define the bodies responsi-
ble for their implementation; however, in the structure of these bodies in 
Ukraine there are no structural units who could have been delegated such 
a responsibility. There is also a significant lack of people with necessary 
qualifications and knowledge of the needed languages. A range of very 
specific problems concerns the medical side of the issue: medical conclu-
sions are hard to be mutually recognized by countries due to differences in 
medical indicators of health conditions, different terminology and meth-
ods used.
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concerning separate issues in seizing property with the aim to 
remove the corruption risks at its application”; the Law of Ukraine 
“On introduction of changes to the Criminal Procedural Code of 
Ukraine concerning the compliance with the recommendations 
of the European Union on Ukraine’s performance according to 
the plan of action on liberalization by the European Union of visa 
regime for Ukraine concerning the investigative jurisdiction of the 
pretrial investigation bodies”; The Law of Ukraine “On the intro-
duction of changes to the Criminal and Civil Codes of Ukraine 
concerning the improvement of the institute of special confisca-
tion with the aim to remove the corruption risks at its application”, 
and finally, to the Law of Ukraine “On labour migration”.
The latter has introduced a range of important innovations, 
namely: more state responsibility for migrants’ reintegration in 
the societies upon their return to the country; it also emphasizes 
the right of labour migrants and their family members for man-
datory state social insurance according to Ukrainian legislation. 
Labour migrants also got the right for family reunions in accord-
ance with acting legislation. Civil unions of labour migrants which 
have been founded abroad have the right for the same, typical for 
civil unions, activity on Ukrainian territory as well. The state is 
to create better conditions for financial remittances transfer from 
labour migrants abroad to their Ukrainian relatives.
The same law also covers a significant part of migrants’ labour 
rights. In particular, it stipulates that every labour migrant before 
leaving the country is supposed to get a labour contract which is 
provided by the party arranging this employment opportunity on 
the side of the sending country. This labour contract is presented 
in the state language of Ukraine and also in one (or more) lan-
guages used as official ones in a receiving country. The contract 
describes the liabilities of an employer, including the following, 
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inter alia: work conditions (including a description of safety rules) 
and order of payment (mentioning the minimum guaranteed vol-
ume); exact deductions from the salary volume before tax; the 
duration of a working day; quantity and length of breaks during 
the working day; the general term of contract duration and the 
conditions under which it can be terminated; social and medical 
insurance included; potential compensation in case of production 
emergency; conditions when a labour migrant may be repatriated.
All of the innovations described here comply with the require-
ments of the European Union concerning external migration 
regulation. And secondly, these innovations have the potential to 
actually change the current situation of Ukrainian migrants for 
the better. However, the question still remains concerning the 
mechanisms of sanctions’ implementation for the violation of this 
law by any of the parties involved.
The political process of the Association Agreement ratification 
is ongoing. Meanwhile, we can already trace certain changes in the 
migration policies of Ukraine’s European neighbours. For exam-
ple, already in 2014–2015 Poland had significantly increased the 
general quantity of multi-entry visas issued for the Ukrainians. 
In 40% of these cases the visas are for more than one year. This 
is considered to be an efficient mechanism to fight both bureau-
cracy and corruption related to visa processes. In the previous 
period the share of long-term Polish visas for the Ukrainians was 
slightly higher than 10% (Polsha znachitelno…, 2015). Speaking 
optimistically, those Ukrainians who got their several-year visas 
in 2014 or 2015 may have been applying for the last time, since a 
visa-free regime is expected by many soon.
The consequences of these changes in Polish visa policy were 
already noticeable in the first half of 2014, when over 400 thou-
sand Ukrainians found jobs in Poland and entered the country. 
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This is twice over the same indicator in the previous year. Among 
these newly employed, around 70% found jobs in agriculture, the 
construction sector or in industrial production (Blaszczak, 2005). 
However, a vast majority of these migrants are only temporary 
and/or seasonal workers, and obviously, this form of employment 
only adds to the trends of precarization.
Since Ukraine overall today is experiencing a wide range of 
both political and socioeconomic problems, nearly all of them to 
this or that extent influence the processes of external migration, 
giving rise to a range of new threats which were registered within 
the EUMAGINE project.
Roughly, around half of the Ukrainian population has migration 
intentions, at least to some extent. The general dynamics of the 
fourth wave of Ukrainian migration was rather unstable: the dec-
ade of the 1990s demonstrated a rapid growth of emigration, while 
from the middle of the 2000s emigration tended to slow down, 
and even a positive migration saldo was recorded. A more or less 
optimistic situation lasted for almost a decade (Bilan, 2014b). The 
next phase of emigration growth coincided with the global eco-
nomic crisis (which also contributed to the growing migration). 
The political crisis of 2013–2014 and the ongoing military conflict 
have contributed significantly to both migration processes and the 
migration intentions of the Ukrainian population.
For several decades of the country’s independence the migration 
flows from Ukraine were very disorganized, without any guiding 
influence of the state or of large business. This was mostly due to 
political uncertainty and the absence of a long-term concept of 
migration policy. Now the conceptual issue of the country’s gen-
eral geopolitical choice has been solved; however, there is still a 
range of institutional and legal issues. For example, borders with 
the Russian Federation are still not delimited fully and officially. 
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With many countries, Ukraine still needs to sign the agreements 
on readmission. But the most sensitive issues in the context of 
Ukrainian external migration are the issues of social protection 
for Ukrainian migrants abroad and the problem of their reintegra-
tion into Ukrainian society upon return.
As we see, the activity of the Ukrainian government related to 
signing international agreements on regulation of various issues 
Figure 12: International agreements of Ukraine concerning 
external migration by the key directions of migration flows.
* The political chapters of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement 
were signed in March 2014. The remaining sections of the agree-
ment were signed in June 2014. The agreement will enter into 
force once all EU countries, in addition to Ukraine, have ratified it.
Source: Data of Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna rada Ukrajiny). 
zakon.rada.gov.ua
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related to the life of Ukrainian migrants abroad throughout the 
period analyzed was in full compliance with the general logic 
of multivector vision which was announced as Ukraine’s strat-
egy at foreign arenas. At the same time, while in the Eurasian 
direction most of such agreements were signed within the CIS 
agenda, for the Euro-Atlantic direction of external migration and 
Ukraine’s foreign policy, a more common practice was signing 
bilateral agreements with a range of receiving countries. This is a 
testament to the fact that throughout the whole period analyzed 
Ukraine had been gradually integrating with Eurasian structures, 
thus approaching the idea of a common legal field within the CIS, 
which became a pretty obvious idea straight before the framework 
agreement on the establishment of the Eurasian Union. This was 
the general external vector of Ukraine, up to the radical changes 
which took place after the political protests and change of powers 
from the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2014, when the country 
switched to the alternative, the opposite of the Eurasian scenario 
of integration.
Therefore, both researchers and politicians face the same issue: 
what must be the reaction of the state, of its political establish-
ment, of business and civil society as the response to these new 
challenges? Since this problem is comparatively new, there is an 
obvious gap in the related research, both at the level of mass dis-
course of surveys etc. and at the level of expert evaluations. Thus, 
even smaller studies on this problem would be of interest in this 
context.
For example, during 2008–2009 a comparative expert evalu-
ation of international labour migration problems by Ukrainian 
and Polish experts was carried out (Yuskiv, 2009, p. 360–361). 
Twenty Ukrainian and eleven Polish experts participated in their 
survey, discussing the problems related to international migration. 
In particular, there was a pool of questions concerning the 
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experts’ evaluation of the efficiency of state regulation of the 
international labour migration from Ukraine from the viewpoint 
of fast results and further development prospects. Also, a list of 
potential further measures was suggested for evaluation from 
the viewpoint of their effectiveness in the opinions of Ukrainian 
and Polish experts. This list included the following: the system of 
sanctions against illegal migration; counteracting illegal interme-
diary services in this field; administrative actions against illegal 
entry to the country and repatriation of migration; establishing 
specialized institutions with certain procedures on migration 
regulation; signing international agreements and other forms of 
supranational regulation; further improvement of national legis-
lation on migration; limitations set on employment of foreign cit-
izens; development and introduction of professional and sectoral 
priorities in foreign employment; indirect methods of migration 
regulation based on purely economic criteria, including invest-
ments, tax preferences and fines on both private individual and 
legal persons; information campaigns covering various issues 
related to migration processes.
To evaluate this list a nominal scale was applied, where: 1  – 
“would hardly lead to any positive result”, 2  – “can be effective 
under certain conditions”, and 3  – “would lead to the needed 
results”. Evaluation of measures using this scale enabled the cal-
culation of the measures’ efficiency index. The value of this index 
would range between 0 and 1. If the value is closer to zero, that 
means that according to the experts’ opinions, the given measure 
would not lead to the needed result. The value closer to 1 shows 
that most of the experts think this measure can be highly effec-
tive. Detailed results of Ukrainian and Polish expert evaluations 
are presented below in Figure 13.
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In the intricate hierarchy of efficient regulation means for 
international labour migration, Ukrainian experts evaluated the 
following positions as number one: development of the national 
legislation on migration and signing the related international 
agreements, and development of supranational regulation. Pol-
ish experts’ choice on the number one positions in this hierar-
chy was very different, namely: indirect regulation of migration 
using the economic criteria, and introduction of limitations on 
foreign employment. The differences in choice are significant and 
conceptual. Ukrainian experts opted for rather abstract solutions 
which shift much of responsibility onto the international com-
munity and foreign partners of Ukraine. Polish experts chose 
much more specific and measurable methods, in particular, the 
ones that are more limiting. However, at the same time, Polish 
experts evaluated quite a wide range of other methods as being 
efficient, from the above-mentioned purely protectionist meth-
ods in their own market up to indirect regulation. Two options 
were evaluated by Ukrainian and Polish experts in radically 
opposite ways. These are: setting professional and sectoral pri-
orities in foreign citizens’ employment and introducing quotas 
on foreign citizens’ employment. There are several reasons for 
that. First of all, trade union movement in Ukraine has been and 
still is in crisis; by many it is viewed as being inefficient when it 
comes to protection of labourers’ rights, since trade unions are 
often accused of representing the interests of large businesses 
rather than those of workers. Thus, protection of workers’ inter-
ests at the level of professions and sectors is viewed by Ukrainian 
experts as inefficient.
Secondly, we can assume that at the time of this survey, Ukrain-
ian experts tended to ignore the influence of labour market regula-
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tion in the context of international labour migration. Ukrainian 
experts overall tended to prefer legal (including the international 
law) and information means of regulation when it came to interna-
tional labour migration. At the same time their Polish colleagues 
viewed these methods as inefficient.
Thus, the Ukrainian experts’ assessment contradicts the vision 
of D. Massey, who emphasized that under crisis, experts would 
opt for restrictive measures.
Meanwhile, the current-day realia require the formation of the 
migration policy concept for Ukraine. The recently approved Law 
of Ukraine “On labour migration” covers mostly the issues related 
to social and legal protection of migrants as well as the issues of 
social reintegration upon return to Ukraine. The issues of state 
regulation of migration flows, the related challenges for the edu-
cation system (mostly university education and professional 
training) have been left out of focus.
On one hand, the signed Association Agreement and also the 
agreement on a free economic zone have created the potential 
space for freer circulation of both economic and human resources. 
On the other hand, from the social viewpoint, external migration 
is becoming more dysfunctional: migration is currently escalat-
ing under great social pessimism and very low expectations about 
Ukraine’s future, and it is often accompanied by the total loss of 
previous social connections, since migrants are concentrating 
their attention only on the receiving society, in which they are 
doomed to further precarization.
Therefore, the key task in the improvement of the institu-
tional and legal regime of external migration from Ukraine 
lays in two dimensions: firstly, in granting all Ukrainian citi-
zens the right to free movement, free employment choice as 
138 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
well as the corresponding legal and social protection in the 
most favourable receiving societies (according to our research, 
in the European direction these would be Germany, Italy, the 
UK and Poland); and secondly, in indirect discouragement of 
mass illegal labour emigration with emphasis on potential pre-
carization.
Within the frameworks of the EUMAGINE project we have 
carried out research to reveal the social demand for a migration 
policy of certain contents. Namely, in the context of migration 
flows, regulation the respondents often mentioned low quality 
of life in Ukraine, and more specifically, a range of negative fac-
tors which served as the push factors for migration. At the level 
of mass discourse there is a widely spread perception of external 
migration as a dysfunctional phenomenon, not as a potentially 
positive one. Thus, concerning the institutional and legal aspects, 
external migration regulation is seen by the general public as 
“what the government must do in order to decrease the external 
migration from Ukraine” (that is, measure weakening and elimi-
nating the push factors).
The key topics (or in other words, the key push factors) men-
tioned by the survey participants were: economic troubles, 
underdeveloped social infrastructure, political instability and 
corruption.
In this context, corruption is probably the most complicated 
issue of all. Obviously, the general corruption level in Ukraine 
is high; however, the level of corruption-related anticipation 
and panic is even higher, and thus, in mass discourse, media 
and political discourses its volumes are often exaggerated, while 
achievements related to fighting corruption are often ignored or 
downplayed – negative perception is widespread.
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However, the same research also revealed another trend, which 
is less powerful so far, but can potentially form an alternative 
in mass discourse. This is the vision of external migration in a 
positive context. Mass expectations related to liberalization of the 
visa regime with European countries and to the legalization of 




Empirical Research on the Factors 
of External Labour Migration from 
Ukraine at the Current Stage
3.1 Overview of current research on the factors of 
external labour migration
The use of sociology in empirical research on external migra-
tion is important. In the absence of trustworthy tools measuring 
external migration, experts and media tend to use rather specula-
tive estimations, especially when it comes to migration volumes. 
Overstatement and dramatization around migration in media 
usually takes place when the results of sociological research are 
presented without a detailed explanation of the tools, methods 
and indicators used.
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Studying external migration by means of demographic statis-
tics does not allow considering numerous aspects of this phe-
nomenon: precision in the volumes of migration; the intensity of 
migration mobility in various social and demographic groups; the 
influences of such factors as origin, education, social status and 
nationality; the dynamics of personal attitudes in the conscious-
ness and behaviour of potential migrants; the contents of migra-
tion expectations and the level of these expectations coming true 
in time etc. As well noted by E. Jaźwińska, for a long period of 
time we were able to use only the state statistics data, various lists 
and registers. The advantage of this data, at least theoretically, is 
that they cover the whole population. The key disadvantage was, 
however, that they had very little information; at best, it was lim-
ited only to key demographic features, and these would tell us 
very little about the motives or aims of migrants, the way they 
made the decision to migrate etc. Besides, in the case of interna-
tional migration the quality of official statistics is very low. Lack of 
and gaps in data are caused by differences in registration methods 
in different countries, and this does not allow us to compare the 
quantity of people leaving one country and arriving in another. 
Moreover, during the recent years illegal (unregistered) migra-
tion increased significantly, and in the absence of formal data it 
becomes even more interesting for researchers (Jaźwińska, 2000).
Today there is a wide variety of rather developed tools for sta-
tistically-oriented qualitative and quantitative research on migra-
tion. Every “family” of sociological methods has its strong and 
weak points. As mentioned by Balakireva et al. (2012), there are 
also certain limitations on using quantitative methods in mass 
surveys when it comes to migration. First of all, migrants have 
to return regularly home and/or have relatives who still live in 
the sending country. In this case both migrants and their relatives 
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can be considered in research and further surveyed. Migrants that 
have nobody to return to in the sending country should be not 
considered. Secondly, migration should be numerous enough that 
the sample would provide enough material for solid conclusions.
While using quantitative methods in sociological research on 
migration there is always the issue of sample. Unspecified socio-
logical research, being representative for Ukraine, with the prob-
ability or quota sample of 1200 persons with the traditional set 
of social and demographic parameters, would have 32 persons 
who had experienced labour migration (if we assume that the 
total volume of labour migrants in the country is 1 million), or 
64 persons (for 2 million of labour migrants), or 96 persons (for 
3 million). Obviously, such a sample size does not allow for reli-
able conclusions on the experience of labour migration or key 
features of labour migrants (including age, gender, duration of 
stay abroad etc.) (Balakireva et al., 2012).
In this regard E. Jaźwińska continues that studying migration 
using nationwide samples is nearly impossible since migrants 
represent only a minor share of the population. If we assume that 
their share is around 5–10%, then in order to obtain the migrants’ 
sample of 1000 persons (or households), we need to survey about 
10–20 thousand respondents (Jaźwińska, 2000, p. 19).
Thus, with the unspecified general sample, we get trustwor-
thy sociological information on migrants only with truly large-
scale research, and this requires a lot of resources, including 
time and labour. Clearly, crossover research would have a much 
smaller sample. However, the most a researcher can do with a 
small sample is a very careful statement of hypotheses, without 
overgeneralization.
In a similar manner, A. Gorny notes that the experience with 
migrant groups shows that applying only quantitative approach 
144 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
with surveys encounters many difficulties and as a consequence, 
there may be serious distortions in final data. One of the wide-
spread problems which researchers are trying to solve while 
using quantitative methods is the lack of opportunity to create 
the needed sample of respondents. The major reason behind 
this is the lack of reliable statistical data on the actual volumes 
of migration, because a large share of it is illegal, and those who 
actually came to the country fully legally are usually hard to reach 
(Gorny, 2005).
A creative approach to sample formation was suggested by 
J. Fawcett and F. Arnold. They proposed finding potential migrants 
using the lists of people who apply for visas or work permits or 
who apply for citizenship status (such a sample will be partially 
random, partially purposive). For the formation of a sample of 
those who have actually migrated (or have a real opportunity to 
do so), they suggest using the lists of people who got visas (or 
work permits) or of those who have recently changed citizenship 
(Fawcet et al., 1987).
Qualitative research is used in cases of new subject fields, for 
example, new types of migration. Then researchers do explora-
tory research in order to study the very structure of the sub-
ject field. Qualitative methods are used when the application of 
quantitative methods is troublesome or impossible. They are also 
applicable to phenomena that are not widespread enough to be 
explored quantitatively. Also, qualitative methods are useful in 
sensitive issues like household relations, personal finance, family 
relations, illegal practices regarding employment, tax evasion, 
contraband etc. Besides that, migration research always works 
with the groups which are hard to reach, for example, high-status 
migrants, illegal migrants, people engaged in or related to organ-
ized crime etc.
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Qualitative research does not concentrate on the volumes; it 
determines trends and patterns. These may include: behavioural 
strategies and the related decision-making; migration experi-
ences; migration motives, values, perceptions and causal relation 
between factors. Flexibility of qualitative research allows us to 
explain differences and similarities in perception, even in chang-
ing cultural contexts.
Qualitative sociological research aims to find the true mean-
ing of human attitude, to understand the social mechanics behind 
behavioural patterns and systems of values, to describe intentions 
and lifestyles. Qualitative research has its roots in anthropology 
and ethnography, which have formed the tradition that to study a 
certain culture, the researcher has to spend some time within it, 
inside it, observing its carriers and interacting with them in their 
everyday lives.
M.S. Knapp describes qualitative ethnographical research as a 
fully unbiased exploratory approach to a problem in question; 
intensive engagement, inclusion of a researcher in a situation; 
using multiple research tools with the emphasis on participant 
observation and the key role of interviewing informants; an 
attempt to understand the regularities in a studied phenomenon 
operating the same terms the participants of the studied social 
situation use; an interpretative approach with the key role of the 
context; the research the product of which, in a form of ethno-
graphical descriptive text, provokes in the readers the sense of 
belonging (Knapp, 1979, p. 119).
Carrying out research using qualitative sociological meth-
ods raises questions concerning the selection of individual 
respondents and their groups, how to establish trust for more 
productive communication and how to process the obtained 
data afterwards.
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The issue of a sample is also relevant for qualitative research. 
The major aim of a sample in a qualitative sociological research is 
to catch the variations in the aspects of social realia, to avoid rep-
etitions and incompleteness, to prevent the focus shift. The most 
frequent choice in qualitative sociological studies is the snow-
ball sampling. A theoretical (or typological) sample means that 
researcher chooses persons with certain features that are relevant 
for the subject field. These features, hypothetically, can differ-
entiate the attitudes, values and practices (in our case these can 
be: absence or availability of migration experience; the level of 
migration mobility; availability or absence of migration opportu-
nities; having relatives abroad; belonging to an ethnical minority 
group etc.).
The snowball sampling method can be especially useful in the 
research of specific types of external migration (for example, 
sports or academic migration). It is also a useful tool for study-
ing social networks. The first person who introduces a researcher 
to a studied community is usually called the gate opener. Most 
often this would be a representative of an international organiza-
tion or an NGO employee (including those providing support to 
migrants); this can also be a public officer from self-government 
or a community leader, a local celebrity. These people ease the first 
contact of the researchers with the so-called gate keepers – the 
key persons in a future study, the local experts who have the most 
knowledge about the local community life in detail. This first step 
is ethically important, since external migration is a highly sensi-
tive issue and setting trust is vital.
In many cases doing a regular survey would kill all hopes of 
getting trustworthy data, especially when it comes to shadow or 
illegal practices of migrants. For example, back in 1995 the Centre 
for Migration Research surveyed 792 former citizens of the Soviet 
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Union. For this, 20 interviewers were working on two border 
points, trying to survey every tenth traveller crossing the border 
from the side of once-Soviet territory. For obvious reasons, being 
on the border, with the customs officers around, the respondents 
were not particularly ready to tell about their real intentions con-
cerning employment (which might be illegal) or how exactly they 
got their visas. This method was borrowed from the British Pas-
senger Survey but clearly did not work well in this specific case 
(Okolski, 1997).
There are specific requirements to both gate openers and gate 
keepers, especially when it comes to polyethnical societies or 
societies divided in other ways which usually have significant 
socioeconomic differentiation. The universal advice would be 
to start the research with several people who potentially could 
become gate openers, then expand to several more gate keepers 
who ideally will represent various stratas in the local society.
A good example of such a sample formation is provided by Jon-
czy (2003) who studied the external labour migration from Opole, 
Poland. Since none of the statistical databases had information on 
the needed population group, Jonczy turned to key informants in 
the selected 12 territorial units of Opole, and those introduced 
him to the households the members of which were working 
abroad. In such a way he managed to conduct interviews in 45% 
of the households which were mentioned by the key informants. 
Thus, the author reached quite a high representativeness level.
Although in quantitative research the sampled population is 
usually around 1000 respondents, in quantitave research the sam-
ple can be 1 informant only. In less extreme cases, as for example, 
in Volodko’s study (2007), the sample consisted of 14 semistruc-
tured interviews with the ladies who had experienced working 
in Poland. Social facts stated verbally by the respondents may be 
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enough for further narrative analysis. That’s why the life story 
of one informant only in a certain social context can be enough 
(Sandelowski, 1991). One of the most important studies for soci-
ology overall and migration research in particular also did not 
have a large population sample (Thomas et al., 1918).
The location choice within national borders is also important 
for the empirical research on external migration. In some cases, 
especially when it comes to explicit seasonal variations in the 
intensity of migration processes, both location and time factor 
are important for field research. Thus, the researcher must have 
advance knowledge about both location and good timing.
The next step is the selection of informants. A popular approach 
is expert choice, as experts are the carriers of the most widespead 
and generally accepted knowledge, attitudes and experience. 
Contacts with experts provide information on both the studied 
phenomenon and also on the community around it.
As noted by E. Jaźwińska, P. Kaczmarczyk and J. Napierała, there 
is a way to solve the dilemma between quantitative and qualita-
tive methods by combining them as suggested by D. Massey. This 
approach was called ethnosurvey by D. Massey (Massey et al., 
1987).
This was implemented during one of the most magistral stud-
ies of the recent decades in the field of migration (Massey et al., 
1987), and it happened to become the methodological reference 
point for many followers. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) 
study of the migration between Mexico and the USA has the fol-
lowing key elements: 1) a set of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to collect data; 2) comparatively symmetrical samples in 
various locations; 3) combining data at different level of analysis 
(starting with separate life stories up to the level of macroanaly-
sis); 4) the interdisciplinary nature of the research.
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Another reputable project on migration was MAFE – Migra-
tion Between Africa and Europe (Beauchemin et al., 2009). This 
project included biography studies (the so-called close-ups) in 
three sending and six receiving countries (Senegal, Ghana and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo; and Belgium, France, Italy, 
Holland, Spain and the UK accordingly). The MAFE database 
had the following parameters: 1) it was multifocused (various 
aspects of the respondents’ lives were studied – work, family rela-
tions, mobility, legal status etc.); 2) the data were compared by 
the cross-level principle (meso- and macrodata were compared 
with microlevel data, on specific respondents); 3) this was a lon-
gitudinal research (the retrospective analysis for reconstruction 
of migration trajectories); 4) the research was transnational (the 
gathered data concerns both sending and receiving countries).
Similar variants of combining quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods are also present in Polish research. For example, in the early 
2000s the research group under the leadership of K. Iglicka car-
ried out a project titled “Migration and its influence on the labour 
market in Poland”. The study was based on the use of quantitative 
methods with further thorough statistical analysis of the obtained 
results and in-depth interviews with hundreds of migrants which 
had returned to Poland from Great Britain, USA and Germany 
(Iglicka, 2003).
Overall, a perfect sociological research has to combine various 
methods, and their diversity and combination at various stages 
of hypotheses’ formulation and their further verification raises 
the quality of subsequent sociological knowledge. Combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods in the research aims to: 
1)  discover both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the 
studied phenomena; 2) reveal and explain the complex interrela-
tion between structures and individuals who finally have to choose 
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whether to migrate or not (Findlay et al., 1999). Combining tools, 
methods and approaches allows us to validate the research results 
and significantly improves the methodological foundations of the 
research. This creates the conditions for performing truly fun-
damental research which will enrich scientific knowledge rather 
than provide basic knowledge on fragmented realia.
Another curious aspect is the cross-national dimension of such 
research. Internationality is vital for sociological knowledge, since 
the whole cycle of migration concerns both sending and receiv-
ing societies, and only cross-national research is able to reveal the 
universal, most widespread features of the migration phenom-
enon. Moreover, even within the national limits it would be more 
preferable to compare several socioeconomic contexts, both pro-
moting and preventing external migration (in the case of a send-
ing society) or various degrees of a society’s attractiveness and 
social comfort for emigrants (in the case of a receiving society).
Therefore, a reference sociological research on external migra-
tion must be based on a smart combination of quantitative and 
qualitative sociological methods in its collection and processing 
of information for further cross-national comparative case stud-
ies in a diversified social context (preferable also multi-sited). As 
many researchers note, such a research design is extremely impor-
tant for overcoming the so-called methodological nationalism 
(Wimmer et al., 2002). As D. S. Massey and J. Durand (probably 
the most influential contemporary scholars in the field of external 
migration) wrote in their joint study: “qualitative and quantitative 
procedures complement one another, and when properly com-
bined, one’s weaknesses become the other’s strengths, yielding 
a body of data with greater reliability and more internal valid-
ity than would be possible to achieve using either method alone” 
(Durand et al., 2004, p. 332).
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Along with combining methods in data collection, the quality 
of sociological information can also be increased by combining 
the methods of its subsequent analysis. There are two opposite 
poles in the wide range of possible methods for qualitative socio-
logical analysis of data. One of these poles is absolute interpreta-
tion, which can easily and often does devolve into speculations; 
it is also characterized by the rejection of a priori statements and 
theory is thus constructed in the process of data analysis as such. 
This approach is most explicitly represented by the so-called 
Grounded theory (Barney et al., 2006). The opposite pole is the 
total quantification of data, solely computer analysis of the raw 
data obtained. This can be done, for example, by means of NVivo, 
AtlasT or other software. Classification and sorting out the data 
obtained by means of qualitative methods, first of all, releases 
the researchers from accusations in speculation, and secondly, it 
directs scientific search on truly well-grounded conclusions.
Obviously, combinations of research methods can be very diverse 
since the sociological methodological toolkit is quite rich. A. Sin-
gleton proposes using the above-mentioned methods in combi-
nation with official demography statistics and analysis of political 
decision-making, since the latter, actualized through the actions of 
the state and other influential factors, may create new opportuni-
ties for the migration process to develop. Singleton is rather critical 
regarding official statistics; however, she does not fully reject their 
use. International migration is a cross-national phenomenon, but 
at the same time international migration statistics are the prod-
uct of national governments, related ministries and other offices. 
Researchers need to remember that official instruments for migra-
tion calculations are limited in many aspects – conceptually, lin-
guistically etc.; besides, they are always carried out within certain 
national legal frameworks (Singleton, 1999, p. 156).
152 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
The topic of external migration appeared in the mass con-
sciousness of Ukrainian society with the fall of the Iron Curtain 
at the end of the 1980s when, on one hand, crossing the national 
borders became easier, and on the other, the socioeconomic crisis 
started, reaching its peak in the early 1990s. Further dynamics 
of socioeconomic development of Ukraine was also characterized 
by the crisis features, especially after the start of the global finan-
cial and economic crisis in 2008, and later, due to the military 
conflict with Russia in the Donbass region (2014–present).
While the first crisis of the 1990s had rather obvious internal 
causes, the following two crises were mainly caused by external 
factors of both economic and geopolitical nature. Let us con-
sider the influence of socioeconomic development dynamics in 
Ukraine on the mass discourse of Ukraine’s population as applied 
to external migration.
First of all, we need to note that formation of the mass dis-
course on external migration was happening under the influ-
ence of significant decrease in quality of life at the beginning 
of the 1990s. As I. Prybytkova wrote, this decade of reforms 
and uncontrolled market transformations was accompanied 
by quantitative and qualitative changes in the labour market 
and economic environment as such: suddenly there were fewer 
opportunities for the application of one’s labour potential since 
now getting state-funded education did not automatically guar-
antee the availability of a job. As was traditional for the Soviet 
Union, economic connections were ruined, and overall, labour 
demand decreased, many enterprises that were still operat-
ing had serious delays with wage payments. Full-time jobs 
were radically cut, part-time and temporary jobs were much 
more available than before, informal employment became 
widespread (Prybytkova, 2009). All these features of labour 
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relations’ instability led to ever-increasing threats of poverty 
due to sudden loss of jobs and rather chaotic redistribution of 
employment forms between those enterprises that managed to 
survive under such conditions. All of the above made external 
migration quite a topical issue for many.
As a result, one of the largest European migration flows was 
formed, and this gave several researchers enough grounds to 
call Ukraine “European Mexico” (Duvell, 2006). Unlike its clos-
est neighbours (Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia), which 
also had quite intensive migration during the same period, 
Ukraine was not successful in developing its national economic 
and labour market, and that only aggravated the consequences of 
the world financial crisis for the country.
Slow dynamics and lack of radical innovations in the socioeco-
nomic development of Ukraine can be partially explained by the 
specific features of both the national political class and the mass 
consciousness in Ukraine. In particular, one of the barriers on the 
way to system reforms, in our opinion, is the deeply rooted pater-
nalism of the Ukrainian population, traditionally high demands 
to the state in terms of social protection, work guarantees and 
labour rights’ protection. Paradoxically, this sort of paternalism is 
combined with citizens distancing themselves from state authori-
ties and with significant distrust of public institutions. Ukrainian 
researcher V. Susak is of a similar opinion and wrote the follow-
ing: “counterinnovative conservatism… is dominating over… 
the desire for innovative development, and this is the sign of 
post-Communist transformations in Ukraine being incomplete” 
(Susak, 2009). This very specific distortion in the mass conscious-
ness of the Ukranian population forms citizens’ disengagement 
from civil and political life due to their distrust, their inability 
to believe in potential constructive changes. We can assume that 
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migration intentions are partially preconditioned by these atti-
tudes within the mass discourse.
Despite such trends and after the years of massive migration 
outflows from Ukraine, 2005 became the turning point in migra-
tion development since that was the year of the first-recorded 
positive saldo in migration (mostly due to the inflows from the 
CIS countries), and thus, Ukraine turned from being a migration 
donor into a migration recipient (Balakireva et al., 2012).
During the first years after gaining independence Ukrainian 
sociology was in a crisis condition, mostly due to a generally 
weak economic situation and scientific financing by the leftover 
principle; besides, Ukrainian sociology was hardly integrated in 
any regional or global research. Therefore, the key problem in 
studying the external labour migration from Ukraine was the 
absence of common methodological approaches to measuring 
and assessing migration processes. Also, there was no unified 
database for calculations and further analysis. Thus, all data on 
the volumes of labour migration from Ukraine, both statistical 
and demographic, including the data presented and analyzed 
in this book, is not completely trustworthy, but in many cases it 
comes from the only source of information available to us.
Further, we would like to overview the available corpus of socio-
logical studies dedicated to the selected issues of mass discourse 
dynamics in Ukraine concerning external migration. One of the 
first attempts of the sociological research on mass discourse con-
cerning external migration from Ukraine after the country got its 
independence was the joint work of S. Pyrozhkov, O. Malinovska 
and N. Marchenko titled “External migration in Ukraine: causes, 
consequences, strategies” and published back in 1997 (Pyrozhkov 
et al., 1997). This research was carried out in the National Institute 
for Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Social Monitoring 
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Centre during the autumn and winter of 1994–1995, with support 
from the Department of Population of the European Economic 
Commission, United Nations. The key topics of this study were: 
causes and consequences of migration; strategies and models of 
labour migration; influence of historic and cultural traditions 
on migration; economic and social influences on migration; 
and family situation influences. For the analysis, both qualita-
tive (migrants’ life stories, interviews with experts) and quantita-
tive (surveys of migrants’ families using the standardized survey 
form) methods were used. The authors came to the following 
conclusions: early in the 1990s migration was primarily short-
term; the dominating forms of external migration were trade and 
labour migrations; and sociodemographic features of migrants 
were described (these were mostly young and middle-aged people 
with higher education and developed qualifications). The study 
also revealed that incomes from such migration were later spent 
mostly on consumption, not as investments.
Another contribution to the initial sociological research of exter-
nal migration from Ukraine was made by the above-mentioned 
V. Susak. The study “Ukrainian host workers and immigrants in 
Portugal (1997–2002)” was published in 2003 (Susak, 2003). It was 
dedicated to studying the reasons behind Portugal’s popularity as a 
receiving destination for Ukrainian migrants and these migrants’ 
social and demographic features. The research used the data of 
the PEMINT project “The political economy of migration in an 
integrating Europe” (http://pemint.ces.uc.pt). The study was using 
mostly quantitative methods to reveal that Portugal managed to 
attract Ukrainian migrants mainly thanks to the construction 
boom which started in 1997 due to the EU preferences provided. 
Thus, the vast majority of Ukrainian migrants in Portugal were 
(and still are, actually) men from Western Ukraine.
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As already noted in the previous chapters, for the analysis 
of migration phenomenon, parallel bilateral research would 
be useful, in both sending and receiving societies. Sadly, in 
Ukrainian sociology this is a very rare case. One of these rare – 
and hence extremely valuable – examples is the project “Social 
portrait of the recent Ukrainian labour migration” which was 
carried out in January 2002 by the Western Ukrainian centre 
“Female perspective”. In their study, 441 persons were sur-
veyed, all working in Italy (or upon return from this country) 
(Sotsialne oblychchya, 2003).
That same year another large-scale study on labour migration 
saw its results published. The study “Life journey of Ukrain-
ian population” was carried out in 2001 by the State Commit-
tee for Statistics and National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 
(Zovnishni trudovi…, 2002). This study covered eight regions 
(oblasts) in Western Ukraine and also Donbass.
The first attempt to describe the dynamics of external migra-
tion from Ukraine was made in 2003 within the framework of 
the research “External labour migrations from Ukraine: socio-
economic aspect” (Pyrozhkov et al., 2003). The empirical basis 
for this research was made up of the interview materials with 
150 migrant families in Kyiv, 100 such families in Chernivtsi and 
100 families in the village of Prylbychy (Lviv oblast). Very similar 
research had been carried out in the same location back in 1997, 
using roughly similar methodology; thus we can consider this 
study longitudinal. The evolution of external migration features 
was described: the duration of stay abroad became longer, while 
educational and qualificational features of migrants changed – in 
2003 the migrants were mostly people with vocational educa-
tion, not a higher one as previously. Moreover, the research noted 
the diversification of destinations: Russia and Poland were still 
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popular; however, increased outflows to Italy, Portugal and Spain 
were noteworthy.
In 2005 a research group headed by I. Markov published a 
collective book titled Ukrainian Labour Migration in the Con-
text of Change in Today’s World to summarize the then-available 
corpus of sociological studies on external migration. Also in 
2005, N. Parkhomenko and A. Starodub published the study 
Ukrainian Labour Migration to the European Union in the Mir-
ror of Sociology: Information-analytical publication. This work 
managed to use the principles of parallel research of migrants 
in two societies  – sending and receiving ones. Empirical data 
in Ukraine was gathered in eight oblasts, while Polish materials 
were gathered in Mazowieckie voivodship (Ukrainska trudova 
migratsiya…, 2005). The author came to the conclusion that 
the key reason and the leading pull factor for Ukrainian-Polish 
migration was potential for higher income.
One of a few comparative studies on migration processes in 
various regions of Ukraine was the joint research by A. Kizilov, 
V. Nikolaievskyi and Ya. Petrova under the title “Peculiarities of 
migration processes in Ukrainian transborder regions (according 
to the results of sociological research in Kharkiv and Lviv oblasts)” 
(Kizilov et al., 2006). This study was carried out within the frame-
work of the international project “Models of migration in new 
European border regions” (INTAS). The research was based on 
the quantitative methods and was rather limited in terms of rep-
resentativeness, since only 400 respondents from two regions 
of Ukraine participated. Still, the study managed to distinguish 
three key models in migration behaviour: labour migration, edu-
cation migration and relocation with residential purposes. Migra-
tion intentions in Lviv oblast were significantly higher than those 
in Kharkiv oblast. For obvious reasons, the migration directions 
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in this study were completely opposite: Russia for Khrakiv oblast, 
and the member countries of the EU for Lviv oblast.
In 2009 one of the most systemic and multi-aspect studies on 
external migration factors was published by I. Prybytkova. The 
key aim of this study was formulated as the synthesis of the avail-
able studies in order to describe fully the preconditions for exter-
nal labour migration. This author used quite large volumes of 
data, from 1992 through 2006, including, inter alia: a) materials 
of the annual monitoring by the Institute of Sociology, National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; b) data of the State Committee 
for Statistics; c) the data of the International Centre for Migra-
tion Policy Development. The author’s results were quite curious, 
namely: most Ukrainian citizens identify themselves as being “the 
poor” and have the feeling that their quality of life is decreasing, 
despite the objective improvement of certain related indicators. 
For example, in the middle of the 2000s the general situation in 
the labour market was quite satisfactory, speaking statistically; 
still, about 43% of the adult population in Ukraine were convinced 
that finding a job was problematic. Prybytkova also revealed the 
dependence between migration experience and migration plans 
(and attitudes). The people who already had migration experi-
ence had higher and more frequent intentions to emigrate with 
residential purposes. The key innovative feature of this study was 
the systemic view on the range of factors in their interrelation – 
quality of life, welfare level, general situation in the labour market 
and migration experience.
The first large-scale sampling investigation of labour migra-
tion issues was carried out in June 2008 within the framework of 
the project “Studying labour migration in Ukraine” by the State 
Committee for Statistics of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Centre 
for Social Reforms. The project was financially and technically 
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supported by the Fund of Arseniy Yatsenyuk “OpenUkraine”, the 
representative office of the International Organization for Migra-
tion in Ukraine, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development in Ukraine (Zovnishnya trudova mihratsiya, 2009). 
This study was based on the sampled population of households, 
covering 48.1 thousand people. The repeated research was car-
ried out in 2012, then covering already 45.5 thousand people. The 
study managed to reveal the volumes of external migration from 
Ukraine at the estimated level of 1.5 million throughout 2005–
2008, and then 1.2 million more during 2010–2012. Till now, the 
most trustworthy source of information on external migration 
(including the one with labour purposes) remains the results of 
two household surveys carried out by the State Committee for 
Statistics in 2008 and in 2012.
According to the Committee’s data from the period of 2007 
through the first half of 2008, the volume of migration was 1.3 
million people. We need to note here that statistical research of 
this type are extremely labour-consuming and also expensive; 
thus, it is nearly impossible to carry them out more often than 
once in several years.
Another attempt to assess the volume of external migration 
was done by the Ukrainian Institute for Sociological Research 
and the Social Monitoring Centre. In December 2008 and May 
2013 they carried out the monitoring surveys, “Your opinion”, 
the samples of which were 2097 and 2009 persons accordingly 
(and this is representative enough in relation to the adult popu-
lation of Ukraine). In 2008 2.8% of the respondents answered 
that they had labour migration experience during 2007–2008, 
and this means that in the corresponding year about 1.1 million 
people in the country overall had this experience. The second 
survey (May 2013) showed that already 3.6% of the respondents 
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had the experience of working abroad (that is, 1.3 million in the 
country overall).
A comprehensive study on a variety of aspects of Ukrainian 
external migration was carried out in 2009 by the Institute of 
Ethnology, National Academy of Sciences (Markov et al., 2009). 
This study used in-depth semistructured interviews and also 
focus group discussions with migration, experts’ survey in the 
receiving countries, monitoring of legislation trends and changes 
in these countries, and monitoring of Ukrainian media space. 
Considering a wide range of the used methods and their smart 
combination, we can state that this research study was probably 
the most multidimensional one and the most methodologically 
thorough.
In 2010–2013 the international project “Theorising the Evolu-
tion of European Migration Systems” came to Ukraine. Its key 
aim was to determine the motives behind migration decisions. 
The leading organizer of the project was the International Migra-
tion Institute (Oxford, UK). Within this project 45 detailed 
interviews were done with Ukrainian migrants in four European 
countries (the UK, Holland, Norway and Portugal), and also, 420 
structured interviews were done in Kyiv (city) and Lviv oblast. 
The latter part of the study aimed to describe the public opinion 
on external migration and to reveal how widespread migration 
intentions are.
About that time the first generalizing studies on external 
migration from Ukraine showed up. For example, in 2010 one 
more collective study was published under the title Labour 
Migration as an Instrument of Internationalization: The Collec-
tion of Materials of the Comprehensive Research on Labour Migra-
tion and Labour Markets (ed. Kis, 2010). This collective book 
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summed up the results of regional studies on external migration 
from Ukraine to such countries as Spain, Italy, Moldova and the 
Russian Federation as well as on the consequences of migration 
in the context of individual life stories, family stories, career suc-
cess stories etc. Consequences for the receiving societies were 
also described.
At the same time, separate studies concentrated more on the 
local cases. In 2010 a group of researchers headed by K. Lev-
chenko published a collective book under the title Ukrainian 
Greece: Causes, Problems, Prospects. The book analyzed the influ-
ence of the world financial and economic crisis on Ukrainian emi-
gration to Greece and migration intentions of the Ukrainians as 
such (Ukrainskaya Gretsiya, 2010). This work used large volumes 
of empirical data: expert interviews with Ukrainian and Greek 
public authorities’ representatives, with NGO officers and experts 
on the issues of external migration, as well as interviews with 
migrants themselves (in Greece and in Ukraine, upon return); 
sociological survey results were also used. The authors got quite 
interesting results. As it turned out, during 2009–2010, mostly 
females of middle age and older, with higher or vocational educa-
tion, primarily married and with children moved from Ukraine 
to Greece. The developing financial crisis had its negative influ-
ence on migrants’ expectations and their levels of income; how-
ever, mass return back to Ukraine was still not observed. Many 
migrants in this regard stated that the Ukrainian state does not 
encourage this return and in case of actual return their reintegra-
tion into Ukrainian society is very complicated. The important 
useful feature of this study is that it contains recommendations 
on the institutional improvement of external migration regula-
tion and in the related legislation.
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Another interesting study was published in 2011. In the book 
titled Labour Migration: Social Consequences and the Ways of 
Reacting, O. Malinovska grounded her own interpretation of the 
dysfunctional influence of external migration in its contemporary 
volumes and manifestations (Malinovska, 2011). She stated that 
intensity of migration processes is directly correlated with real 
estate prices, the phenomenon of social orphanage and the poor 
state of the social care for the elderly in Ukraine. In her opin-
ion, optimal migration policy must be managed so that to “keep 
people in Ukraine by means of creating decent living conditions, 
through development of internal labour migration as an alter-
native to external one, through protection of Ukrainian labour 
migrants’ rights abroad and development of stimuli for reverse 
migration” (repatriation).
Among all European destinations in Ukrainian labour migra-
tion, the most thoroughly studied ones are Poland and Greece. 
In particular, in 2011 V. Volodko published the thesis study 
under the title “The influence of labour migration on the family 
roles of Ukrainian women (with work experience in Poland and 
Greece)” (Volodko, 2011). This study is dedicated to the socio-
logical analysis of the family roles’ structure, family life practices 
of female migrants, comparing that among premigration, migra-
tion and postmigration time periods. The study was based on the 
qualitative sociological methods (semistructured interviews) and 
reached the following conclusions: Labour migration to Poland 
and Greece does not have any radical influence on the structure 
of family roles. The most significant changes occur during the 
migration period. However, during the postmigration period, all 
practices attributed through migration experience cease to exist 
gradually, including the features related to the EU emancipation.
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In 2011 Lviv-based researcher O. Rovenchak published her 
thesis on the conceptualization of contemporary international 
migration as a sociocultural phenomenon of the globalization 
epoch. In it, inter alia, she presented the results of her compara-
tive research on female labour migration from Ukraine to Poland 
and Greece. This research was carried out during 2008–2010. The 
author did 120 semistructured interviews with female migrants 
in Poland, Greece and back in Ukraine (Rovenchak, 2011). The 
results of this research confirmed the growing importance of non-
economic factors as the causes for migration. The key models of 
female Ukrainians’ adaptation in Greece were based on diaspora 
groups and voluntary segregation, while in Poland the assimila-
tion trend is more obvious. A collective book by O. Ivankova-
Stetsiuk, H. Seleshchuk and V. Susak (Ivankova-Stetsiuk et al., 
2011) had a similar research focus.
Therefore, we can generalize the following key features of the 
sociological corpus of work on external migration from Ukraine. 
First of all, the dynamics of the studies is noteworthy: until the 
early 2000s the issues of sociocultural nature, identity transfor-
mations and migrants’ adaptation to a different cultural environ-
ment were totally out of the scope of research. Secondly, a large 
share of empirically oriented research on external migration 
from Ukraine does not go over the national boundaries; that is, 
they miss the foreign component  – the actual migrants staying 
in receiving countries are seldom covered by such research. And 
thirdly, nearly all of the studies can be divided into two types – 
they are either too local or all-Ukrainian. Thus, while the former 
do not allow generalization of the results on the national scale, the 
latter do not reveal the regional features of external migration and 
the key geographical differences.
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3.2 Theoretical-methodological fundamentals and 
general framework of the EUMAGINE project11
The EUMAGINE project is quite different from the previ-
ously mentioned studies by its object field: this is a large-scale 
cross-national project which managed to cover four countries 
(Ukraine, Turkey, Senegal and Morocco) and, therefore, it also 
covered several migration flows, most of which are directed 
toward the receiving countries within the European Union. The 
project methodology is very comprehensive; the research object 
is concentrated not only on the socio-demographic structure of 
migration, but also includes a wide range of sociocultural issues 
(namely, the stable correlation between migrants’ imaginations 
and imagined demography, their ideas about democracy, human 
rights and institutional efficiency in the potential receiving 
countries etc.).
The project’s methodology synthesizes the neoinstitutional 
grounds and social constructivism. The institutional focus of 
the study is predetermined by the contemporary international 
regime of state obligations related to human rights protection 
and democratic support. Today the international influence of 
human rights and democracy worldwide is undeniable and thus, 
it always becomes the object of many studies with an obvious 
institutional focus.
 11 The research study “EUMAGINE: Imagining Europe from the outside” 
was carried out by the consortium of universities and research cent-
ers: University of Antwerp (Belgium), Oxford University (UK), Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (Norway), University of Koç (Turkey), Moham-
med V University (Morocco), Center for Sociological Research (Ukraine) 
and Cheikh AntaDiop University (Senegal). The research was carried out 
during the time period from February 2010 till January 2013 in four 
countries. In each country 2000 respondents participated in the ques-
tionnaire survey. Project #: SSH-2009-4.2.2.
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The project analyzes the functional roles of various types 
of discourses (media, political, popular etc.) in the emergence 
of: 1)  perceptions of human rights and democracy in Europe; 
2) migration intentions; and 3) final migration decisions in regional, 
national and international contexts. This particular interest in the 
individual perceptions and decision-making is in line with sev-
eral other international studies on migration, including the pre-
viously mentioned studies by Massey et al. (1998). It was Stark 
(1984) who first introduced the importance of individual-level 
migration decision-making. According to Carling (2002), inten-
tions to migrate can be analyzed at macro- as well as microlevels. 
On the macrolevel, this author refers to the question of why a 
large number of people wish to emigrate and attributes this to the 
emigration environment. This emigration environment is made 
of social, cultural, political and economic contexts on the one 
hand, as well as the nature of migration as a socially and cultur-
ally constructed project on the other.
The latter refers to the discursively constructed meanings of 
migration. In this, the second component of the project’s meth-
odology is manifested  – social constructivism. The microlevel 
approach to intentions puts forward the question: who wants to 
migrate and who wants to stay? There are various individual-level 
factors influencing migration-related intentions, such as gender, 
age, migration experience and social strata affiliation. The EUM-
AGINE project aims to combine these two approaches to explore 
how macrolevel (media discourse and political discourse) and 
mesolevel (popular discourse) impact individual-level percep-
tions, imaginations and later, actual intentions.
The project’s key hypothesis is that macro- and mesolevel dis-
courses in the emigration environment would influence intentions 
directly through the perception of human rights and democracy, 
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and this influence can be positive and/or negative. The concep-
tual model of the project demonstrates that perceptions of human 
rights and democracy, migration and geographical imaginations 
play a crucial role in shaping migration intentions. The core 
assumption is that human rights and democracy perceptions, 
intentions and decisions are structured by various discourses, i.e. 
they are preconditioned culturally and socially.
Perceptions have become very important in the context of con-
temporary international migration, in which an ever-increasing 
number of people are exposed to migration ideas as such because 
of overwhelming mass communication and wider transporta-
tion possibilities and also due to the growing role and widespread 
activity of migration-facilitating institutions, such as human traf-
fickers, international recruitment offices, marriage bureaus etc. 
(Carling, 2002).
The project also assumes that the perceptions of human rights 
and democracy may impact the so-called “culture of migration”; 
that is, migration is getting deeply rooted into behavioural rep-
ertoire (Massey, 1998). This “culture of migration”– frequently 
present in popular discourse, media, cultural artefacts and espe-
cially in social networks – somehow enthrals potential migrants’ 
perceptions and affects their further behaviour (Collyer, 2006; 
Pang, 2007).
Till now, comprehensive empirical research on migrants’ per-
ception of human rights and democracy, and further migration-
related intentions at the premigration phase remains too limited 
(de Haas, 2007). Various recent studies on international migra-
tion point out the importance of discourses and imagina-
tions concerning potential destination countries in generating 
migration-related intentions and decisions. Discourses and 
imaginations concerning democracy and human rights focus 
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mostly on the individual level (since these are often related to 
asylum-seeking situations and other humanitarian issues) or a 
more general level (human rights under the conditions of free-
market economy; social welfare characterized by the rule of law; 
democracy limiting the government influence). The role of per-
ceptions of democracy and human rights and their possible con-
nection to migration motives remains very much understudied 
(Boneva et al., 2001).
As already mentioned above, the project has studied vari-
ous types of discourse. Popular discourse here is understood as 
socially and culturally determined narratives and practices about 
migration, migrants and destinations. Discourse as such within 
the framework of this research project includes representations, 
practices and performances through which meanings are pro-
duced and legitimized (Gregory, 2000, p. 180–181). Also, the pro-
ject focuses on the way the political/governmental discourse on 
human rights, democracy and migration impacts the perceptions 
of human rights and democracy, and also how it impacts the geo-
graphical imaginations.
Malmborg and Strath argue that “Europe is an imaginary dis-
cursive construction, emerging out of nation state debates within 
the imaginary frame of a European identity” (Malmborg et al., 
2002). This holds equally true for many other possible destina-
tion regions since a vast majority of potential migrants have 
never actually visited the destination point before the deciding to 
migrate and thus, they usually have very limited knowledge about 
their future destination countries (Efionayi-Mader et al., 2001). 
Media discourses and discourses of returning migrants, friends 
and family abroad are also important sources for perceptions and 
imaginations about democracy and human rights (Koser et al., 
2004). This limited, (second-hand) information, often responding 
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to local actual social and pragmatic needs, appeals to potential 
migrants of certain destinations. In this context, the project spe-
cifically explored individual perceptions in the source countries 
concerning human rights and democracy in order to analyze the 
link between these perceptions and migration decision-making.
Three major parts can be singled out in the conceptual frame-
work of the impact of macro- and mesolevel discourses on the 
development of human rights and democracy perceptions, migra-
tion intentions and migration decision-making: 1) the impact of 
various types of discourses on perceptions; 2) the further impact 
of perceptions on migration intentions; 3) the relation between 
perceptions, intentions and migration decision-making. There-
fore, the first part deals with perceptions, the second explains the 
motivation and the third studies the related behaviour.
It is also important to add here that in this research gender is 
treated as the core factor in shaping perceptions of human rights 
and democracy and migration-related imaginations, intentions 
and decisions.
Thus, the conceptual framework of this research, putting it 
simply, basically means that: the attempts to migrate to Europe 
are preceded by the development of certain finalized percep-
tions on human rights and democracy development in Europe 
and in a home country, and the related decision to migrate. 
Intentions in this context may vary from very broad wishes to 
go to Europe or elsewhere to more specific preferences in terms 
of destinations and migration modes (e.g., family reunification, 
creating a family, temporary/seasonal work, asylum or illegal 
entry for various purposes). Migration-related perceptions 
and intentions develop within specific geopolitical, economic 
and cultural settings which are often referred to as emigration 
environment (Carling, 2002). The project described is based on 
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a specific analytical framework which has predetermined the 
project design. This analytical framework assumes that migra-
tion behaviour is being influenced by the factors at three levels: 
macro, meso and micro. At the macrolevel, political and socio-
economic contexts, the acting migration regimes in the coun-
tries of origin and receiving countries and also the influence of 
mass media – namely, its discourse concerning both countries, 
sending and receiving ones, and also migration as such – are 
important. The mesolevel factors influencing the migration 
behaviour include local and transnational communities and 
social networks as well as cultural phenomenon, e.g. local sub-
cultures. And finally, at the microlevel the most significant 
influences on migration behaviour exercise the individual fea-
tures, such as age, gender, social status, education achievements 
etc. Besides that, migration intentions and migration behaviour 
can be partially influenced by an individual’s experience of pre-
viously successful (or not) external migration.
Numerous ethnographic studies have already shown how migra-
tion intentions are linked to socially and culturally constructed 
perceptions. These include the ideas and meanings attached to 
migration process, subjective images of one’s own current envi-
ronment, thoughts about potential destinations. The EUMAG-
INE project seeks to understand how perceptions of human rights 
and democracy are formed and then translate into intentions and, 
further, into the decisions to migrate. These processes are influ-
enced by the factors at three levels.
The macrolevel includes the factors common to all potential 
migrants, such as national policies on emigration/immigra-
tion, general economic and political situation in a country, mass 
media, situation with human rights and the maturity of the 
democracy.
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The mesolevel covers the factors in between an individual 
and the society (Goss et al., 1995). Local and transnational net-
works through which people gather the needed information and 
exchange ideas are most important here.
Finally, the microlevel concerns specifically individual features. 
Perceptions are shaped not only by human rights conditions in 
a country, but also by individual-level factors, such as gender or 
political views (Carlson et al., 2007). The resulting intentions to 
migrate are clearly influenced by gender, age, education level, 
current labour market situation, political sentiments etc. Each 
migration act has its impact on the context in which subsequent 
migration decisions are made (Massey, 1998). Therefore, the 
project treats all related perceptions, intentions and decisions as 
dynamic processes, open to changes in location and time. Indi-
vidual features as well as meso- and macrolevel factors affect the 
degree to which people with intentions to migrate are actually able 
to go. There are substantial barriers (for example, but not limited 
to, European restrictive immigration policies) and literally millions 
of people have dreams to go to Europe that will never be fulfilled.
The project also aims for a dynamic non-Eurocentric analysis 
of the impact of human rights and democracy perceptions on 
migration intentions and decisions in important source coun-
tries, including Ukraine. The project particularly focuses on the 
contribution of such perceptions on migration intentions and 
decisions in emigration and transit regions outside the European 
Union. Four related topics are addressed: 1) the relation between 
perceptions among people living in the selected source countries 
concerning human rights and democracy situation in Europe 
and in their own countries and their migration intentions; 2) the 
influence of human rights and democracy-related perceptions 
on migration as compared to the effects from other determinant 
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factors; 3) the extent to which migration is perceived as a life 
project; and finally, 4) how potential migrants compare Europe 
with other major destination regions such as the USA, Russia, 
Canada or Australia when it comes again to their perception of 
human rights and democracy.
The fundamental background for this project has been formed 
by the systemic analysis of the existing literature on the issue and 
other quantitative and qualitative data, and also the collection 
of new materials by means of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods in the selected regions of the source countries.
The project has an innovative methodological design. The post-
structuralist era in international migration and human rights 
research is in need for a multidisciplinary, multilevel theoretical 
framework within which migration is seen as a social and cultural 
construct. The research design enables full-scale comparison of 
the perceptions of human rights and democracy, migration-
related intentions and decisions between the countries on the 
one hand, and also the comparison of the processes under study 
within a single country on the other hand. Within countries the 
following is in focus: triangulation of data material; comparisons 
between different types of data, different regions, and different 
profiles of potential migrants. Between countries the following 
is emphasized: transcending the country level for cross-country 
comparison.
For theoretical and methodological reasons, the project ana-
lyzes the perceptions of human rights and democracy by poten-
tial migrants, i.e. migrants, but also of the large number of people 
who have not (perhaps yet) moved. Thus, the research got its con-
trol group – the non-migrants.
In order to study the variety of contextual influences on the per-
ceptions of human rights, democracy and subsequent migration 
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intentions and decisions, the project has opted for the case study 
approach. The project is based on the assumption that by compar-
ing and contrasting a diversity of local contexts, it is possible to 
generalize how these perceptions are formed and how they influ-
ence migration intentions and, then, migration decisions. There-
fore, the starting point will be to reach an in-depth understanding 
of perceptions, intentions and motivations in the selected areas of 
migration sources.
For this, four countries have been chosen as important as areas 
of origin: Morocco, Senegal, Turkey and Ukraine. All four coun-
tries are the sources of substantial migrant inflows in Europe. 
They also are attractive areas for migrants from more distant 
countries (remember that back in 2005 the external migration 
saldo in Ukraine became positive, and this happened primarily 
due to migration from other CIS countries). Migration flows to 
Europe from and through these four case study countries include 
regular migration (including that for family reunion purposes), 
asylum or employment, as well as irregular migration.
In order to reflect the diversity within each country, four types 
of locations have been selected. These 16 “cases-within-cases” 
were carefully selected, using the information provided by the 
project partners based in Morocco, Senegal, Turkey and Ukraine. 
To guarantee the diversity of perceptions, intentions and motiva-
tions in each country, four research locations have been chosen 
using the following selection criteria: 1) an area characterized by 
high emigration rates; 2) the second comparable socioeconomic 
area with low emigration rate; 3) a comparable area with a signifi-
cant immigration history; and 4) a location with a specific human 
rights situation.
The target population of the study is the general population in 
the 18–40 years old age range, that is, those who are most likely to 
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consider emigration as an option. Besides other relevant individ-
ual-level variables such as age, gender, socioeconomic, political 
and legal status within the target population, the project com-
pared the perceptions on human rights and democracy, and then 
migration intentions and decisions of three primary categories of 
individuals: voluntary non-migrants, involuntary non-migrants 
and migrants (Carling, 2002).
Theo (2003) states that “imagination may be interpreted in 
general terms and forms a basis for understanding the world and 
making decisions”. The methodology of this project has enabled 
the in-depth study of local processes and people’s subjective per-
ceptions, their systematic comparisons and further quantitative 
generalizations.
There have been three major methodological components in 
the study: 1) ethnographic fieldwork; 2) a large-scale survey; and 
3) qualitative interviews with the selected respondents directed 
by an interview guide. The research uses three-method trian-
gulation by means of combining the quantitative method with 
two qualitative methodologies, namely, in-depth interviews and 
observations in the communities. Taking into account the choice 
of research methods, the major challenge in this research was to 
draw together quantitative and qualitative research parts.
The project is conceptually innovative. Until recently, the link 
between democracy, human rights and migration has been hardly 
discussed. Moreover, the very notions of “perceptions”, “migratory 
imaginations” and “geographical imaginations” remain rather 
unexplored and hardly used in the external migration research. 
Various authors have already pointed at the power of perceptions 
and imaginations in inducing decisions to change the place of 
residence. However, how exactly this concept relates to the other 
concepts in migration research such as the culture of migration, 
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intentions, migration decision-making etc. so far remains out of 
the scope of migration research.
The project will be relevant for the following target audiences: 
1) academic and university researchers; 2) policy developers; 
3) NGOs working in the related social fields; and 4) human 
rights activists. This and similar projects are especially rele-
vant for NGOs and other civil society organizations since they 
can indeed play a crucial role in the related information cam-
paigns, since information distributed by public authorities and 
other representatives of power is often distrusted by potential 
and actual migrants (Koser et al., 2004). The project may also 
be interesting and useful for the staff of embassies and consulate 
offices engaged in social protection activities in key destination 
countries of labour migration.
3.3 Quantitative research of the factors in external 
labour migration of Ukraine’s population in their 
cross-country and internal dimensions
Here we would like to describe the methodology, the programme 
and the key features in the design, procedures and tools applied 
for research in EUMAGINE. The authors of the project were 
trying to take into account the previous experiences in external 
migration research in Ukraine, namely, to dispose of probably the 
most widespread disadvantage of such studies – excessive ethno-
centrism.
The international project “EUMAGINE: Imagining Europe 
from the outside” was carried out by the consortium of universi-
ties and research centres from February 2010 till January 2013 
in four countries. The cross-national dimension of this project 
is quite impressive  – Ukraine, Turkey, Morocco and Senegal. 
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All four countries are the starting points in the quite numerous 
migration outflows to the EU.
The EUMAGINE project had quite an ambitious aim – to apply 
a rather non-Eurocentric approach to assessment of a wide range 
of socioeconomic, cultural and political contexts of migration as 
well as the microlevel variables of the related mass discourse and 
intentions of migration to the EU countries.
Obviously, when the research goes beyond national borders, it 
creates additional requirements for research teams and puts for-
ward additional methodological problems, widely known as the 
dilemma of maximum quality: research framework, methods and 
tools are maximally adjusted to the local context under study; 
however, further comparison of separate cases is rather problem-
atic. On the other hand, there is the consistent quality approach, 
under which the research design, methods and tools remain 
unchanged; however, there are risks that the local specificity of 
the context would be lost, left out of research scope.
Within the project in question this dilemma was solved in the 
following way: the quantitative side of the project presupposed the 
use of the common for the entire toolkit, without any adaptations, 
but local specificity was still taken into consideration because the 
qualitative methods and tools were also applied (the semistruc-
tured interviews with experts and representatives of power).
The quantitative part of the research was represented by the 
survey covering 500 people at each of the 16 territories (that is, 
8000 respondents overall). The random selection method was 
used to get the sample of respondents aged between 18 and 39. 
Below we present the analysis of the quantitative component of 
the research for which SPSS was used. In the following subchapter 
we will present the analysis of the qualitative components (NVivo 
software package applied).
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In Ukraine four territories were chosen for the research. Just 
like in three other countries, the criteria of the “theoretical sam-
ple” have been considered during the selection: Solomyanskyi dis-
trict of Kyiv (the territory with a high positive saldo of migration 
within the country); Zbarazkyi district of Ternopil oblast (the ter-
ritory with high indicators of external migration); Znamyanskyi 
district of Kirovogradska oblast (the territory with a low indicator 
of external migration) and Novovodolazskyi district of Kharkiv 
oblast (the territory with a high indicator of external migration 
and a rather specific situation with human rights).
The quantitative side of the project covered the issues related 
to the household’s composition, external migration experience, 
availability of relatives abroad, migration intentions (rather 
abstract or more specific and exact), the desired directions for 
migration, the evaluation of the situation in the home country 
and in European countries (as the leading choice between the 
desired directions for external migration).
While studying the perception of the situation in receiv-
ing countries, the notion of “geographical imaginations” was 
applied. This concept means the subjective perception by a per-
son of space, specific locations, people residing there and politi-
cal and economic opportunities related to these specific places 
in question. Such perceptions/imaginations are formed partially 
chaotically, in the regular course of everyday life, and partially 
intentionally – under the influence of specific political and cul-
tural discourses. They can also be “inherited”, since such imagi-
nations are part of national identity formation. Regardless of the 
level of objectiveness in such geographical imaginations, in time 
they tend to actualize since they may have very explicit, material-
ized consequences, just as any other cultural symbolic construct.
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While studying the migration intentions the following screen-
ing question was used: “Ideally, if you had an opportunity to go 
abroad to live and work there for the next five years – would you 
go or stay in your country?” The answers to this question demon-
strated that in all the studied territories the share of females with 
migration intentions ranged from 25% to 76%, while for males 
this variation was from 43% to 90%. Thus, in all the studied ter-
ritories the share of respondents with migration intentions was 
higher among men than among women (a drastic difference in 
this regard was also observed in Turkey). We can assume that 
such distribution was influenced by the traditional gender per-
ceptions of the role of man (the breadwinner, ready for hardships 
and risks for the sake of his family) and that of woman (the pre-
server of the hearth).
Further, we determined the preferences in migration destina-
tions among the respondents who had confirmed their migration 
intentions. In three other countries, aside from Ukraine, the most 
preferred destination was always the EU, while for the Ukrainians 
the most desired destinations were Germany, the USA, Russia and 
Italy (that is, generally speaking, the preferred destination is not 
exactly European, but “Western”). The actual statistical leader in 
Ukrainian emigration is the Russian Federation; however, in the 
“wish list” of countries for migration, this country is ranked only 
the fourth. Obviously, one of the key reasons for that is a much 
easier migration regime between Ukraine and Russia. However, it 
is worth noting here that this data was gathered before the annex-
ation of Crimea and further geopolitical and military conflict in 
the border region between the two countries. Most probably, at 
the time of publication, the results in terms of both actual statis-
tics and respondents’ answers would be very much different.
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Table 4 presents more details on the respondents’ answers 
regarding migration intentions.
As we can see in Table 4, the Western Ukrainian region (repre-
sented here by Zbarazkyi district) and the centre of the country 
(Solomyanskyi district of the capital city) are more Europe-
oriented, while the Mid-Eastern and South-Eastern regions 
of Ukraine have very mixed preferences, partially European, 
partially Eurasian. In Novovodolazskyi district, which borders 
Russia, the first choice is Eurasian; however, the second choice 
is still Europe-oriented. While the respondents in Znamyanskyi 
district (which is quite in the middle of the country, far from 
national borders) the first choice is European, while the second 
choice is Eurasian.
Since, when studying the geographical imaginations and migra-
tion intentions in their regional dimension, we have to pay some 
attention to the problem of sociocultural differences present in 
Ukrainian society, we need to introduce additional methodo-
logical and theoretical instruments. One such instrument is the 
assumption that specificity of mass consciousness of the popu-
lation in certain regions of Ukraine is predetermined by peculi-
arities of these regions’ historic development: here the so-called 
“lonque durée” are manifested, truly significant and resistance to 
changes in social properties. The social space of today’s Ukraine 
has been formed as a result of historic confrontation of vari-
ous state-level, religious and cultural formations from the West 
to the East, and this long-term confrontation has formed a sort 
of historic zonality on the territory of Ukraine. This zonality is 
first of all manifested while comparing those Ukrainian regions 
which used to be included into different countries. As well noted 
by Belarusian researcher S. Kandrychyn (2008), the explanatory 
power here has the very notion of a historic border. These historic 
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borders have special significance in the case when political barri-
ers and sociocultural differences overlap. In this sense, the largest 
gap between societies would be between those which are attrib-
uted to different civilizational areas. This idea was well explained 
by S. Huntington, and in its own time got many followers as well 
as criticism. Applying this to Ukraine, this idea is interpreted as – 
according to the above-mentioned author – Ukraine belongs to 
the so-called “torn societies”, that is, those societies in the ter-
ritories in which there are borders between different cultural and 
civilizational areas. In our case, this important border is deter-
mined by two historic borders: the border of 1772, which existed 
before the Rzecz Pospolita split and further inclusion of Right-
Bank Ukraine to Russian empire, and then, the border of 1939, 
the one which was valid right before World War II (after the war 
this border was removed and Western territories of Ukraine were 
joined to the USSR). Ukraine’s example of social space differen-
tiation is probably among the most known ones; however, it is 
definitely not the only case when the historic factor has so much 
value in today’s civil life.
Below we present the map from the widely known Huntington’s 
work, in which Ukraine, along with some other European 
countries, is presented as the territory that contains the bor-
der between two civilizations – the Western and the Orthodox 
(Huntington, 1993).
The discussion on whether Huntington was wrong or right is 
still ongoing. This active discussion concerns both general meth-
odological grounds of his theory (see, for example, the work 
by E.  Said, “Class of ignorance” (2001), in which Huntington 
is viewed as the representative of orientalism), and also more 
specific criticism of his empirical results of cross-national com-
parisons and conclusions on civilizational differences (see, for 
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Figure 14: Civilizational divide and torn countries in Europe, 
according to S. Huntington.
Source: Huntington, 1993.
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example, the joint work by R. Ingleheart and P. Norris, “The true 
clash of civilizations” (2003)). To some extent, this discussion also 
concerns the adequacy of this theory in its application to Ukraine 
specifically. For example, Ya. Hrytsak emphasized the dynamic 
nature of sociocultural identities and on the significant changes 
in historical limitations, as mentioned in Huntington’s work. Ya. 
Hrytsak considers his vision to be too sketchy and too primitive 
in its dichotomy presentation of sociocultural realia (which are 
far more complex than banal dichotomy) (Hrytsak, 1995). Speak-
ing rather metaphorically, this author states there are not two 
Ukraines, but twenty-two.
On the opposite side, S. Kandrychyn supports Huntington’s 
vision and empirical results concerning the differentiated social 
space of Ukraine, and in particular, concerning different dimen-
sions of social pathologies in historically different regions of the 
country. Huntington’s view is seen as also relevant by Ukrainian 
sociologists O. Kutsenko and A. Horbachuk (2014) who supple-
ments the ideas suggested by Huntington with their own theoreti-
cal postcolonial studies.
The choice of four regions for the research within the 
EUMAGINE project enabled covering the above-described zon-
ality of Ukrainian social space and thus, one more time reinforced 
the statement about the importance of regional community affili-
ation as a factor which socially differentiates the Ukrainians. 
Below we present the map of Ukraine on which one can see, 
firstly, the political borders of 1772 and 1939 which played their 
significant differentiating role in the formation of Ukrainian mass 
consciousness, according to Huntington’s concept, and secondly, 
the location of all four communities in which the EUMAGINE 
surveys were carried out in Ukraine.
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As one can see, the choice of locations for Ukrainian surveys 
on external migration issues gave us an opportunity to verify 
the availability of a certain sociocultural gradient, which has 
been many times detected by other authors in relation to such 
subject fields as political and geopolitical orientations, historic 
memory etc.
The topical toolkit of our quantitative research was divided into 
the following groups and subgroups as seen in Table 5.
Figure 15: Historical borders and locations of the field stage of 
EUMAGINE survey on the territory of contemporary Ukraine.
Source: Author’s own figure.
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Table 5: The covered aspects of the quantitative research on mass 





Geographical imaginations related 




–  Life of women in 
Ukraine
–  Life of men in 
Ukraine
–  In Ukraine women 
have equal life 
chances with men
–  Living and working in Europe is a 
good experience for a woman
–  Living and working in Europe is a 
good experience for a man
–  People who leave for Europe often 
lose connections with their family 
back in Ukraine
– Life of women in Europe
– Life of men in Europe






–  There is a lot of cor-
ruption in Ukraine
–  In Ukraine it is not 
safe to walk in the 
streets during the 
night time
–  There is a lot of corruption in 
Europe
–  In Europe it is not safe to walk in 
the streets during the night time






–  Finding job in 
Ukraine is easy
–  In Ukraine one can 
reach real success 
by hard work
–  Finding job in Europe is easy
–  Most of the Ukrainians working in 
Europe become rich
–  Most of the Ukrainians working in 
Europe get valuable professional 
knowledge




– Schools in Ukraine
–  Healthcare system 
in Ukraine
–  Government sup-
port for the poor in 
Ukraine
– Schools in Europe
– Healthcare in Europe
–  Government support for the poor 
in Europe
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Concerning the first aspect of the survey (family and gen-
der issues), over 40% of the respondents agreed that women in 
Ukraine have equal life chances with men. Interestingly, in all 
the regions men confirmed this statement much more frequently 
than women. Almost half (45%) of the respondents noted that 
women’s life in Ukraine is “neither bad, nor good”, while 36% 
opted for “bad” or “very bad”. “Good” options were chosen only 
by 17.4% of the respondents. Negative answers on women’s lives 
in Ukraine are much more frequent in the East of the country: in 
Kharkiv oblast they totalled 62%, while in the capital their share 
was 44%.
Twenty-eight percent of the respondents agreed with the state-
ment that people leaving for Europe lose family connections back 
at home (no significant difference between genders on this issue). 
This answer in Ukraine got the lowest confirmation within the 





Geographical imaginations related 






–  Politicians in 
Ukraine work for the 
sake of the people
–  In Ukraine people 
can publicly speak 
up on whatever 
they want





–  Politicians in Europe work for the 
sake of the people
–  In Europe people can publicly 
speak up on whatever they want
–  European governments respects 
all languages which their citizens 
speak 
Source: “EUMAGINE: Imagining Europe from the outside”
186 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
loss of family connections, in Senegal, 42%, and 49% in Morocco). 
This may be explained by the relative welfare of the families of 
Ukrainian migrants, as compared to other studied countries 
which suffer from large-scale migration outflows. Interestingly, 
this problem, even though nearly denied by our respondents, is 
very often mentioned by mass media.
Indicators of discrimination, criminality and corruption got the 
following results. Thirty-four percent agreed with the assump-
tion that migrants from Ukraine are treated badly in Europe, 
while 30% disagreed. In the cross-national comparison the fol-
lowing curious observation was recorded: in other three coun-
tries the share of those who disagreed with this statement was 
always larger. For example, in Turkey 44.8% of the respondents 
disagreed with the statement that their compatriots are being dis-
criminated in Europe, while 36% agreed. In Morocco this ratio 
was 52.7% to 21%. In Senegal, 41.4% to 35%. Only in Ukraine 
did more respondents think that their compatriots are discrimi-
nated against in Europe. This result can be partially explained by 
regional differences in the attitude toward discrimination as such. 
As our more detailed analysis shows, the largest share of confirm-
ing discrimination answers was in Kharkiv oblast – 45.2% of the 
respondents (while 28.6% disagreed). Most of those who agreed 
with this statement in Kharkiv oblast were women with no migra-
tion intentions. And this indirectly confirms that in the mass dis-
course on migration there is the topic of exploitation of Ukrainian 
women in European countries.
The lowest confirmation for bad treatment of the Ukrainians 
in Europe was recorded in Zbarazkyi district, Ternopil oblast – 
28.7% (while 30.7% objected to this statement). It is worth adding 
here that in Zbarazkyi district only 8.8% of the respondents got 
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visas for European travels during the last five years at the time 
of the research, while in Novovodolazskyi district (the most con-
vinced in discrimination of the Ukrainians in the EU) only 1.4% 
of the respondents got European visas during the same five years.
Therefore, we can observe that the most convinced of a bad atti-
tude from Europeans toward the Ukrainians are the respondents 
in the regions that have the least experience with European trav-
els as such. This is probably one of the most obvious examples of 
imagined geography. We can also conclude that one of the key 
features of mass Ukrainian discourse on external migration is the 
negative stereotyping of this phenomenon, in particular, in the 
aspect of national discrimination. We can assume that this imag-
ined discrimination is partially the fruit of mass media influence, 
since this stereotype finds its place mostly in the heads of those 
who were never abroad themselves. A significant role is played by 
the mass media’s choice in topics, which is often predetermined 
by their rush for dramatic front-page materials like the deaths and 
sufferings of Ukrainian migrants abroad, as was already described 
in the previous chapter.
Additionally, we can also consider the hypothesis on the influ-
ence from neighbouring Russian mass media, which often has 
clearly anti-European rhetoric. N. Bitten also noted in this regard 
that in the today’s Russian media discourse “European stands for 
alien, dangerous, deviant” (Bitten, 2015).
Concerning the issue of security – the Ukrainians rated security 
in European countries higher than at home (similarly to other 
three countries’ respondents, actually). Thirty-eight percent of 
the Ukrainians agreed it would be dangerous to walk in the streets 
during the night time in Ukraine (while 22.8% stated it would be 
dangerous to do so in Europe).
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Similar results were obtained for corruption: 80.7% agreed 
on widespread corruption in Ukraine, while only 13.1% of the 
respondents thought that it is widespread in Europe.
When it comes to financial and professional success, Ukrainian 
respondents are very critical in relation to their own society. Only 
8.3% agreed that it would be easy to find job in Ukraine. And only 
22.8% agreed that hard work in Ukraine leads to real success. The 
results for the same questions but regarding Europe got the fol-
lowing results: 34.1% of Ukrainian respondents think that finding 
job in Europe is easy, while 66.1% are convinced that in Europe 
hard work can lead to success.
Thirty-five percent of the Ukrainians think that they can 
become rich thanks to European jobs, and 65% of them are sure 
that while working in Europe the Ukrainians get valuable profes-
sional knowledge.
Obviously, in the mass discourse of Ukrainian society the image 
of Europe is rather complex, if not confused: it combines negative 
stereotyping of Ukrainian society with rather positive stereotyp-
ing of European target societies for potential migration.
The answers related to institutional efficiency make the mass 
discourse’s larger picture more complete. The survey had several 
questions to reveal the key features of the imagined Europe. When 
it comes to efficiency of education and healthcare systems, putting 
it simply, we can state that the vast majority of the respondents, in 
all places, perceive these systems as operating poorly in Ukraine 
and operating well in Europe.
Here we also record the correlation between such assessment 
and the desire to emigrate. Therefore, we can note that mass dis-
course on institutional inefficiency in Ukraine and institutional 
efficiency in Europe as a potential receiving destination deter-
mines migration intentions to a very large extent.
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We also recorded a bidirectional correlation between the nega-
tive evaluations of schools in Ukraine and the desire to emigrate. 
Even higher correlation values are recorded for the healthcare 
sector: 78.2% of the respondents in Zbarazkyi, 77.3% of the 
respondents in Novovodolazkyi district, 58.8% of the respond-
ents in Znamenskyi district and 64.5% of the respondents in 
Solomyanskyi district of Kyiv think that the healthcare system in 
Ukraine is “bad” or “very bad”. The assessments of the European 
healthcare are almost exactly the reverse: positive answers were 
given by 74% of the respondents in Znamenskyi district, while 
in Zbarazkyi district they reached the level of 90%. Therefore, 
we can again record the phenomenon of positive stereotyping of 
European countries (simply because it is rather hard to imagine 
that these 90% of the respondents in Zbarazkyi district have real 
knowledge of the actual healthcare situation in Europe).
Another dimension of institutional efficiency covered by the 
survey was governmental support for the poor. The vast majority 
of the respondents think that in Ukraine this support is “bad” or 
“very bad” (82.3% together). Only 3% of them find this support 
to be “good” or “very good”. And again, a mirror-like situation is 
observed: at the same time over 70% of Ukrainian respondents 
think that in Europe governmental support for the poor is “good” 
or “very good”.
The next group of questions concerned the imaginations 
related to democracy, freedom of speech and diversity. In this 
group the answers were divided in the following way. The state-
ment “Politicians in Ukraine do what is best for people” got criti-
cally low support, while over 70% of the respondents partially or 
fully disagreed with this statement. Twenty percent provided no 
answer at all. High level of distrust, huge distance between politi-
cal elite and population were manifesting themselves long before 
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the events of late 2013 through early 2014. This was the process 
of power delegimitization formation, and this deligitimization 
and it had quite significant regional differences. In Western 
Ukraine (which later in 2013–2014 was most involved in pro-
tests) over 90% of the respondents had very critical attitudes to 
politicians. As with the previous answer, there is a correlation 
between this political criticism and migration intentions of the 
respondents.
Overall, quantitative estimations demonstrate that in mass con-
sciousness, institutional efficiency in Ukraine is assessed very 
poorly and negatively.
It is important to note, however, that in Kharkiv and Kirovo-
grad oblasts the share of those who did not have any answer at all 
is quite large (the “no answer” option was used here four times 
more frequently than in Kyiv or Ternopil oblast; in Znamenskyi 
district is was actually over 40%). This signifies serious uncer-
tainty and disorientation in Eastern Ukraine overall, and later on 
this was transformed into a rather “floating” mass consciousness 
phenomenon.
At the same time, according to the already revealed positive 
stereotyping of European countries, the activity of European 
politicians was also assessed positively: over 48% of Ukrainian 
respondents agreed with the statement “Politicians in Europe 
work for the sake of people”.
Cross-regional analysis of the answers concerning freedom of 
speech and democracy demonstrated that the largest share of 
those who believe in Ukrainian freedom of speech live in Western 
and Central regions of the country, while on the East and South 
East this indicator is lower.
The most optimistic view on the freedom of speech in Europe 
(over 60%) is recorded among the respondents in Zbarazkyi and 
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Solomyanskyi districts (that is, Western Ukraine and the capital 
of the country). The least sure group in this regard is represented 
by men residing in Znamenskyi district (South-East of Ukraine) – 
also over 60%.
Therefore, we can summarize that in Ukrainian respondents’ 
perceptions of their own country and of the countries for poten-
tial migration there is clearly negative stereotyping of their own 
country and positive stereotyping of European countries.
When it comes to positive stereotypes about Europe, the 
regional factor is very important, since residents of Western and 
Central Ukraine tend to imagine European countries in a much 
more positive way as compared to other regions which are much 
more distanced from the EU.
Statistically significant correlation is observed between the geo-
graphical imaginations of Ukrainian citizens about institutional 
efficiency of domestic and European institutions.
3.4 Qualitative study of the factors in external 
labour migration of population from four 
macroregions of Ukraine
The qualitative field research in the EUMAGINE project consists 
of two equally important aspects: observation and interviews. 
While some aspects of the research topics may be sufficiently 
covered by interviews with informants, others will have to be 
observed by the researcher in the field.
An interview guide and scenario for the observation and the 
interviews are elaborated, partly on the basis of the quantitative 
data collected during the first half of 2010. However, the proposal 
(suggested at the kick-off meeting in Antwerp) to locate the per-
sons to be interviewed for the qualitative data collection among 
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those persons that have participated in the survey (quantitative 
data collection) was not withheld for two reasons. First, choosing 
informants from among the survey respondents may be consid-
ered a breach of confidentiality by some, and secondly, the pur-
pose of the qualitative data collection is not to further explore 
individual factors of migration motives. While informants may 
include persons who have responded to the survey, the informa-
tion in the two data collection formats will not be linked.
Within the EUMAGINE project 80 in-depth interviews were 
performed  – 20 in each district with specific migration situa-
tions. These interviews were semistructured, and the selection of 
individuals for them was carried out according to the principle 
of maximum coverage by the following criteria: gender (the sam-
ple had to be balanced by gender); current status in the labour 
market (both unemployed and those working in various sectors); 
migration experience (the informants were both with migration 
history and without it); migration intentions (informants having 
such intentions and informants without such intentions). Regard-
ing the age, the category of those between 18 and 39 years old was 
chosen since this is the most economically and migratory active 
population.
This subchapter uses the sequences borrowed from one of the 
most well-known and most innovative studies on external migra-
tion from Ukraine (from the position of qualitative methods) – this 
is the research study by A. Rishko-Porcescu titled “Transformation 
of social space in a big city in time and societal dimensions” (2015). 
Sequences from this work were applied to the topical elements of 
this subchapter, dedicated to migrants’ perception of discrimina-
tion in receiving societies (namely, in Poland).
We do hope that our data contributes to filling in the general 
research canvas on Ukrainian perceptions of Europe as “the 
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country of El Dorado”. The qualitative approach used for this 
helps achieve maximum precision and detail of the data obtained, 
according the strategy of comparative research known as “maxi-
mum quality approach” (while as already noted in the previous 
subchapter, quantitative research in this cross-national study was 
carried out according to the maximum consistency approach).
The qualitative part of our research, as with the previous quanti-
tative one, recorded differences in migration perceptions between 
the residents of various regions (which are not only geographi-
cally different, but also socioculturally). These differences most 
of all concern the experience of cross-border movements (includ-
ing the illegal ones), the experience of working abroad and the 
related imaginations about such work as well as the imaginations 
of the most-desired directions for external migration. However, 
the image of the “imagined Europe” among our informants from 
different sociocultural regions of Ukraine turned out to be rather 
comprehensive.
One of the introductory questions in these interviews con-
cerned the migration intentions in a hypothetical, ideal situation, 
when “somebody provides the necessary documents for life and 
work in Europe”, and the answers showed that overall the Ukrain-
ians are ready for such travels, however, under certain conditions:
“If there were such conditions: here you have your documents, 
money, we have already made arrangements for you – you would 
have there a job, which suits you well, you can do it” (42206, 
Zbarazh research area).
It was also recorded that Ukrainian informants are rather toler-
ant of illegal migration when it is related to Ukrainians leaving 
the country; however, they consider this to be a negative phenom-
enon when it comes to illegal immigrants coming to Ukraine. The 
most important excuse for the practices of illegal emigration they 
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see in the pragmatic reason to work abroad, while the ways of 
doing so is seen as the matter of secondary importance:
“There are different ways of going abroad: legal and illegal. It 
depends on the possibility – what kind of possibility you have. If 
it is possible to go legally, you can get all the documents for work 
and travelling there, you go legally...
I.: And what are the reasons to emigrate illegally?
R.: Life forces… (smiling).
I.: Do you accept this kind of emigration or don’t?
R.: I can understand it. If there is a need to go abroad, to earn 
money, but there is no opportunity to leave, people emigrate ille-
gally. The most important thing is that a person is solving his/her 
problems, does something for it” (41244, Zbarazh).
Several informants additionally clarified that border crossing is 
usually legal, however, further migrant’s steps on getting job, per-
forming it and staying in a country against visa-specified condi-
tions and terms are often illegal:
“The border crossing was legal, and then  – you never know” 
(41124, Zbarazh).
“Oh well, people were leaving with the hope that they would 
later be legalized and would work officially” (41124, Zbarazh).
A typical pathway of border-crossing and further employment 
in the most prosperous (in their imaginations) European coun-
tries was legal entry to Poland, and then – not quite legal migra-
tion within the Schengen zone:
“The most important thing is entering Poland. This is the first 
aim of everyone, then you will see how it goes” (41245, Zbarazh).
The most informationally substantial (in terms of their own 
memories and thoughts about their own experience) were the 
answers to the questions on illegal migration of the informants 
from Western Ukraine. The general perception is obviously 
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distorted and thus requires more detailed further research. 
We can only assume that the repertoire of described behav-
iour has been forming for decades and has been impacted by 
the migration experiences of various sociocultural regions of 
Ukraine during the second and the third waves of migration. It 
is important to emphasize here that in the history of Ukrainian 
migration only the first wave was completely legal, and that was 
hundred years ago.
An important notion which explains these or that migration 
intentions is the so-called “geographical imaginations”. These 
imaginations, first of all, reveal the potential and the most-desired 
countries for migration. So, what are those countries associated 
with Europe in the minds of Ukrainian informants?
Answering the question: “Which countries do you think of 
if you hear the word ‘Europe’?”, the majority of the informants 
answered it is Germany. This country was described as the most 
developed country in Europe by 42110, 42203, 43104 and 44208.
It was also viewed as being economically and politically power-
ful and also as providing security (legal, financial, social) for all – 
its citizens, migrants and future generations. This country is seen 
as the one with stable conditions which enable planning for the 
future and development of life projects for themselves and their 
children. Germany’s economic power and state of development is 
a geographical imagination that fulfils one of the primary migra-
tion intentions – economic stability and security (41114, 41242, 
42107, 42104), and “a salary one can live on” (42105) while “noth-
ing will change in our country” (44109).
“Germany. It is the most powerful country of the whole Euro-
pean Union” (43123); “the government cares about them” (41121), 
“the biggest one… leader of Europe in fact, the biggest economi-
cally developed country” (41122). “This is evident and everybody 
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knows who watches at least television. Germany and France are in 
the first place, holding the entire European Union” (41238).
At the same time, the informants refer to Germany as not 
only an economic power but also as the source of social welfare, 
imagining that this “state will not leave you alone, will not let 
you starve” – while this is one of the major disappointments the 
informants had experienced during the early years of Ukraine’s 
independence. For instance: “Most of all, I am impressed with 
Germany (economically it is a very powerful country)” (41117), 
“but there are also all sorts of social programs that I liked (when I 
was) in Germany” (Ibid). Also, “there are totally different priori-
ties for employment there ... you will be valued highly ... I think 
people are better protected there (socioeconomically and by the 
police)” (42107).
Aside from Germany being probably the most imagined coun-
try of Europe, there are also mentions of France:
“Of course, when I think of Europe, I first of all, don’t know why, 
think about France, about Paris, as about the country to which I 
would really want to go. I think that the quality of life there is 
really high” (41116, Zbarazh).
In several cases the informants mentioned the countries in 
which they personally had been to or they have friends who had 
travelled there and had been working there. For example: “I once 
was abroad myself, in Czech Republic, so I more or less have 
an idea what is Europe… and now I imagine it to be like that” 
(41112, Zbarazh); or, “first associations are Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
this is where our people go for work” (41238, Zbarazh).
Now let us turn to more clarifying information obtained from 
the in-depth interviews by the following topical groups of issues: 
1) problems of the external migrants’ families; 2) gender mod-
els and gender inequality in Ukraine and in European countries; 
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3) discrimination against Ukrainian migrants in the receiving coun-
tries; 4) corruption in Ukraine and in European countries; 5) assess-
ment of life quality, social protection and opportunities for financial 
and professional success – in Ukraine and in European countries; 
6) human rights’ protection, freedom of speech and democracy in 
Ukraine and in European countries; and 7) institutional efficiency 
and politicians’ role in Ukraine and in European countries.
Problems in the families of external migrants
The fourth wave of external migration from Ukraine was the most 
gender-balanced, as compared to the previous three waves. Previ-
ously, external migration from Ukraine was mostly a “man’s job”, 
and only in very rare case females emigrated (mostly that was the 
case when the whole family was relocating at once).
Besides that, the current, fourth wave of external migration 
from Ukraine is the first one in which a large share of migrants 
is formed by single females, the largest share of which belongs to 
divorced and widowed women (Virc, 2012, p. 127).
Thus, for obvious reasons, during the fourth wave such issues 
as gender models and roles, transnational families, social orphan-
age and lack of home care became extremely urgent. Under “care” 
here we mean all possible forms of both professional and informal 
care and support for all who need it.
In the mass discourse on external migration negativism is espe-
cially powerful, first of all and most of all in the context of family 
issues. Comparing sociodemographic, economic and sociological 
data, as well as the related features of media discourse on external 
migration we can assume that this negativism was formed already 
at early stages of the fourth migration wave from Ukraine, and in 
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time we can observe its weakening. However, it is still too early to 
talk about new, positive discourse related to external migration 
from Ukraine.
External migration of one spouse is often perceived as a threat 
to a couple’s existence as such: “there are many cases when one 
is leaving, and the family stay, and then the family falls apart…” 
(41118, Zbarazh)12. In the cases when a husband or a wife is leav-
ing, the threats are different essentially but have the same strength 
of impact: “When a woman leaves, then the man does not know 
what to do, and there are a lot of men, not all of them, who lose 
oneself in drinking, or find another family. And when a man leaves, 
very often he will find another woman there. Because we all under-
stand, when still young people live separately, the families often 
get separated” (41116, Zbarazh); “parents must be with their chil-
dren. And we have such cases, when children are being brought up 
here, while parents, their mother sets her personal life in a differ-
ent country, and in time children literary forget their mother, for-
get this word. This is very bad” (41116, Zbarazh); “Recently more 
women leave for abroad. Maybe, it is easier for them to find work 
there. But I think this is a negative moment. A negative moment in 
relation to their families which they leave behind. If a man leaves, 
this could be okay, but if a woman leaves, this is almost 100% guar-
antee that the family will split up” (41245, Zbarazh).
Within the gender dimension in migration imaginations of 
Ukrainian informants, there is a certain moral panic in relation 
to the very phenomenon of external migration, and this panic is 
both a symptom of family problems and their cause. One of the 
 12 In this and several other topical groups, the most informative and sub-
stantial were the answers from the informants in Western region (due to 
obviously much more experience related to external migration).
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informants described the connection between external migration 
and family troubles in the following way:
“I.: And is this a problem only for the Ukrainians that someone 
goes abroad, while other stays here?
R.: Yes, this is a big problem. It broke a lot of families.
I.: Are there any examples among your friends, colleagues?
R.: Yes, there are” (41126, Zbarazh).
Here is another example describing the negative influence of 
external migration:
“I.: Do you think that migration somehow splits up families, 
that it destroys families because a woman or a man leaves the 
country and then their relationships deteriorate?
R.: It happens, certainly it happens, even often. Especially in 
young families, when they get married, a child is born, a man goes, 
for example, abroad. Here is this girl sitting with her child and has 
to look after it, then begins the kindergarten, school, and her hus-
band is abroad and there is no family reunion, there is no intimacy 
between them because they become in years, almost strangers, and 
only their child ties them together. So if a man or a woman does 
not come back for a long time young couples in most cases divorce. 
Even though they have a child, they still divorce” (41240, Zbarazh).
Thus, the key family threat in the mass discourse on external 
migration is seen in long-term migration. E. Libanova agrees with 
this and also adds that “long-term labour migration often causes 
separation. And the divorce can be initiated by both the emigrant 
and also by the one left at home” (Libanova, 2011, p. 25)13. Note 
 13 Here we need to add that this problem in external migration was partially 
solved by the latest communication and transport possibilities which were 
not available during the early years of the fourth migration wave. Today 
communications and information exchange in the Internet provides bet-
ter chances for at least virtual presence of family members, for their direct 
participation in economic and other decisions of the family.
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that short-term labour migration is not considered to be a threat 
for family life:
“For example, a lot of people want to go to Poland. It is good 
there because it is not far away. You work there for three months, 
three at home, for example. And here you are again, the same. As 
if you don’t go away from the family for a long time and you have 
a job” (41121, Zbarazh).
Traditional gender models, roles and values in the context 
of external migration demonstrated another interesting turn: 
for some people external migration became a means of actual 
divorce. On one hand, they wanted to get separated, but on the 
other, they are afraid to do this officially due to family pressure 
and/or traditional family values in the local community. As A. 
F. Vianello mentioned in this regard: “Female migration is often 
the cause for divorce, but sometimes the decision to leave is a 
strategy developed to distance oneself from the spouse; in other 
cases the divorce is caused by the fact that the man found another 
partner while the wife was absent. And finally, families get sepa-
rated because the woman has found another partner in a receiv-
ing country” (Vianello, 2012). This phenomenon of the so-called 
“migration divorce” in Ukrainian mass discourse has another 
name – the Italian syndrome.
Another important family problem for external migrants is 
upbringing children left in Ukraine: “I think that in the country a 
new generation is being formed, of senseless children, who want 
to achieve nothing in their life, they only want to rest, since they 
are used to money they have. They do not feel the lack of financial 
means … To some extent, this is degradation, because they do not 
develop, they only rest” (41245, Zbarazh).
In this regard mass discourse is in line with the research/
expert one. Among the key threats to children’s upbringing in 
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the situation of labour emigration the researchers mention the 
following: the threat of stigmatization – in child’s consciousness 
there soon arises the narrative of being a victim – and the threat 
of social disorientation  – these children are not able to fairly 
evaluate their life situation, to set relations or to have emotional 
connections with other people due to lack to communication 
and emotional support in their early age (Ivankova-Stetsiuk 
et al., 2012, p. 18).
Nearly one-fifth of all Ukrainian families are multigenera-
tional (Ukraiinske suspilstvo…, 2012). This form of family liv-
ing is especially spread in rural communities, and at the same 
time it is one of the sources of migration outflow from Ukraine. 
These multigenerational families usually live under the condi-
tions of the so-called subsistence economy. That is, they are 
highly dependent on natural production (they consume what 
they grow and breed), they also have informal exchanges with 
other households (including labour resource exchanges and 
agricultural equipment exchanges). In such families and such 
situations transborder migration attracts the middle generation 
(and to a lesser extent, the younger generation). In this regard 
it is worth noting the “specialization” of functions which has 
been establishing itself for years: the elder generation is mostly 
responsible for economic and financial issues, while the middle 
generation is responsible for the upbringing of children. This 
function is now being left on the spouse who stays in Ukraine. 
In this context the role of elder generation changes somehow; 
now this generation has to ease the negative consequences from 
this new gap in the family, in both economic and sociopshy-
cological senses. The only resource the members of this elder 
generation have in abundance is time. Due to this functions’ 
redistribution inside the family, the representatives of the elder 
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generation have no chance but to find themselves in the situa-
tion of forced “active aging”.
Migration decisions are initiated by migrants independently; 
however, the final decision-making is usually done upon 
approval from other family members. Among the reasons for 
going abroad the respondents most often mentioned the finan-
cial interests of the families. Representatives of the younger 
generation also mentioned other, less materialistic motives, like 
self-fulfilment or getting new experience. Long-term migration 
is seen by many as a much bigger problem than short-term stay. 
The most problematic variant is seen when a long-term migra-
tion act is done by a mother and a wife.
Therefore, we can conclude that transborder migration not 
always ruins families, but it can increase the interdependence of 
its members. This, in its turn, does not damage families, but helps 
establish better connections between generations inside a family 
due to the situation in which many responsibilities inside a family 
are exchanged and delegated to each other.
Overall, we can conclude that the influence from transborder 
migration on the functioning of multigenerational families is 
rather contradictory, while for nuclear families this is indeed a 
much bigger problem.
Gender models and gender inequality in Ukraine and in 
European countries
Describing traditional distribution of responsibilities and com-
petences, the majority of our informants relate to comparatively 
egalitarian models:
“Well, I would not say that somebody is leading at ours. As 
agreed by parties, I would put it like this. We find agreement. The 
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wife told me ‘I want this’, and I say ‘Maybe we don’t need this’, 
then we find agreement, and we will do first one thing, and later – 
another” (41112, Zbarazh).
In their answers concerning the life chances of men and women 
in Europe and in Ukraine our informants were rather unani-
mous; nearly all acknowledged higher life chances of females in 
Europe:
“I think women have more opportunities to work there [in 
Europe]. If one will consider a factory, there are women and men, 
all working there. Here, we just have such jobs when men get 
more. With pleasure one will hire a man for a job rather than 
a woman; they think that a woman cannot work that way. And 
here, as people say, only in some shops, in bars, so women go 
only there. And it is all around. Women are at any firm” (41112, 
Zbarazh).
“І.: Please, tell us from your own experience, is there any differ-
ence between men and women in your town? I mean, are there any 
priorities for employment or, suppose, during local government 
elections, are men or women preferred, or to the same extent?
R.: The fact is that I’ve never seen any woman run for the posi-
tion in our local government” (42105, Znamyanskyi).
Informants see the cause for such a situation the in the great 
conservatism of Ukrainian society, under which traditional values 
and lifestyle significantly limit women in their choices, force them 
concentrate on family responsibilities, on children’s upbringing, 
but not on career growth, education or development of new skills.
“I.: Well, if we exclude the authority sector and leave the sectors 
of business, education and services. It is possible for women to 
reach self-fulfilment in Europe?
R.: Of course it is. Why not? 
I.: On the same level with men? 
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R.: I think yes. I think that in Europe it is possible. Here also 
if someone would like to  – he/she can. Obviously, in our case, 
woman is more in the family, with kids, due to mode of life  ... 
and because of all of these women simply cannot reach something 
greater. Woman has to take care about everything. The work plus 
all the rest – home and everything for home” (41114, Zbarazh).
A large share of the informants of both genders justifies the 
existing gender barriers in the labour market and difference in 
pay: “Taking into account the physical features of a man, he can 
bear more. Of course, for a man it is easier to find a job. Because, 
first of all, he can work under much worse conditions than a 
woman. Besides, he can endure more than a woman … And you 
know, our men work for 12 hours, or even for 18 hours a day. You 
just give them work, and most importantly is that the woman at 
home does not scold for money” (41245, Zbarazh).
We have to note here that traditional perceptions of the gender 
model of employment, conventional attitude toward professional 
and career growth are more inherent to the Western region of 
Ukraine. In other sociocultural areas, urban territories especially, 
the attitude toward traditional gender models is less explicit, and 
the issues of work specificity and the required qualification in the 
labour market are of primary importance:
“I.: It is not important – man, woman – if there is a vacancy, 
then people are equal…
R: If there is a vacancy and if this person has some education, 
some work experience or something like this, then it will be set-
tled” (VN850005, Znamyanskyi).
“I.: Okay, and what do you think, who have more chance to get 
employed – men or women?
R.: There is no difference, here, because it depends on the sector.
I.: What do you mean under ‘depends on the sector’?
206 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
R.: Yes, in some cases it will be harder for men to get employed; 
in other cases, for women. For example, accountants – they can 
be both men and women, but for some reason I have never met a 
male accountant” (43143104, Solomyanskyi).
Describing disproportions in the labour market and differ-
ences in career prospects for the people of both genders and vari-
ous ages, the informants from all territories, except for Western 
Ukraine, were concentrated not as much on the traditional distri-
bution of functions between men and women, but more on the 
specific interests of specific employers which may be not willing 
to employ specific groups:
“Nobody wants to employ a single girl of a marriageable age 
who in a year or two will be on the maternity leave, that’s right. 
And nobody would hire you if you are five years from pension 
age” (VN850006, Znamyanskyi).
“Many employers are afraid to hire women, because before 
20 a woman is too light-minded, and after 25 she will want to 
have children and will be on maternity leave, plus this is a gap 
in work, plus this means additional expenses for the employer, 
and if there are no children so far, she will definitely will leave 
to have them in the nearest three or four years. While every 
employer want the employee to work for at least 5 years” 
(43143135, Solomyanskyi).
Another aspect of gender imbalance indicated by several 
informants was the imbalance in authorities’ representatative-
ness: “Concerning local self-government bodies, I have never 
seen a woman running … Only men are running for such posi-
tions” (VN850010, Znamyanskyi).
Informants’ opinions concerning the role of external migra-
tion in the lives of women and in the lives of man correspond 
to the traditional perceptions of gender models and the related 
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behaviour. Woman must stay at home as the hearth-keeper and 
the mother, while man is allowed to go for external migration and 
in some cases must do it as the breadwinner:
“Well, men are still breadwinners in their families. They provide 
and they must support their family ... Perhaps most men consider 
themselves to be breadwinners and if a man doesn’t have a decent 
salary then he has to search for other variants which would fit bet-
ter in supporting the family” (42103, Znamyanskyi).
Following the logic of V. Volodko, we can assume that Ukrain-
ian men, like Ukrainian women, are themselves the carriers of 
rather traditional perceptions of gender roles. In those cases 
when women return to Ukraine from migration, there is a short 
period of her rather innovative behaviour, when a woman has 
more financial influence on the household, and thus, there is 
more equal distribution of home labour. But very soon the gen-
der behaviour returns to the traditional patterns which are more 
socially approved in Ukrainian society (Volodko, 2009).
This vision is additionally confirmed by the qualitative data 
obtained in our project. Ukrainian women are family-oriented 
and rather conservative when it comes to choosing a place of liv-
ing. Above 40% of them prefer staying in a home area, even if it is 
possible to consider options of moving to another part of Ukraine 
or going abroad.
In the group of answers concerning the discrimination of 
Ukrainian migrants in the receiving countries we revealed that 
in most cases the informants have not observed any discrimina-
tion in the treatment of the Ukrainians in European countries. 
But at the same time we can note the phenomenon of self-
stereotyping of the Ukrainians. In several answers the inform-
ants were complaining that Ukrainians are “not civilized”, “not 
law-abiding” and “not polite” while being abroad, and in this 
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way they explained and justified the negative attitude toward the 
Ukrainians:
“Well, there were different cases, but generally the attitude was 
good depending on how one behaves” (42112, Zbarazh).
“Well, you know how they call it, ‘crowd overrunning the city’. 
Well, because our people probably spoil their cities, because 
Ukrainians are not that civilized, and because … we are different 
people ... there are those that can steal, and it is a minus for our 
country” (42121, Zbarazh).
A. Rishko-Porcescu also gathered some evidence describing the 
mass discourse of Ukrainian migrants in Poland concerning the 
feelings and experiences related to discrimination. While describ-
ing their social environment in Poland, the migrants usually use 
the categories of nationalities, meaning, they are using some sort 
of “national optics” in their vision of the world around them. As 
Rishko-Porcescu revealed, Ukrainian migrants frequently prefer 
to reside with people of the same nationality. Very often they note 
that they keep close contact only with other Ukrainians, while 
with the Pols they have only business/work-related contact. Sel-
dom exceptions are those Ukrainian migrants who have family 
connections with the Pols.
At the same time there is another social criteria in Ukrainian 
migrants’ descriptions of their experiences with discrimination in 
the receiving societies. Evidence of this discrimination is divided 
into nearly equal halves, depending on life success achieved in 
emigration. The migrants that are more successful and thus, more 
integrated into the receiving, society stress that there is no dis-
criminatory treatment from Polish side: “Throughout all my stay 
here, I never and from nobody heard anything negative in rela-
tion to myself ” (male, 26 years old, two years of permanent stay, 
highly qualified worker) (Rishko-Porcescu, 2015, p. 153).
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Less successful Ukrainian migrants mentioned there is both 
discrimination and some sort of social distance between Ukrain-
ians and Pols. “I did not have conflicts with the Pols, but I always 
felt I am alien here. Despite all the demonstrative tolerance and 
culture, they always show that you are Ukrainian. I feel this eve-
rywhere, especially in administrative institutions. I think this is 
some sort of historical stereotype, because we are poorer. But 
Ukrainians are more open to Pols. Maybe because we are in an 
alien country, and they are in their own country” (female, 30 
years old, 12 years of permanent stay, temporary unemployed). 
“The negative thing here straight from the very beginning is the 
situation when you are alien by 100%. You don’t know anything, 
there is no sense in speaking Ukrainian here, people maybe will 
understand you, but they will not respond. I was shocked. And 
I was very ashamed to show that I am a foreigner, moreover, 
than I am from Ukraine” (female, 24 years old, eight months of 
permanent stay, on the maternity leave) (Rishko-Porcescu, 2015, 
p. 155). “Now I have all documents, and I am absolutely legal 
here, nobody is saying anything to me. But I had problems in the 
past. I even had to change my last name” (female, 35 years old, 
15 years of permanent stay, works as a sewer) (Rishko-Porcescu, 
2015, p. 156).
It is interesting to note that distancing and distrust, and even 
negative (self)-stereotyping are being formed in the minds of 
Ukrainian migrants in relation to other Ukrainians in very simi-
lar life situations. “Recently I was sitting on a bus stop, and two 
Ukrainians were sitting and talking about their work, about 
how to switch on some equipment and other details. I could 
get acquainted with them, but we are here like ants. I would get 
acquainted, then they will want my job, and I don’t need this. This 
is self-defence” (female, 48 years old, four years of permanent 
210 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
stay in Poland, a nurse) (Rishko-Porcescu, 2015, p. 144). “I don’t 
have Ukrainian circle at all, maybe there was no such opportu-
nity to find people, or maybe I did not want that so much, it is 
always very complicated with them, they also want something 
from you…” (female, 35 years old, 15 years of permanent stay in 
Poland, a seamstress) (Rishko-Porcescu, 2015, p. 136).
Thus, we can observe that parallel to the formation of migrants’ 
communities and social networks there is another trend  – iso-
lation from other Ukrainian migrants. The socioeconomic and 
sociocultural factors which lead to this isolation most definitely 
require additional research. So far we can only assume that this 
phenomenon, according to the neoinstitutional theory, can 
be called “downward levelling pressure”. And as noted in this 
regard by A. Portes and J. Sensenbrenner: “successful individu-
als are beset by fellow group members relying on the strength of 
collective norms, and highly solitary communities restrict the 
scope of personal action as the cost of privileged access to eco-
nomic resources. The last form discussed in this section conspires 
directly against efforts toward individual mobility by exerting lev-
elling pressures to keep members of downtrodden groups in the 
same situation as their peers. The mechanism at work is the fear 
that a solidarity born out of common adversity would be under-
mined by the departure of the more successful members. Each 
success story saps the morale of a group, if that morale is built 
precisely on the limited possibilities for ascent under an oppres-
sive social order” (Portes et al., 1993, p. 1342).
To the best of our knowledge, this mechanism has never been 
studied in relation to the communities of Ukrainian migrants. 
While we have found enough evidence to state that this phenom-
enon is extremely real for the Ukrainian migrants’ community. 
Ukrainian migrants who are highly qualified and have decently 
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paid jobs (and often, also a completely legal status) are not really 
willing to be in any sort of relationship with other Ukrainian 
migrants who have much less favourable life circumstances. Thus, 
some migrants are reluctant to reveal their national identity in 
order to avoid unexpected contacts with other Ukrainians. This 
is also confirmed by A. Portes and J. Sensenbrenner: “Perhaps, 
the most destructive consequence of this negative manifestation 
of social capital is the wedge that it drives between successful 
members of the minority and those left behind” (Portes et al., 
1993, p. 1343).
On the other hand, Ukrainian migrants who are unskilled 
labourers do not feel any discomfort or threat from their relations 
with other Ukrainian migrants since for them this communica-
tion is providing additional resources, but not consuming them 
(this includes emotional and psychological support, exchange 
of useful information, finding ways to deliver remittances to 
Ukraine, getting recommendations for potential employers etc.). 
“Women who do the cleaning are trying to stick together, we are a 
band. That’s right. This is only because we need support and infor-
mation. When I get back to Ukraine, the woman from next door 
in my village will go to Poland to fill in my place. And this is con-
stant, we are trying not to lose employers” (female, 34 years old, 
three years of commuting migration, cleaning) (Rishko-Porcescu, 
2015, p. 139).
Corruption in Ukraine and in European countries.
The informants’ answers concerning corruption in Ukraine and 
in Europe are fully concordant with the results of our qualita-
tive survey. We revealed that mass discourse in Ukraine agrees 
on the widespread corruption in Ukraine. As noted by one of the 
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informants: “I do not know any single sphere which would be 
not infected with corruption” (43135). The informants stated that 
corruption is “everywhere in Ukraine” and they also provided 
more specific examples; namely, they mentioned:
• education, including both schools and universities, and 
especially corruption at the stage of university entry and 
corruption related to various exams and grades (41240; 
41242)
• labour market and corruption related to job search and 
employment, corruption related to well-paid and high-
profile jobs (41242; 41125; 41127)
• healthcare system and, more specifically, bribing doctors 
during the medical services’ provision (42104, 41240, 
42105, 43131, 41242)
• corruption at the level of central and local authorities 
(41117; 41122; 41124)
• law enforcement units and courts (43112; 44121)
Concerning the latter, our informants, in particular, told the 
interviewers that law enforcement units in Ukraine take bribes 
and violate human rights so frequently that it can be considered 
their everyday practice. Many informants are of the opinion that 
there is a huge gap between law enforcement in Ukraine and their 
counterparts in European countries:
“work for the people’s benefit, but not for the benefit of some 
distinguished rich population groups … in Europe police tries 
to fight criminality somehow, they try to catch some specific 
criminals, and in our case criminals can pay off to be left in 
peace … our police can catch some criminal and then just let 
him go” (44121).
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Along with the self-stereotyping we can observe the stereotyp-
ing of imagined Europe. For example, concerning corruption, the 
vast majority of the informants believe in the “zero level, as com-
pared to Ukraine” corruption in Europe, not specifying which 
European countries they actually mean here. According to these 
stereotypes, imagined Europe does not have corruption-related 
problems as such: “If to compare with our actual situation here, 
corruption in Europe is equal to zero. In Ukraine today it is blos-
soming so much, that there are no limits to it” (41116, Zbarazh).
The next group of questions was related to the quality of life, 
social protection and opportunities for financial and professional 
success – in Ukraine and in European countries.
Concerning all these issues the majority of informants are very 
critical and sceptical describing life in their places of residence:
“Mainly ... life isn’t easy here, it is very difficult” (44121, Novo-
vodolazskyi). “In my opinion, we have very poor quality of life, 
because there is lack of everything. The town is small … here 
healthcare is very poor, one might even say that there is nowhere 
to study and to work. There is lack of everything, and we want 
something better” (42109, Znamyanskyi).
The objective indicators of socioeconomic situation, among all 
four studied territories, were the lowest in Zbarazkyi district, and 
some of the informants’ answers fully correspond to the state of 
affairs:
“Quality of life ... quality of life, of course, we have no quality of 
life; because salaries are low ... for example, my salary is enough 
only to pay for gas, for electricity, but it is not enough for the 
phone already” (41121, Zbarazkyi).
While the largest group of informants confirmed that the qual-
ity of life is really low, the second-largest group is formed of those 
214 Migration of  the Ukrainian Population
informants who had no certain answer or who provided rather 
contradictory statements:
“The quality of life is average, I won’t call it high, because people 
have low salaries. Taking into account that we live in a village, 
many people have gardens, they work there all year round, so they 
don’t have to spend money on food” (42204, Znamyanskyi).
Evaluating social support by the governments in Ukraine and 
in Europe (and comparing them), the informants tended to state 
that in Ukraine this sort of support is at a miserable level and can 
only help them to survive physically, while in Europe state finan-
cial support for the poor is high enough, if not to say generous:
“There, maybe, people are socially protected better. Because the 
level of life is higher – and accordingly, social protection level is 
also higher. And at ours it is so low, because life level is miserable, 
that’s it” (41114, Zbarazkyi).
An interesting phenomenon is revealed here (and it is worth 
more in-depth research): a large share of the informants see all 
European countries in a very generalized way, imagining them 
all to be almost socialistic and exaggerating the role of the state 
in the process of overcoming poverty problems: “there people 
are more protected by the state. The state helps its people to have 
at least something and helps in everything” (41118, Zbarazkyi); 
“As far as I know, there pensioners are much better taken care of, 
more than in our state … Their rights are protected, they have 
preferences, they get good pensions” (43143104, Solomyanskyi); 
“Europe means happy, smiling, travelling pensioners, citizens 
are protected by the state … retiring on pension in the European 
Union is a dream, a person worked for the state, and then this 
state, when the person is already free and can rest, will take care 
of him…” (43143135, Solomyanskyi).
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There are also more realistic assessments, but those are also very 
positive in terms of quality of life in Europe as compared to the 
one in Ukraine. Moreover, many informants repeated nearly the 
same statement – that Europe is the benchmark of the socially fair 
system: “I am not saying that in Europe one can be not working 
and still having a beautiful life. Of course, I have such associations 
that one needs to work there, and really hard. Maybe even really 
a lot, and overtime. But for your work you can also get decent 
salary which corresponds to your hard work, so that you can rest, 
you can feed yourself accordingly etc.” (41116, Zbarazkyi).
Comparison of employment opportunities in Ukraine and in 
Europe revealed that the informants mostly think that it is hard 
to find job both in Ukraine and in Europe. However, significant 
differences are noted:
“In Europe … they can find a deserving job with the diploma 
they get. And with our diplomas, I do not know, maybe except 
from a few schools, but I am not sure about it as well, that it is not 
possible to find a good job” (42108, Znamyanskyi).
“Well, I think they should have such governmental programs 
that help a person to find a job if he/she wants, of course. I think 
anyway, the government in Europe takes care about people much 
more” (41240, Zbaraz).
There was also a question on the opportunity to “go up” or 
“achieve the state of welfare” by hard work, and Ukrainian inform-
ants mostly stated that they do not believe in such an opportunity. 
This common answer has correlates with the objective economic 
situation in Ukraine, since in the country overall it is typical to 
work (even to work in several places) and still be poor. Many 
actively working people, despite all their efforts, are not finan-
cially able to purchase durable goods, let alone a car or real estate:
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“We work from 9 to 6 without lunch and still receive the mini-
mum rate – it is not enough … Quality of life, of course, we have 
no quality of life” (41121).
Thus, if a person manages to find a job, that does not automati-
cally mean that he or she will be able to provide for the family: 
“…you can find a job. It’s possible, but again, the salary is low, 
everything is about money. I see people working really hard, hell-
ish hard, I would say, and people work just for 800, 1000–1200 
gryvnias and this is not enough” (42104). “They want too much 
for too low price. They won’t raise the salaries, but we are sup-
posed to meet their crazy demands” (43102). The informants 
often reiterated the same descriptions of the situations in which it 
is impossible to make a living on one salary: “the prices are rising, 
you can only survive, you can’t live” (41122).
At the same time the informants’ imaginations of Europe are 
much more optimistic. One of the most important statements in 
this regard is that in the imagined Europe, rewards for your work 
allow you to improve your quality of life gradually:
“If a person has a good job here, and he works there efficiently, 
can he hope for the improvement of life, of family welfare, some 
kind of progress?” (44121).
“One can count on gradual improvement of life level” (44125).
Such imaginations of Ukrainian informants go really far; we 
even came across the following statements:
“I: So, what makes people go abroad? What are their reasons?
R: Some people want to get rich. They strive for enrichment and 
better living” (43111).
As with many other topics and issues, in the discussions on 
life quality in Europe we reveal the stereotyped perception 
of Europe  – in the imagined Europe there are no differences 
between separate countries. There are a few exceptions though; 
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several people mentioned the difference between “old” and 
“new” EU members:
“If not to speak about Bulgaria, Romania and other recently 
added countries, in general, in the older members of the Euro-
pean Union the level of life is so high that we can only dream 
about it … Bulgaria and Romania even though de jure are in the 
European Union, but de facto they are still very far from the same 
level of life” (43143135, Solomyanskyi).
Apart from the financial dimension, in the eyes of many Ukrain-
ians Europe is the place where one can get valuable experience 
and improve one’s qualifications. Such imaginations add to the 
image of Europe as the place of not only financial enrichment, but 
also the place of certain cultural values and worldviews:
“Well, I agree with that. I think everything they do there might 
be useful in future life. What I know for sure that if a man goes to 
work on construction he can later use it in his own life. I have the 
example that my friend’s father went to work in Russia on con-
struction and when he came from there he built a cottage house 
himself. He got experience, skills and now he knows how to build, 
how to do other things. Now he has almost finished a two-storied 
house” (41244, Zbarazh).
“I encourage people not only to study in Europe but, in general, 
learn something new, be tolerant to the people who, for exam-
ple, have come from other countries and learn a lot of interesting 
things about them” (44101, Novovodolazskyi).
In the informants’ attitude to the topic of human rights pro-
tection, freedom of speech and democracy in Ukraine and in 
European countries we recorded the following peculiarities. The 
majority of informants agreed on the high level of freedom of 
speech in Ukraine. However, significant regional differences can 
be observed in this regard concerning the freedom of speech of 
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the informants themselves, especially when it comes to the issue of 
corruption. People on the West of the country were more eager to 
speak about it (Zbarazkyi district – 153 mentions), while inform-
ants on the East are rather reluctant to communicate on this issue 
(Novovodolazskyi district – 48 mentions). One of the very rare 
mentions of the problems with human rights in Novovodolazskyi 
district was voiced like this:
“Well … there was a situation in our place ... one boy was beaten 
by the police and then they said that he had fallen from stairs 
and had hit himself. And in another place a few men supposedly 
jumped out of the windows. So yes … you do feel frightened and 
scared for your life” (44121).
It is important to note here, though, that the general situa-
tion with freedom of speech, human rights and democracy in 
Ukraine became much more sensitive in the years following 
this gathering of empirical material. As recorded by the UN 
representatives and numerous international NGOs, the politi-
cal conflict of 2013–2014 has led to serious radicalization of 
the society, popularity of many extremist groups and numerous 
human rights violations, primarily in the territories which are 
not under state control today, namely, violations of the Crimean 
Tatars’ rights in Crimea and significant pressure on the Ukrain-
ian-speaking population on the Donbass (areas controlled by 
separatist groups).
The group of questions concerning institutional efficiency and 
political performance in Ukraine and in European countries 
covered the following sectors: education, healthcare and political 
institutions’ functioning. More specifically, Ukrainian inform-
ants tended to explain low quality of education in Ukraine by 
low wages of teachers, by lack of motivation of the latter to do 
their job well:
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“School education is horrible, it is just a fake. Because of the 
lack of financing teachers are not so eager to teach kids properly – 
they teach just for the kids to get their school leaving certificates” 
(44128, Novovodolazskyi).
Regarding the general situation with school education, the 
informants also noted a huge gap between education in cities and 
in villages, stating that the former is much better:
“What is a village school? Even if we compare a village and a dis-
trict school, the latter is at an upper stage. Kharkiv and a village – it 
is just like heaven and earth” (44211, Novovodolazskyi).
They imagine school education in Europe to be of good quality, 
whether they themselves were in Europe or not:
“…education obtained in Europe is more valued than education 
obtained in Ukraine in many educational institutions of Ukraine 
since most of these educational institutions have not reached the 
international level yet” (41130, Zbaraz).
“I don’t know for sure whether education in Europe is better 
than ours and to what extent, but I consider it to be good. They 
don’t come here to study. On the contrary, our students go there” 
(42103, Znamyanskyi).
Several informants mentioned that the advantage of the European 
education system, as opposed to the Ukrainian one, is that it is bet-
ter oriented toward the labour market; getting education is directly 
related to one’s further work:
“People, getting a particular education, know for sure what will 
be required from them. So they try to get employed according to 
the education they got. And at ours, we graduate from an institute 
or a university, have a specific specialty, but very few actually go 
work according to this specialty” (43143104, Solomyanskyi).
At the same time there are also informants who compare educa-
tion in Ukraine and in Europe by means of comparing the skills 
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and talents of Ukrainian and European students, and they mostly 
assess skills and talents of Ukrainian children rather highly:
“You know, I always knew and I know now that our education 
is at a very high level. Especially it was so when I was in school. 
You can ask students of European schools some questions, from 
the same secondary schools as we have here, they do not know 
many things than our children know. I think the education we 
have here is at the good level, it is okay, and our children can com-
pete with European children, because our kids are really smart” 
(41238, Zbaraz).
We can record quite a similar way of thinking regarding the 
state of healthcare in Ukraine and in Europe: “I know that 
medical services should be of high quality in Europe because 
there are social programs there. They also have social insur-
ance, and it pays for advanced medical equipment etc.” (44116, 
Novovodolazskyi).
There is also a popular thought that rich Ukrainians prefer 
European medical services. This is presented as additional proof 
that European healthcare is of high quality:
“All our businessmen, the so-called ‘new Ukrainians’ are treated 
there and they are satisfied. Apparently, their healthcare is much 
better than ours. Though we have good experts, we lack support 
from the government and lack equipment first of all” (42207, 
Znamyanskyi).
There are also mentions of the personal experiences or experi-
ences of friends who travelled in Europe. The medical insurance 
of European countries got positive assessments:
“My cousin lives and works in Germany … so he has told me 
that healthcare is on a higher level, dentists’ service is cheaper 
there … he has his medical insurance included into his work con-
tract” (44118, Novovodolazskyi).
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“The key advantage of healthcare abroad is, of course, insur-
ances. They provide 100% guarantee of high-quality medical ser-
vices provision for population. Because in the opposite case the 
doctor will be legally punished. So he is making sure he is provid-
ing real help, of good quality, and he is trying to cure to the maxi-
mum. Because he will be later responsible for this, even his license 
can be revoked if anything…” (41245, Zbarazkyi).
Concerning the comparison of Ukrainian and European politi-
cians, our qualitative data confirms the results we got in the quan-
titative part of our research. It is important to take into account 
the general political and social situation in the country at the time 
of these interviews. The situation then and mass discourse specifi-
cally was characterized by significant frustration, political apathy 
and citizens distancing themselves from political events; the pro-
test potential was very low. Radicalization of the society obviously 
happened later, and being provoked by a range of events, it ended 
up in the mass protests of late 2013 through early 2014.
Frustration and absolute disappointment can be illustrated, for 
example, by the following statement: “our government cannot 
even repair the roads, so all the rest is out of question as such” 
(42105).
Here we can also observe self-stigmatization and extremely low 
expectations of politicians:
“Our government is wrong, and our people too … Everything 
is wrong here. For the most part it is all about the government. 
Look, people are trying to get their attention, standing near the 
Verkhovna Rada, but they get no response at all. They care about 
their own business in this Rada. They don’t care about anything 
else” (43114).
The informants were also very sceptical answering the question 
whether Ukrainian politicians are doing anything good for the 
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society. This large distance, if not gap, between Ukrainian gen-
eral population and public authorities was previously noted by 
numerous other researchers.
“To be honest, there is a small percentage, maybe five percent of 
probability that the situation will change. This can happen if the 
government of the country, as they say, changes its direction and 
improves social protection. That is, pensions will be increased, 
adequate medical care will be provided. If the whole financial 
situation is improved, there is a small percentage of probability 
that people will get the feeling of success in life then. It is not even 
zero level now, you cannot even feel like a human being” (44106, 
Novovodolazskyi).
Negative assessments of institutional efficiency in Ukraine 
(and high level of corruption in particular) is also observed in 
the informants’ comments on the prospects of starting one’s own 
business in Ukraine as compared to doing the same in Europe:
“Today in our country, starting a business is a very unpredict-
able thing; you are not able to guess what will be next … if some 
magnat wishes, they will tear you into pieces, and it does not mat-
ter how well or how right you were in your business. Plus cor-
ruption of the judiciary system … Today even teenagers already 
understand that here nobody will guarantee you anything … and 
if fiscal authorities do not let your business dream come true in – 
then naturally, we will choose the path of least resistance, we will 
try to leave” (43143135, Solomyanskyi).
There was also a question concerning the potential abolition of 
visa regime by European countries, and in this regard the inform-
ants were very straightforward  – the migration outflow from 
Ukraine will grow significantly and quickly:
“I.: And if, for example, they introduce the visa-free regime?
R.: Then – that’s it!
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I.: People will all go – or maybe…?
R.: Massively. All would be gone, including me” (41245, 
Zbarazkyi).
Therefore, let us conclude this subchapter. The conclusions are 
rather gloomy, since they point to a range of interrelated and seri-
ous socioeconomic, institutional and sociocultural problems:
• Social infrastructure (education and healthcare) is greatly 
below the expectations of the Ukrainian people, whereas 
perceived good education and medical service in Europe 
are the incentives for the Ukrainians to migrate.
• A large majority of the Ukrainians do not trust their polit-
ical representatives whilst the performance of European 
politicians is assessed highly by them.
• Corruption is seen by over 70% as a huge problem for the 
country’s further development and prosperity; in contrast, 
corruption in the EU is imagined to be generally low.
• A majority of the Ukrainians consider their chances to 
achieve success by working hard in Ukraine much lower 
than the chances for the same in Europe.
• Gender equality and freedom of speech are believed to 
be higher in the EU than in Ukraine.
• People in Ukraine do not seem to be well informed 
about actual conditions in Europe.
Imaginations about Europe are rather idealized. We got an 
impression that in the minds of the Ukrainians, imagined Europe 
is some sort of discursive structure, some sort of foretype of “good 
society”, in which everything is “tuned” to the optimal level: state 
guarantees on social protection, perfect work of all institutions 
and an enormous open field for self-realization. As the results of 
the qualitative part of the research show, there is a strong cor-
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relation between such idealized imaginations about Europe and 
the migration intentions. This discursive structure becomes one 
of the pull factors. Elements of mass discourse which add to more 
realistic or negative imaginations of Europe are not widespread 
and not so pronounced.
In this study we recorded the state of mass consciousness of 
Ukrainian population as being rather frustrated, pessimistic and 
even fatal. We can assume that after the political events of autumn 
2013 through winter 2014 and further military developments, 
such sentiments in Ukrainian society are only increasing, and in 
the background of rather unpopular and complicated reforms, 
and considering the potential visa regime abolition with the EU, 
all of the above would lead to significant increase in the migra-
tion outflow from Ukraine, which might be comparable in vol-
ume with that of the middle through the second half of the 1990s.
CHAPTER 4
System Analysis of External Labour 
Migration of Ukrainian Population at 
the Fourth Stage
4.1 Theoretical and methodological fundamentals 
of system analysis of external migration processes
External migration is a complicated phenomenon which is prede-
termined by a wide range of socioeconomic and culture-oriented 
factors. In today’s world the issue of external migration becomes 
especially real due to intensification of multi-sided interactions 
which nearly always disregard state borders and become global. 
Also, due to a range of potential new opportunities and threats 
which arise between the sending countries and the receiving 
countries. Along with this there are also new opportunities to 
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study this phenomenon since we can observe some sort of stand-
ardization of the indicators relevant to external migration and of 
the procedures for accounting them. Statistical data also grows 
in size; thus today there is much more available statistical, demo-
graphic and sociological information on our subject matter.
At the same time we can also observe the growing interest from 
the side of political and managerial circles to the possibilities of 
science-based measuring and forecasting of migration flows. In 
particular, from the administrative viewpoint, there is an ever-
growing demand for detecting and measuring the migration-
related risks and also for the mechanisms regulating migration 
flows, mechanisms which may help integrate and adapt migration 
communities. The multidirectionality of these tasks straight from 
the very beginning renders it impossible to provide clear and 
simple answers within a single discipline; still, problems related 
to external migration traditionally and even today are covered 
mostly by economic research discourse.
This is additionally proved by the intensive development of the 
neoclassical theory of external migration which operates not only 
traditional economic categories of demand and proposition at the 
labour market, dual economies which combine capitalist segment 
and economic of subsistence, and also micro- and macroeco-
nomic push and pull factors, categories and patterns which cover 
institutional and sociocultural factors: key features of migration 
regimes, migration intentions, geographic imaginations about the 
potential countries for migration etc.
The obvious mainstream of the contemporary research on exter-
nal migration is based on the acknowledgment of the narrowness 
of single-discipline approaches and thus, the necessity for inter-
disciplinary integration to be able to take into account the wide 
range of factors that determine the phenomenon of migration. 
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The complexity and multi-aspect nature of external migration 
lead us to the necessity for applying interdisciplinary analytical 
schemes as well as a range of other methods which would catch 
the very essence of this phenomenon in all of its dynamics and 
complexity. The fundamental work in this regard was created by 
Polish sociologist P. Sztompka in his study “Sociology: Analysis of 
Society” (Sztompka, 2002). According to this work, social prac-
tices are being formed by two groups of factors – institutional and 
discursive ones. These two dimensions, which are in the research 
focus of sociological science, are necessary to consider external 
migration from the angle of the micro- and macroeconomic 
dimensions of these former factors’ formation.
Each group of these factors is comparatively autonomous and 
represents (operating the terminology of A. Schutz) “the finite 
province of meaning” – which is a specific, comparatively sepa-
rate field of human experience determined by a logic of its own 
(Schutz, 1962). Thus, the economic field is primarily described 
using the model of homo economicus which considers rational 
buyer, employer, employee, investor, creditor etc., while the 
institutional field follows political and organizational logic. The 
sociocultural field is determined mostly by intangible factors 
which are hard to detect and measure; these are values, norms, 
hierarchies of identities, loyalties and behaviour. At the same 
time all these rather autonomous fields are combined by means 
of an intricate two-sided interrelation, and in this regard exter-
nal migration is just another complex social phenomenon. For 
example, certain institutional changes can cause rapid economic 
growth or, on the other hand, can lead to economic troubles 
at the national level. These troubles, in turn, would change the 
priorities in the value system and thus, the life strategies of the 
general population would also gradually change. On the other 
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hand, the institutional features of any society (its political and 
administrative organization, first of all) as well as the function-
ing of any economy are determined by the priorities and values 
of its political elite – and the population too, by the role of labour 
ethics and the power of its influence on the society, by the most 
common social practices etc.
In today’s research the attention of researchers working with 
human rights and democracy issues in general is primarily 
focused on the institutional side of the problem. The following 
aspects of democracy and human rights in the EU, their most 
common discourse and attitudes toward them in source coun-
tries may influence migration processes: free elections (including 
passive and active political rights necessary for that, like freedom 
of opinion, the right to vote, the right to be elected, the degree of 
freedom of political association); parliamentary democracy; rule 
of law (limited government, division of powers within the state 
system, independent and impartial courts and legal procedures); 
individual rights and freedoms; social, economic and cultural 
rights and freedoms (including free market area and the state 
of social welfare); and recognition of multiculturalism by public 
authorities and by the society at large.
We also suggest to take into account various types of dis-
courses that can influence migration plans and the correspond-
ing behaviour. It is important to focus on macro- and mesolevels 
of these discourses within the emigration environment since 
they influence through the so-called “migration imaginations” 
and “geographical imaginations”, and this sort of influence may 
be positive and/or negative. In the EUMAGINE project the con-
ceptual model hypothesizes that perceptions of human rights 
and democracy manifested through migration and geographi-
cal imaginations probably play the most crucial role in shaping 
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migration intentions. A core assumption of the project is that 
perceptions of human rights and democracy, intentions and deci-
sions are structured by various discourses; that is, they are cultur-
ally and socially embedded.
Therefore, modelling the interrelation of a wide range of factors 
determining external migration include taking into account the rel-
ative autonomy of these “finite domains” in their interrelation too. In 
analytical terms the model here can be presented as a system of push 
and pull factors which become real in comparative autonomous 
Figure 17: Theoretical modelling of the factors determining 
external migration from Ukraine. Source: Author’s own figure.
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fields  – microeconomic, macroeconomic, institutional and socio-
cultural. Below we present the graphical interpretation of this vision, 
which will be further applied in modelling the external migration 
from Ukraine during the fourth wave (see the next subchapter).
Within the system of factors determining external migration, 
just as it is done traditionally, it would be reasonable to differ-
entiate between two types of factors – push and pull factors. The 
former ones mostly determine why people leave their country of 
origin, what exactly does not satisfy a potential migrant in his or 
her own country. While the latter factors determine the vector of 
migration and the specific country chosen by a migrant according 
to his or her knowledge and imaginations. Besides that, in accord-
ance to the theoretical methodological framework of neoinstitu-
tionalism chosen here we divide all these factors into four groups 
(macroeconomic, microeconomic, institutional and social), and 
their mutual interaction is actually determining the migration 
intentions and migration behaviour.
4.2 Statistical model of economic, institutional 
and sociocultural factors of the external labour 
migration from Ukraine
External migration today attracts the attention of the many – general 
public, media and writers, politicians and researchers. Today’s 
Ukrainian society is experiencing the fourth wave of emigration 
which partially has common features with the previous three waves 
but in some aspects it is also unprecedented. First of all, the scale 
of the phenomenon is impressive as such. During the first wave of 
emigration from Ukraine (1880–1914) about 1.5 million people left 
the country; during the second wave (1914–1939) around 200–300 
thousand more people left Ukraine; during the third wave (1939 
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through the end of 1950s) over 300 thousand people moved abroad. 
As of 2015 (and we do not have data on 2016 so far), the fourth 
wave of emigration from Ukraine, according to some estimations, 
already involved over 7 million Ukrainian citizens.
This number may be somewhat misleading since it creates an 
impression of a truly catastrophic depopulation of Ukraine. It is 
important to remember here that the absolute majority of these 
migrants return to the country, sooner or later, sometimes for 
good, sometimes to engage in external migration later again. The 
impressive number of several millions of Ukrainians in this con-
text should be treated as an indicator of a truly contemporary, 
highly dynamic society with its open migration regime and “rub-
bing out” of national borders. Remigration, circular migration, 
multiple citizenship, transnational families – all of these are the 
signs of the twenty-first century society.
As is well noted in this regard by E. Libanova, “it would be 
impossible to determine the real volume of migration transfers in 
Ukraine today. The differences are so big, they are twice as large as 
the average indicator. Thus, it is feasible to concentrate not on the 
absolute numbers as such, but on the structure and trends which 
are much more realistic” (Libanova, 2011, p. 15).
However, the impossibility of exact numerical calculations does 
not mean we cannot analyze the factors which force Ukrainians 
leave their country. This study is the attempt to combine the spe-
cifics of economic theory, statistics and sociology in studying the 
external migration factors for Ukraine on the basis of a wider 
spectrum of macroeconomic, microeconomic and sociological 
data and applying the statistical procedures of correlation, factor 
and regression analysis.
In the research field (primarily the economic one) similar stud-
ies are not numerous but we still can mention the availability 
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of a certain corpus of works in this direction. Thus, Ukrainian 
researcher O. Pasichnyk used factor analysis to study the migra-
tion process as having several stages: the stage of potential migra-
tion, the stage of the immediate migration act, and the stage of 
migration process consequences (Pasichnyk, 2012).
V. Borshchevska applied correlation and regression analysis of 
an econometric model and came to the conclusion that external 
migration from Ukraine was primarily caused by low monthly 
average salary, as compared to other countries, and in time this 
emigration becomes more and more determined by the economic 
development factors (Borshchevska, 2012).
K. Shekhovtseva also applied correlation and regression analysis 
in her study to conclude that two factors influence, most of all: the 
number of Ukrainian emigrants: unemployment rate for the age 
group of 15–70 years old and the state of social protection measures 
(Shekhovtseva, 2013). Yu. Kurunova used regression modelling 
and created an econometric model for the influence on external 
migration of a range of economic factors (GDP per capita, income 
per capita, average monthly salary, indebtedness in salaries, con-
sumer prices index, cost of bank credits in foreign currency, level of 
unemployment, the number of vacancies, the rate of employment 
via the state employment agency etc.) (Kurunova, 2012). All these 
studies contribute to the systemic re-evaluation of the external 
migration phenomenon and help develop the necessary tools for 
monitoring and forecasting the dynamics of emigration.
At the same time there are several gaps in the related research 
field and we are trying here to fill in these gaps. These are, namely: 
1) little attention to institutional and social factors due to over-
concentrated attention on macro- and microeconomic factors of 
emigration only; 2) analysis of the external migration factor for 
the whole period of the fourth wave, starting from the early 1990s 
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till now, without distinguishing it specific phases. Only such an 
uninterrupted study could reveal the dynamics of factors forcing 
the Ukrainians to go abroad during all the years of the country’s 
independence.
This work is based on the theoretical model which covers 
microeconomic, macroeconomic, institutional and sociocultural 
factors of the external migration of the Ukrainian population. 
The socioeconomic factors which determine external migration 
during the fourth wave need to be considered within the general 
socioeconomic context of Ukraine’s development since the early 
years of its independence through now. In this regard, we sug-
gest dividing the whole time period under study into two halves 
which are differentiated by the socioeconomic context of migra-
tion decisions and by the motivation of external migrants.
The first half – from the early 1990s until the start of the new 
millennium – was a period of severe socioeconomic crisis, radi-
cal decrease of life quality, money depreciation and critical indi-
cators of GNP. During this first period, external migration from 
Ukraine was determined primarily by the economic factors: 
many enterprises stopped operating, delays with salary payments 
lasted for many months, the unemployment rate in the country 
was growing month by month. The key motivation of external 
migrants then was “escaping from misery”; going abroad was not 
the enrichment strategy, this was a strategy of survival.
The beginning of the second half of the fourth wave was in 2003. 
This year was the first one to record the growth in gross product. 
Here the process of gradual improvement began, and therefore, 
during this period Ukrainian migrants were driven by completely 
different motives: the desire to increase the family welfare rate, 
the need to settle issues with real estate, the necessity to finance 
education for children etc.
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The whole analyzed period (more specifically, from the first 
quarter of 1992 through the second quarter of 2013) is divided 
into halves according to the dynamics of Ukrainian society’s 
development. Tentatively, we can call the first half the period of 
deep socioeconomic crisis, while the second half is the period of 
stabilization and relative welfare. We assume that during these 
two periods the systems of external migration factors for the 
Ukrainians have changed: during the first half of the fourth wave 
(deep socioeconomic crisis) the most important were the factors 
of macro- and microeconomic nature, while for the second half 
(the period of relative stability and at least minimal welfare) the 
influence of sociocultural and institutional factors grew signifi-
cantly. The dynamics of migration saldo throughout the whole 
fourth wave actually confirms this periodization of ours.
According to the selected theoretical model for further statis-
tical modelling we have chosen the group of factors which are 
presented in Table 6.
The comparative analysis performed, of the average values of 
all factors throughout the whole period, indicates the statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) differences for the following factors: mac-
roeconomic variables (budget deficit, GDP per capita, employ-
ment level, poverty index); microeconomic variables (the average 
monthly pension, the average monthly salary); institutional vari-
ables (the following indices constructed by World bank experts: 
Voice and Accountability index, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism index, Regulatory Quality index, Rule of Law 
index, Control over Corruption index); and sociocultural variables 
(anomic demoralization index, anxiety index, social well-being 
index, the average point in the answers to “To which degree are 
you satisfied with your work?”).
We performed the regression analysis for the dependence 
between migration saldo in Ukraine and each of four groups of 
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Table 6: Indicators and sources of data used in the modelling of 
Ukrainian external migration factors.






Statistical data from 
public institutions 
of Ukraine and 
from international 
organizations: State 
Statistics Service of 




Food products and soft drinks in the general 
structure of Ukrainian households’ spending
Average monthly size of pension
Average monthly salary 
Institutional variables:
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Average point of the answers to the question “To 
what extent are you satisfied with your work?”
Yes-answers to the questions: “Do you plan to go 
abroad for temporary work in the nearest year?”
% of the Ukrainians who answered “I am 
completely happy” on the question about happiness
Average rate in the answers concerning the level 









Source: Author`s own data.
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factors in the period from 1992 till 2002, and the influence on 
migration saldo turned out to be significant for one factor only – 
the average point of satisfaction with work (p < 0.1). However, in 
the period from 2003 till 2013 the influence of such factors as the 
Voice and Accountability index (p < 0.1), Government Effective-
ness index and Control over Corruption index (p < 0,05) were 
also significant.
Further, we have performed the exploratory factor analysis to 
determine which factors influence migration saldo. This was car-
ried out for each period separately by means of the key compo-
nents method and setting the maximum at two forming factors. 
The choice of two factors only is confirmed by the scree test.
The matrix of factor loads for the period 1992–2002 (Table 7) 
shows that two factors explain 68.77% of the whole variation in 
the variable “migration seldom for Ukraine”, and this is quite a 
high indicator of the explanatory power of the model. At this, the 
first factor is more correlated with the rest of the variables than 
the second one.
Factor 1 is closely correlated with the following indicators: Pov-
erty index, Voice and Accountability index, Government Effec-
tiveness index, Control over Corruption index, Social well-being 
index, and the average point on satisfaction with work answers.
Factor 2 is determined by the following indicators: budget 
deficit, unemployment rate, the share of food and soft drinks in 
household spending, and the average monthly pension.
To perform the multiple regression equation further, we select 
the most meaningful variables among the independent ones. 
According to our factor analysis these would be: budget deficit, 
unemployment level, poverty index, the share of food products 
and soft drinks in the general structure of household spending, 
the average monthly pension, Voice and Accountability index, 
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Government Effectiveness index, Control over Corruption index, 
Social well-being index, and finally, the average point in the 
answers concerning satisfaction with work.
The calculated correlation ratio is R = 0.76008663, and this 
means that there is a strong correlation between the selected 
indicators and the migration saldo, the determination coefficient 
R2 = 0.57773169 shows that 57.77% of change in migration saldo 
is explained by the selected above factors. Our conclusions con-
cerning the right choice of factors and correlation and also the 
adequacy of the model built (and of the obtained regression equa-
tion) is also confirmed by Fished-Snedecor distribution criterion 
(p < 0.03179).
Table 7: Matrix of factor loads (1992–2002).
Factor 1 Factor 2
Budget deficit −0.074248 0.910809
Unemployment rate in Ukraine 0.370515 0.859785
Poverty index in Ukraine −0.791954 0.326490
The share of food products and soft drinks in 
the total structure of household spending
−0.102500 0.978898
The average monthly pension 0.230740 −0.922528
Voice and Accountability index −0.801065 0.211504
Government Effectiveness index 0.940492 −0.004137
Control over Corruption index 0.915296 0.130315
Social well-being index 0.891796 0.049519
The average point in the answers to the ques-
tion “To which extent are you satisfied with 
your work?”
0.748246 −0.112219
Expl. Var 6.675087 5.016660
Prp. Totl 0.392652 0.3
Source: Author`s own data.
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It is noteworthy here that, in the regression equation (Table 8) 
only two factors are statistically significant (p < 0.05) – the average 
point in the answers related to work satisfaction and the budget 
deficit (in % of GDP).
The regression equation for the influence of selected indicators 
on migration saldo takes the following form:
(Migration saldo in Ukraine) = 0.581672 * (Average point in the 
answers to the question “To which extent are you satisfied with 
your work?”) + 0,542556 * (budget deficit in % to GDP).
For the period 2003–2013 two factors (see Table 9) explain 
73,82% of the whole dispersion (variation) of the dependent vari-
able (migration saldo). The first factor is more correlated than the 
second one.
For the second half of the fourth wave in Ukrainian migra-
tion (2003–2013) Factor 1 is mostly correlated with the follow-
ing independent variables: GDP per capita, Poverty index, the 
share of food and soft drinks in general household spending, 
Table 8: Regression model parameters (1992–2002).
Beta Std. Err. B Std. Err. t(8) p-level
Intercept −1698.37 617.5295 −2.75027 0.025048
The average 
point in the 




fied with your 
work?”
0.581672 0.230623 554.17 219.7182 2.52218 0.035688
Budget deficit 0.542556 0.230623 16.25 6.9081 2.35257 0.046495
Source: Author`s own data.
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the average pension, the average salary, Voice and Accountabil-
ity index, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
index, Government Effectiveness index, Social anxiety index and 
Social well-being index.
Table 9: Matrix of factor loadings (2003–2013).
Factor 1 Factor 2
Budget deficit −0.354665 −0.773621
GDP per capita −0.915259 −0.347657
Unemployment rate in Ukraine 0.506409 −0.825809
Poverty index in Ukraine 0.960251 −0.078178
Food products and soft drinks share in the total 
structure of Ukrainian household spending
0.974427 0.005811
Average monthly pension −0.867769 −0.472459
Average monthly salary −0.983261 0.085343
Voice and Accountability index −0.881809 0.218262
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terror-
ism index
−0.765230 0.468480
Government Effectiveness index 0.816837 0.508004
Regulatory Quality index 0.179896 0.436508
Rule of Law index −0.537559 0.405754
Control over Corruption index 0.151452 0.917018
Anomic demoralization index −0.066490 −0.005862
Social anxiety index 0.905230 0.119766
Social well-being index −0.913262 0.312473
The average point in the answers to the ques-
tion “To which extent are you satisfied with your 
work?”
−0.337341 0.349087
Expl. Var 8.957714 3.593120
Prp. Totl 0.526924 0.211360
Source: Author`s own data.
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Factor 2 is determined by the following factors: budget deficit, 
unemployment level and Control over Corruption index.
We should note here that for this period no correlation at all 
is observed for the following factors: Regulatory Quality index, 
Rule of Law index, Anomic demoralization index and the average 
point in the answers concerning satisfaction with work.
For further calculations of the multiple equation regression 
we select the most significant independent factors. According 
to the factor analysis above, there would be: budget deficit, GDP 
per capita, unemployment rate, Poverty index, the share of food 
products and soft drinks in the total household spending, the 
average monthly pension, the average monthly salary, Voice and 
Accountability index, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/
Terrorism index, Government Effectiveness index, Control over 
Corruption index, Social anxiety index and Social well-being 
index.
The correlation coefficient R = 0.99994560 confirms strong cor-
relation between the selected factors and migration saldo, while 
the determination coefficient R2 = 0.99989119 shows that 99.98% 
of changes in migration saldo can be explained by these selected 
factors. The conclusion on the right correlation and the adequacy 
of the built model (regression equation obtained) is confirmed by 
the results of Fisher-Snecedor distribution criteria (p < 0.01956).
In the regression equation statistically significant (p < 0.05) are 
the following parameters: Poverty index, GDP per capita, aver-
age monthly pension and Voice and Accountability index. Only 
for two factors (Government Effectiveness index and Social well-
being index) p > 0.05 is insignificant but p < 0.1.
Thus, the regression equation would be as follows:
(Migration saldo in Ukraine) = -0.64972 * (Poverty index) + 
0.21584 * (Government Effectiveness index) + 1.46783 * (GDP 
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per capita) -1.09797 * (average monthly pension) + +0.42528 * 
(Voice and Accountability index) -0.37216 * (Social well-being 
index).
We need to mention here additionally that all these factors 
determine Factor 1.
The regression equation for the newly formed factors’ influence 
on migration saldo (Table 11) would be as follows:
(Migration saldo in Ukraine) = -0.874957 * (Factor 1) + 0.147494* 
(Factor 2), and Factor 1 is the only statistically significant factor 
(р<0.05). The calculated correlation coefficient R = 0.78730470 
means there is a significant correlation between the selected fac-
tors and migration saldo, while the determination coefficient 
Table 10: Regression model parameters (2003–2013).
Beta Std. Err. 
of Beta
B Std. Err. 
of B
T p-level
Intercept −626.530 56.11770 −11.1646 0.056870
Poverty index 
in Ukraine




0.21584 0.033434 32.487 5.03230 6.4556 0.097837








0.42528 0.033201 22.557 1.76096 12.8094 0.049599
Social well-
being index
−0.37216 0.038234 −6.007 0.61709 −9.7339 0.065174
Source: Author`s own data.
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R2 = 0.78730470 shows that 78.73% of change in migration saldo 
is explained by these newly formed factors.
Therefore, we can conclude that the system of factors that deter-
mine the scale of external migration from Ukraine throughout 
the whole fourth wave has been changing. These changes are 
obviously caused by the related socioeconomic, sociocultural 
and institutional changes which took place in Ukraine during the 
period analyzed. These two periods in the post-Soviet develop-
ment of Ukraine (the period of deep crisis – 1991–2002, and the 
period of stabilization and relative welfare – 2003–2013) concern-
ing the migration behaviour factors presumably had the following 
specific features discovered by means of regression analysis. We 
have created two models to describe the impact of external migra-
tion factors for the two periods described above. For the first half 
of the fourth wave the regression equation shows only two sig-
nificant factors – the average point in the answers to the question 
“To which extent are you satisfied with your work” and the budget 
deficit. During the same period of time the key factors of exter-
nal migration were related to the specific features of the labour 
market and labour activity as such; this was also the period of 
long-term delays in salary payments and overall, the period of the 
Table 11: Parameters in the regression model of the newly formed 
factors (2003–2013).
Beta Std. Err. 
of Beta
B Std. Err. 
of B
t p-level
Intercept 6.0375 2.843875 2.12298 0.087175
Factor 1 −0,874957 0.206250 −12.8973 3.040230 −4.24222 0.008152
Factor 2 0,147494 0.206250 2.1741 3.040230 0.71512 0.506527
Source: Author`s own data.
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lowest level of life quality. A significant correlation with budget 
deficit, in our opinion, reveals the sensitivity of the population 
to the problems related to public financing of the social protec-
tion system, infrastructure development and social services for 
population.
For the second half of the fourth wave the key factors deter-
mining external migration were the poverty rate and the institu-
tional factors related to efficient governing, the ability to influence 
political decisions in the country and corruption fighting. It is 
obvious that during this period of time social demand becomes 
more complex, more diversified, and so does people’s vision of life 
quality level. This shift can be described as the move from purely 
materialistic demands (and accordingly, factors of external migra-
tion) to mixed ones (materialistic and also post-materialistic) 
(R. Inglehart et al., 2005).
The data presented by other authors are relevant to our results. 
For example, O. Hodovanska noted: “Research materials provide 
us with the evidence to state that the aims of labour migrants dur-
ing the mid 1990s–early 2000s include excessive savings, up to 
the most vital items, so that to satisfy the family needs back in 
Ukraine, while at the current stage most of the earned money are 
used for satisfaction of the own life necessities, including intangi-
ble ones, which is partially related to getting to know the country 
of work better, its culture and traditions” (Hodovanska, 2010).
The same trend, in the context of more systemic value and soci-
ocultural transformations was emphasized by Zaremba (2014): 
“view on the migrant as a physical labour force is transformed 
under the concept of postmaterialism … today’s Ukrainian 
labour migrant is more often the carrier of highly specific profes-
sional skills, also having certain set of values and life priorities, 
strategies and standpoints which are being formed within the 
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general orientation on ‘searching for the better’ (life, conditions, 
opportunities)”.
Described here, by means of system modelling, dynamics of 
external migration factors at the fourth wave in its publicistic 
discourse is described as being in transition to the fifth wave. 
For example, Shafranosh (2016) put it like this: “the fifth wave of 
Ukrainian emigration will be different from the previous ones in 
its important detail – the portrait of Ukrainian emigrant, since 
today’s Ukrainian is looking for not only higher income and secu-
rity for him/herself and his/her family, but also wishes to integrate 
into the international community, but not to be simply a cheap 
labour”.
Overall, today the term “fifth wave” in relation to external migra-
tion is already used by several authors to describe the dynam-
ics of external migration factors; however, it requires its deeper 
conceptualization, and as of now, we can forecast that in the next 
couple of years this term will quickly get conventional. There are 
also several important factors influencing the volume of exter-
nal migration but not considered in this model. Taking them into 
account would be necessary and appropriate in further research 
on external migration factors in Ukraine. These are, first of all, the 
features of migration regimes in the countries that became the key 
recipients of migration inflows from Ukraine. Adding these indi-
cators of migration regimes to the model of external migration 
factors would require creating the system of related indicators. As 
of today all scientific attempts to measure and quantify the fea-
tures of migration regimes have been rather sketchy: usually only 
two types of migration regimes are mentioned – the one requiring 
a visa and visa-free. A more detailed system of migration regime 
indicators in the future should include the following issues: the 
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rate of visa rejections, visa costs, opportunities for further legal 
employment once a visa is obtained etc.
The forecast on further transformations within the system of 
migration behaviour factors in Ukraine must proceed from the 
current trends among which there are two major ones: the first 
one is related to the crisis phenomena in Ukraine, radical poverty 
and high unemployment rate, depreciation of hryvnya, inflation 
growth and problems related to the military conflict on the Don-
bass; while the second one is directly connected to the expected 
liberalization of the migration regime with the EU countries 
in parallel to complicating migration regime with the Russian 
Federation. Both trends suggest that in the near future external 
migration from Ukraine will only increase.
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External migration in today’s world occurs in unprecedented vol-
umes, and new forms of it are emerging all the time. Growing 
mobility of population, new transport, communication and other 
technological opportunities, liberalization of migration regimes 
and emergence of supranational regional structures have all 
caused the current situation in which opportunities to go abroad 
at nearly any age got the largest ever possible share of population, 
and this becomes the reality for nearly all countries of the world. 
And Ukraine is no exception to these processes.
The country has a rich history of external migration which is 
rather well studied. Two of the four waves in external migration 
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from Ukraine (the first and the fourth) were voluntary, while the 
two remaining waves (the second and the third) were forced ones. 
Historical reconstruction of the key specific features of Ukrain-
ian emigration is experiencing a range of problems, among which 
lack of available data is probably the most serious one. At the 
same time, the current stage in Ukrainian emigration is open for 
research, and an extremely wide range of sources, methods and 
tools for data collection and further analysis is available. How-
ever, we should note there is a certain methodological gap in this 
field since theoretical and methodological achievements of vari-
ous related disciplines are not yet integrated into the system of 
joint research on external migration processes.
Speaking chronologically, the fourth wave of external migration 
from Ukraine started with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Accord-
ing to many researchers, it is still ongoing. However, its qualita-
tive features have been changing all the time, and thus, external 
migration today is very much different from the migration of the 
early 1990s. The socioeconomic factors determining the dynam-
ics of external migration from Ukraine are to be considered in the 
general context of socioeconomic dynamics of Ukrainian society 
development. Within the fourth wave of Ukrainian emigration 
we see at least two periods which are rather different from each 
other in terms of institutional regulation of external migration 
and also in terms of the socioeconomic context of migration deci-
sion-making, migrants’ initial motivations and socioeconomic 
consequences from migration processes.
The first period lasted from the beginning of the 1990s until the 
early 2000s. It was developing on the back of severe economic and 
political crises, both having consequences easily comparable with 
the Great Depression in the USA. Aside from economic crisis, 
this time period was also characterized by a dramatic decrease of 
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the welfare level in the country and nearly absolute depreciation 
of all people’s savings. At the very beginning of the first period of 
the fourth emigration wave, the migration flow consisted mostly 
of the representatives of ethnic minorities which had strong insti-
tutional support for their migration decisions and support on the 
side of informal social networks in the receiving societies. Highly 
qualified professionals followed them, and their leave was a typi-
cal example of the brain drain, that is, the loss of valuable human 
capital by the country of origin.
In the middle of the 1990s emigration attributed new eco-
nomic and social features: this was the time of mass migration 
of people with blue-collar qualifications, rather vulnerable in 
both economic and social senses. Most of them were employed 
illegally in the receiving countries. The specific features of this 
period were:
• Materialistic motivation to emigrate, orientation pri-
marily on the opportunities to earn money and solve the 
financial problems of the families back at home
• Absence or low intensity of communication between the 
migrants and their families left in Ukraine
• Circular migration was hardly possible due to ille-
gal employment (and thus, the related risk of being 
deported) and also due to problems with getting a visa 
again later
• Absence of social and legal protection caused by illegal 
employment; human trafficking was a common practice 
which led to further victimization of Ukrainian emi-
grants. Additional problems with the law were caused 
by minor illegal activities practiced by the migrants, fre-
quent visa regime violations etc.
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• Remittances from Ukrainian labour migrants mostly 
became part of a totally inefficient “economy of subsist-
ence” within the migrants’ households in Ukraine (that 
is, they have been only consumed, disinvested, spent by 
the families on current spending by the principle “to get 
by not to get ahead”)
• Labour emigration is socially perceived as a key prob-
lem, accompanied with alarmism and moral panick-
ing in media; in mass perception external migration is 
envisioned as a negative phenomenon, comparable with 
country’s depopulation and/or severe economic crisis
These rather negative features of the first period in the fourth wave 
of emigration caused the widespread use of the notion “zarobitch-
anyn” in relation to labour migrants which has an absolutely neg-
ative connotation and thus adds to a rather distorted imagine of 
labour emigration from Ukraine.
The second period of the fourth wave of Ukrainian migration 
started in the 2000s, with the start of an economic revival and the 
first indicators of economic growth in the country. The specific 
features of this period in external migration are the following:
• Change in motivation for migration, shift to the mixed 
materialistic-postmaterialistic motivation which was 
mostly explicitly revealed among younger migrants who 
demonstrated such new motives for migration as the 
desire for self-actualization, wishes to get new knowledge, 
skills and impressions, strive for better education etc.
• More attention to non-financial aspects of life in the 
receiving societies, namely, the level of institutions’ effi-
ciency, higher quality of education, better developed 
healthcare and legal support etc.
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• Intensified communication between migrants and their 
families back in Ukraine, and consequently, less destruc-
tive influence on the families previously caused by con-
stant absence of some family members which is not 
compensated by their virtual presence
• Circular migration became more frequent and easy to 
organize, and this also had positive influence on family 
life of many labour migrants.
• Financial expenditures of migrant-dependent house-
holds back in Ukraine were very much re-oriented. 
Previously hypothesized regularity was now confirmed: 
in the periods of economic underdevelopment private 
transfers from abroad are mostly spent on the current 
needs of migrants’ households, while in times of bet-
ter economic environment and observable growth such 
remittances are mostly spent on real estate, vehicle pur-
chases, university education for children, and also as an 
initial capital for starting one’s own business. Similar 
conclusions concerning external migration from Poland 
have been drawn by one of the leading Polish researchers, 
R. Jończу. This author has studied the external transfers 
to migrants’ households in Opole voivodship and noted 
that despite significant growth of transfers (at least 2.15 
billion zlot during 2004, the year of Poland’s entry to the 
EU), they did not contribute to economic value of the 
region in question. Members of migrants’ families spent 
these transfers on everyday spending which was often 
an economic waste, including commodities and services 
which were actually produced outside the native region. 
As a result, assets which could have contributed to the 
economy of the region and stimulate its development, 
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were at least partially returned to places of their origin 
(Jończy, 2000).
• The legal status of many migrants also became much 
better regulated; legal employment and work permits 
became a more common practice; several intergov-
ernmental agreements concerning legal employment 
opportunities for Ukrainian citizens in the selected 
European countries have helped fight human traffick-
ing and criminal victimization of the Ukrainians in the 
receiving societies.
• Gradual integration of Ukrainian migrants into the 
receiving communities, transnational families have 
become quite common
• Gradual deproblemization of external migration presen-
tations in media and mass discourse
Therefore, during these two periods (potentially, the two first 
periods, since this wave is still ongoing) of the fourth wave of 
external migration from Ukraine, significant changes already 
happened in its key features. However, several migration imagi-
nations have remained unchanged throughout the whole period 
under study. For example, our empirical research records positive 
stereotyping of European receiving countries overall. The Ukrain-
ians mostly see Europe in a rather sketchy way – as a homogenous 
well-maintained society with a high quality of all aspects of wel-
fare. Such imaginations absolutely ignore any differences inside 
the EU, including those in levels of life quality, much like the 
social stratification of the receiving societies and complex socio-
economic dynamics of these countries’ development as such. The 
additional discursive unit to that is negative stereotyping of their 
own society in Ukrainian minds, which can be interpreted as a 
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“self-fulfilling prophecy” (Merton, 1968). This, in turn, becomes 
one of the reasons for low efficiency of reforms in the country 
and not very impressive results in the fight against corruption in 
particular.
The political crisis of 2013–2014 and the signing of the Associa-
tion Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, along with further 
liberalization of the migration regime for Ukraine, most probably, 
would lead to another period in the fourth wave of Ukrainian emi-
gration. Today we can already note some of its new features. As 
with any other forecast, speaking about potential further develop-
ment of Ukrainian migration we must keep in mind “the tree of 
opportunities”, the most and the least likely directions in its devel-
opment. Obviously, the most important variable in such forecasts, 
and this applies not only to migration, but also to more general 
forecasts (social dynamics, economic development etc.) would be 
Ukraine’s progress in its Eurointegration intentions. Uncertainty 
of the European Union’s future, foreshown by the Brexit, leads us 
to consider not only moderately optimistic scenarios of further 
events, but also of problematic, pessimistic ones.
Sound and reasonable analysis of the current situation with 
Ukrainian external migration allows us assume that in the near 
future the following its features would strengthen:
• The circular nature of migration: when going abroad 
for work does not mean the human resource is wasted 
for good, and this more stable circular migration would 
allow gradually transforming brain drain into brain gain
• a less dysfunctional social and psychological conse-
quences for migrants’ families due to wider use of com-
munications which help establish at least the virtual 
presence of migrants
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• transnational families would become more common, as 
well as the so-called host families
• gender rebalancing which already started during the early 
years of the fourth wave would become more obvious
• further shift from economic/materialistic migration 
motives to more institutional and sociocultural ones 
(which are mixed materialist/post-materialistic)
• quality changes in the legal status of labour migrants and 
their legal protection, more guarantees for labour rights 
due to large-scale recruiting programs initiated at the 
level of governments and supported by large businesses
There are also reasons to suppose that at the next stage of Ukrainian 
emigration the diaspora’s role would be much less important, for 
new migrants, first of all. There are many reasons for that, includ-
ing: growing individualization of cultural, social and economic lives 
in many countries; fewer discrimination barriers which previously 
used to force migrants to establish communities for support and 
protection from a rather unwelcoming society; rapidly developing 
social segmentation by the lifestyle principle, by values, interests, 
professional specialization (as opposed to previous segmentation 
by language, culture, religion and/or ethnicity).
Despite how optimistic the above may sound, there would also 
be some potential negative trends. Both at home and abroad in the 
near future the Ukrainians would most probably suffer from the 
ongoing precarization. Today’s neoliberal flexibility of the labour 
market would further shift the load of risks and uncertainty from 
employers on employees. And the first “victim” in it would be 
social guarantees and chances for life-long stable employment. 
We need to note here that labour precarization is the unavoidable 
consequence of neoliberal reforms, in any economy, due to lesser 
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influence of the state and retreat from the paternalistic model of 
public administration. This is exactly the vector of the ongoing 
reforms in Ukraine today. Note that the advisor to the Minister 
for Finance of Ukraine is the American economist А. B. Laffer, 
who indeed is the follower of neoliberalism and also the former 
advisor to such well-known politicians as M. H. Thatcher and 
R. W. Reagan. Moreover, Slovak and Polish neoliberal reform-
ers І. Mikloš and L. Balcerowicz are the co-heads of the Group 
of Strategic Advisors supporting reforms in Ukraine; the latter is 
also the President’s representative in the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine. Therefore, we have reasons to state that the Ukrainian 
state today, at least to some extent, is on its way to Reaganomics 
and Thatcherism.
Very similar processes are actually observed in many other 
countries. They totally comply with the interests of the largest 
employers since such policies minimize their economic risks and 
enable a more flexible and timely reaction to changes in the mar-
ket environments, for example, by means of production reorgani-
zation and/or staff cuts. In most cases trade unions are excluded 
from the processes of decision-making (as it is hard to imagine 
the trade union of freelancers, for example).
At the same time, Ukraine has some local features in this regard. 
First of all, precarization contrasts itself with the comparatively 
recent paternalistic past which used to guarantee employment, 
free education and healthcare, state-owned place of residence 
etc. In the Soviet times, loss of a job could have only been initi-
ated by an employee, not an employer. Till now, a large share of 
the Ukrainian population perceives the absence of labour right 
guarantees as a stress factor, as one of the elements of social dep-
rivation. And this is one of the key reasons behind the popular-
ity and significant social influence of rather leftist and populist 
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political groups (which can be called “Ukrainian” only formally). 
Secondly, there are objective reasons to state that the welfare level 
in Ukraine is among the lowest in Europe. The specific feature 
of the Ukrainian economy is the poverty of working population. 
Today, just as during the crisis of the 1990s, having a constant 
place of work does not insure one from poverty. In this context, 
neoliberal reforms accompanied by the ongoing economic crisis 
leads the whole country to the situation when labour precariza-
tion becomes an important push factor.
Therefore, European fears related to migration risks in case 
of visa regime abolition become quite understandable. These 
risks are getting more and more real, considering the combina-
tion of push factors on the Ukrainian side and a range of eco-
nomic, institutional and discursive pull factors on the European 
side. However, a visa-free regime for Ukraine itself can become 
a vital innovative factor which may potentially intensify institu-
tional reforms in the country and attract more Western invest-
ments into the Ukrainian economy. In the longer term, a visa-free 
regime may also influence the political elites (by minimizing their 
authoritarian intentions, still widely popular) and general public 
(by strengthening the right, more objective perception of demo-
cratic models of European governance).
The problem of migration risks as of today is very much under-
studied, in both theoretical and empirical aspects. Therefore, 
today there is no predictive model to measure and assess the 
migration risks which potentially can arise after the introduction 
of a visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens crossing the EU bor-
ders. Until such predictive models are developed, all related dis-
cussions within the administrative, expert and public discourses 
are very much politically biased. Thus, probably the only way to 
forecast the migration risks related to visa-free regime between 
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Ukraine and the EU would be to study the corresponding experi-
ence of the countries with similar experiences. For example, back 
in 2004 Poland became the member of the European Union. As 
noted by R. Jończy and D. Rokita-Poskart, who studied the empir-
ical materials of the Opole voevodship: “Poland’s entry to the EU 
caused significant changes in the employment of the Pols, espe-
cially during the years straight after the EU entry. Then, growth 
in the number of Pols employed abroad was recorded, however, 
already after 2008 the dynamics of this indicator became much 
more stable” (Jończy and Rokita-Poskart, 2014).
Therefore we can predict that in the context of external migra-
tion, a visa-free regime in the short term would, most probably, 
have certain dysfunctional consequences for both sending and 
receiving societies, primarily due to sharp and significant growth 
of illegal employment. At the same time, the long-term potential 
advantages from a visa-free regime concern changes in labour 
migration as such: from being the factor of constant social, eco-
nomic and legal destabilization, it will turn into the factor of 
positive institutional, economic and sociocultural changes at the 
borders of the European Union. In the opposite case, the con-
tinuation for forced ghettoization of Ukraine straight behind “the 
closed doors” would preserve the destabilizing nature of migra-
tion, and most probably, would also have negative impacts on the 
institutional, political, economic and sociocultural dimensions of 
further development of Ukrainian society’s.
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